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Populism played a prominent role in elections held in both Indonesia and Malaysia in 2019 
and 2018 respectively, which showed cross regional similarities in terms of strategies 
employed by populist candidates and elites albeit with different outcomes. This thesis will 
argue that through the use of nativist and religious rhetoric, this brought forth ‘unlikely 
alliances’ of nationalist and Islamist coalition’s, reframing of economic issues in identity 
terms and a counter populism invoking an idea of a pluralist national citizenship in both 
democracies. This in turn can allow populism to hinder the development of democratic values 
and principles through illiberalism, anti-pluralism and democratic decline in terms of 
diminished minority rights. This thesis will propose that populism played a significant part in 
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This thesis will be a critical examination on populist discourse during electoral contestation 
between two Muslim majority democracies: Malaysia and Indonesia. This research will focus 
on populism and compare features of religious mobilization within both countries and the 
differences in their electoral outcome. More specifically, this thesis will investigate how 
populism is shaping electoral politics in both countries and will argue that populist discourse 
has become the new threat to democracy in terms of mobilisation of masses affecting 
socioeconomic, social classes and minority rights, resulting in a shift towards illiberal 
tendencies.  This has now posed an equal threat to democracy in both countries as there is a 
palpable link between illiberalism with a counter-populism of a pluralist national citizenship 
and majoritarianism. 
 
Populism has become a distinct phenomenon operating on different scales in South East Asia 
and globally (DeHanas and Shterin, 2018). Populism is one of the challenges to contemporary 
democracy that has captured increasing academic and media attention in the last two decades 
and many scholars have adopted different analysis on populism. The conversation takes place 
within the context of similar growing concerns of the emergence of identity politics in Malaysia 
and Indonesia during electoral contestation that has resulted in invoking mobilization through 
religious tones being attached to a particular political agenda by elites and prominent political 
actors. South East Asian societies are polarised by socioeconomic inequalities and surges in 
religiosity; therefore, the people are susceptible to being easily mobilized (Vatikiotis, 2019).  
 
In order to explain the variances between these two case studies, it should be asserted religion 
and identity politics provides a fertile basis for populism and can have an array of impacts, 
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some of which may be detrimental to liberal democratic norms. Populism has a myriad of 
definition’s and has been around for as long as democracy. It has a profound effect within states 
that experience historically rooted anxiety as a result of colonialism, invasion or a loss of global 
status. 
 
Both case studies, as this thesis will explore, will affirm that both Malaysia and Indonesia fit 
the above description that populism has been used as an electoral strategy by a combination of 
non-political elites and political party elites during electoral contestation to mobilise and 
generate voter support. By creating an imagined unified nation against ‘corrupt elites’ and 
external enemies, a chosen ‘charismatic leader’ provides the voice for the will of the nation, as 
party of a strategic political plan. This can be fundamentally through illiberal means through 
rejecting diversity of religious and ethnic identity, in which both cases prominently display 
such tendencies. The people have been mobilised by elites to provide a vehicle for mass 
mobilisation of change and therefore believe that their government is not rightfully 
representing their beliefs. 
 
Religious identity is utilised to mobilise as a part of a political strategy, especially during 
periods of electoral contestation, however, there has been little academic interest or 
development in the connection. The use of religious identity raises the issue in how populists 
and the elites interact with voters and how voters react to Islamic leaders and populists. Further 
research is required, particularly in this region, as right-wing populists in Western democracies 
have used religion during recent election campaigns to engage the ‘pure people’ whose moral 
centre have been alleged to be under threat from ‘liberal elites’ (Marouzki, McDonnel and Roy, 
2016). In comparison to South East Asian democracies, there is historical evidence that Islamic 
political actors have always used populism as a vehicle to mobilise the people, and current 
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manifestations draw upon long standing poles and tensions within society i.e. The Bumi-Putera 
Legacy in Malaysia and the Pribumi’s in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2016).  
 
This thesis will contribute to a comparative study of two Muslim majority democracies and 
how they have each used specific populist discourse in similar ways during political 
contestation but have produced different electoral outcomes. This study will examine populist 
strategies in both case studies and assess them according to the research criteria and how they 
have impacted on democracy, and how populism constitutes as a threat. 
 
The thesis will also demonstrate the similarities and differences of populist discourse during 
electoral contestation between Malaysia and Indonesia and how different forms of populism 
(identity politics, religious populism and authoritarian populism) is being used and to what 
extent is constitutes as a threat to democracy through manipulation of people’s voting patterns 
and beliefs through emotion by viewing themselves as saviour’s or protectors of Islam. It is 
important to differentiate that “populism is always a form of identity politics, although not all 
versions of identity politics are populist” (Muller, 2016, 10). 
 
Both elections in 2018 and 2019 have presented that particularly during electoral campaigns is 
when religious populist discourse was utilised to mobilize the masses and became more 
prevalent as compared to previous electoral contestations. There is underdeveloped literature 
pertaining to the populism in the Malaysian case study, and this thesis will show that there is 
an equal threat to democracy in Malaysia and Indonesia, as religious identity overlaps with 




Over the years, there has been growing religiosity in Malaysia and Indonesia, spanning across 
all social classes (Kurlantzick, 2018). This thesis will reveal the new form of emerging 
populism is a unique phenomenon for both Malaysia and Indonesia and it can be asserted that 
certain strands of Islamic populism attempt to incorporate and co-opt this growing religiosity, 
which in itself can pose a threat to democracy as it can feed in to illiberal and authoritarian 
tendencies. 
 
When populism intersects with identity, it creates a fear based on ‘identity’ and reverts the 
people back to their perceived religious roots and sacred values of the nation. When populism 
intersects with ethnic identity, elites and political actors can pivot anger towards those that do 
not fit within the physical standards of ‘the people’. Populism can be utilised by elites to expose 
existing ethno-religious cleavages within society as a result of cultural backlash or economic 
downturn. During extraordinary times ie. Period of intense socio-economic change, elites can 
be pitted against one another. This is mainly because of populism’s ability to adapt to different 
contexts across the ideological spectrum. 
 
Based on the trajectory of both elections, Malaysia’s strong nativist and religious political 
environment (in terms of governmental institutions and multi-cultural and multi-religious 
dynamics) provides fertile ground for an emerging ethnoreligious populism (Azhari and Abdul 
Halim, 2019, 150), as the influence of populist Malay leaders and religious political party 
alliances should not be underestimated particularly during electoral contestations. In Indonesia, 
political elites were able to absorb the emerging radical Islamic conservative currents during 
political campaigns. Nonetheless, the nation does show signs of Islamic groups trying to 




The approach used by Jokowi Widodo; Indonesia’s current President, was able to succeed in 
being re-elected was to strategically co-opt with Islamists and convince voters of his piety, 
whilst in Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammad’s, Malaysia’s former and current Prime Minister, 
successful populism style as a ‘former soft authoritarian’ to the ‘people’s champ’ triumphed 
over the ethno-religious populism style from the Najib/Barisan Nasional government. It was a 
matter of taking back control in favour of the people. With an increase in political 
fragmentation and cultural diversification, Malaysia’s case view’s populist groups developing 
stronger populist tones in the need for stronger Malay unity and draw stricter religious 
boundaries, especially issues pertaining to consolidate the Malay Muslim identity. However, 
to some extent, ethnoreligious populist discourse is unable to gain traction in Malaysia due to 
the strong influence of societal and economic groups. 
 
Both case studies will show that even though populism sets the tone for elections, it does not 
necessarily bring about the outcome the populists and elites both had hoped. Populism may 
appear to be a corrective measure to help in progressing democracies with popular opinion, 
however when manipulated by elites, populism no longer becomes an authentic version of 
democracy. Those who used religion maliciously during the election campaigns failed in 
winning their election.  
 
Both democratising countries are now facing challenges on how to combat with populist 
politics, whereby both governments have embraced rather than minimizing the surge in the 
increasing global wave of populism. We can conclude that populists and elites have used 
religion as a way of forging a new consensus in order to engage ‘the people’ who have lost 
their moral centre, even though majority of citizens lack a sense of strong religiosity (Jenkins 
and Jager, 2019). In Malaysia, this was a case of an incumbency utilising institutionalised 
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religious populism, whilst Indonesia was a case of a contender for power to form a strategic 
alliance with Islamist groups for a similar purpose. 
 
Populist political parties and movements, whether radical right of left, nationalist, authoritarian 
or democratic will always construct an opposition between the people and the elite. In addition, 
populists on the left and right will interpret complex socioeconomic and socio-cultural 
processes as to favour the elite and going up against the interest of the masses (Cleen, Glynos 
and Mondon, 2018, 654). 
 
The next chapter will explore the different debates on populism, what has been examined and 
which trajectory this research will favour on how populism is being used by elites as an 





ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE ON POPULISM 
 
Within the field of political science, the meaning of populism is much debated. There is no 
consensus regarding a definition due to the diversity of different political forces in the 
contemporary global world, as well as the diversity in the political and socioeconomic 
environment in which populism can thrive. Kaltwasser and Mudde (2017, 7) have offered a 
useful definition of populism as “an idea that society is separated into 2 groups at odds with 
another- the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’, and is often combined with a common 
ideology, which can be either left or ring-wing.  
 
This chapter will disentangle different kinds of populism in the contexts in which they emerge 
and identify characteristics of each. There will also be an examination of the different debates 
on populism by notable political scholars such as Laclau, Mudde, Norris, Kaltwasser and 
Mouffe (to name a few). Drawing on these scholars, a number of key features of populism will 
be identified, as well as the regional variations of populist discourse. These will be used as the 
foundation for a comparative framework analysis. 
 
Populism, as this thesis will demonstrate, via a comparison of two South East Asian 
democracies- Malaysia and Indonesia, is defined as a political strategy (Weyland, 2017).  The 
strategy used is to invoke the people against one another and to provide a means for a vehicle 
to mass mobilize – strengthening the bond between leader and followers. The scope of this 
research will argue that populism has been deployed as a form of political strategy used, often 
cynically, by existing political elites to push for a specific rhetoric or narrative on a political 
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platform. This strategy is dependent on how ‘the people’ are being discursively constructed’ 
and the elite in defining who the ‘others’ are.  
 
Bearing this in mind, this thesis does not prescribe a specific definition of populism but 
approaching the concept as a form of ‘strategic approach’ during elections, and in doing so, 
focusing on the role of ethnoreligious populism as a construct of the ‘people’ in Malaysia and 
Indonesia’s political trajectory during their respective elections. 
 
1.1 What is Populism? 
Populism is difficult to define as it varies from nation to nation. It refers to the range of political 
stances that emphasises the idea of ‘the people’ pitted against ‘the elite’. Populism can manifest 
itself into different forms at different time periods (ie. especially during electoral contestation). 
Most recently, populism has impacted the nature of global politics and has sparked interest 
amongst academics and political scholars on how to define and conceptualise the term 
(Verbeek, 2019, 3). But across these debates, the main commonality agreed by all is that 
populism has two core principles: 
1. It claims to speak on behalf of the people. 
2. The people must stand in opposition to an elite establishment that inhibits them from 
choosing their political preferences (Moffit and Bryant, 2019). 
When these two core principles are combined and utilised in different ways with different 
populist parties, leaders and movements, this makes populism an ambiguous term, as its 
manifestation changes accordingly. For example, a left-wing populist’ conception of ‘the elite’ 
and ‘the people’ are defined in terms of socioeconomic grievances whilst right-wing populists’ 




A populist can be regarded as an individual, political party or a social movement (Gagnon et 
al, 2018, 11). These agents are given the term because they adopt a specific style of behaviour, 
ideology or a discursive frame. 
 
1.2 Debates on Populism 
One of the most popular and influential works on populism was by Ernesto Laclau (1979) who 
defined populism as ‘form of politics that seeks to articulate and construct political identities 
and practices within a specific logic’ (Laclau, 1979, 159). His definition of politics was limited 
to racist and nativist ideology of the far right (Featherstone and Karaliotas, 2019, 32), but in 
today’s current political climate, it is evident that the far left, social democrats, centrists and 
every politician can mobilise their own political agendas and respective ideologies. With the 
foundation that ‘the people’ are political actors and the concept of populism as a specific logic 
to articulate ‘the people’, Laclau’s theory has now allowed for more work into populist politics 
from a left-wing perspective. 
 
Jan Werner Muller (2016) argues that populism is characterised as a rejection of pluralism 
(Muller, 2016, 3) and provides an astute political insight that populism is reshaping global 
economic, political and cultural connections between nations. His work investigates: who 
speaks for the people?, Who are the people?, And how does populist identification occur?. He 
does not merely define populism as simply being an opportunity for political leaders to win 
votes through mobilizing and accentuating political incorrect stances. Muller accentuates that 
there is more to populism than simply an opportunistic attempt for politicians to gain voter 
support by accentuating politically incorrect stances. He argues against the fact that populism 
is primarily conducted by ‘political panderers’ (Muller, 2016, 23). 
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What sets Muller’s work apart from other work on populism, is he takes it further by pointing 
out the negative connotation attached to populism in terms of being a threat to democracy. One 
aspect that many political scientists overlook, is the tendency to demobilise followers and 
‘reducing democracy to a spectacle’ (Abromeit, 2017, 183). 
 
Aslanidis (2015) argues that populism can be understood as a discursive frame through a 
collection of linguistic tools, rather than a set of ideas. This closely follows Laclau’s theory of 
populist discourse, whereby diversity is explained by the political demands articulated in 
populist terms. Emotive language is used when expressing populist sentiment, especially when 
populists use words such as “we” and “they” which does not constitute to whether they are 
referring to a homogenous entity or the corrupt elite (Rooduijn, 2011, 1280). There is growing 
inequality with regards to economy that has created an environment in which emotive populist 
discourse finds a receptive audience, which is evident in both case studies. 
 
Kaltwasser and Mudde (2017, 6) defines populism as ‘a thin centred ideology that deems 
society to be divided into two antagonistic groups’. With populist leaders trying to mobilise 
the electorate, the main protagonists of populism are fixated on a political ideology.  In contrast, 
Roth (2017) states that many scholars argue that populism is a pragmatic tool to attract voter 
support, which suggests that forms of populism do not reflect or constitute an ideology, but 
rather political expediency. Mudde’s definition of a thin centred ideology does not take into 
account who the mobilisers are, whilst scholars such as Weyland (2017), Rooduijn (2018) 
clearly state the elites and political actors. 
 
Populism, as this thesis will argue, is compatible with mainstream politics due to the ever 
changing and radical nature and rejection of the current establishment (Jacobson, 2018), as 
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there are politicians who use populist language during their political campaigns such as Tony 
Blair and George Bush (Pearce, 2018). Therefore, if populism is used as a political tool without 
an underlying ideology, then any actor or populist can exploit this, to generate an expectation 
that populists will use populist discourse differently in accordance with their strategic agenda. 
 
In addition, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018) have identified that political parties (using the 
French National Front as an example) and social movements (such as the Tea Party) are 
considered as modes of populist mobilization that are separate from personalistic leadership, 
hence, used a political-strategic approach. They argue that defining populism in this way 
emphasizes more on the leader and that populist forces can exist without charismatic leaders 
(Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018, 1672). 
 
Charismatic leaders have always been populists’ secret weapon, to forward a specific political 
agenda. Pappas argues that that even though charismatic leadership is not considered an 
essential feature of a populist leader, however, during electoral contestation, it was found to be 
an important causal feature for the successes of populist parties and movements (Pappas, 2016, 
386). Thus, this gives leaders greater momentum in the short term, but in the long term, there 
will be difficulties pertaining to the issues of succession as this will disrupt the regularized and 
rigid form of leadership. Even though populist forms of leadership and vertical modes of 
political organisation are indispensable to political action, and can essentially become catalysts 
for political innovation, the problem prevails once these charismatic leaders are in power.  
 
Populist appeal is usually dependent on how populists portray themselves, whether as a 
movement or as a party (Baker, 2019). Populist movements are built on support and being 
visible to their leaders, but often these movements share similar ‘shelf-life’ as these leaders, as 
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personalized leadership only works when they are in command. This becomes a problem when 
transferring authority to new leaders. As a movement, populists will be unable to 
institutionalise themselves and will lose a major part of their appeal as they lack an in-depth 
institutionalized base of support (Kenny, 2019). 
 
Kaltwasser and Mudde (2017, 1673) also argue that electoral support for populist radical right 
parties are usually explained through framing economic anxiety in a cultural framework.  
Rooduijn (2019) affirms this by asserting that when during times of economic hardship, radical 
right voting is considered a favourable option. The electoral strength of populist forces is 
causally related to the extent to politicize issues that have deliberately been ignored by the 
current establishment. Populist forces can assist in increasing electoral responsiveness when 
the elected administration is able to generate policy outcomes because of the significant voting 
by the people. 
 
Rooduijn (2019, 363) affirms that populism should be defined as a set of ideas that concerns 
an antagonistic relationship between the virtuous people and the corrupt elite (people centrism 
vs anti-elitism). There is now a shift from the supply to the demand side of the political 
spectrum with regards to nationalistic exclusionism, which is a core characteristic of populism.  
Roth (2016) claims that the growing number of people have come to see the rights of ‘outsiders’ 
take precedence over their rights which is what political analysts identify as the rise of 
majoritarianism. This undermines the idea of liberal notions of citizenship and notions of social 
pluralism with a broad consensus that forms of populism are in a direct response to and 
rejection of liberal notions of pluralism. Both Malaysian and Indonesian politicians have used 
this in order to gain power and flourish during periods of electoral contestation, especially at 
times when xenophobia, nativism, immigration and racism are on the rise, but the aftermath of 
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both elections proves that it was insufficient to win over the voters, as this similar tactic had 
been deployed successfully with Trump in the US (Chacko and Jayasuriya, 2017). 
 
Many scholars affirm that there remains a lack of empirical work comparing how populist 
discourse is used in relation to specific political issues and policy areas (Pearce, 2018).  Several 
political scholars’ (Weyland, 2017, Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018, Barr, 2018, Boninowski, 
2019) view populism as a political strategy particularly during periods of global economic 
uncertainty or where cultural distinctions are depicted between the people and the elite. In 
addition, Barr (2018) states that to understand the consequence of populist mobilization, the 
identified causal mechanisms should be consistent with the conceptualization of populism. 
When citizens have grown tired of a corrupt elite in power, an opportunistic politician or party 
coalition will be able to take advantage and use anti-establishment appeals, which is a populist 
notion of framing political structures and power.  
 
Scholars such as John Judis (2016), argue that populism flourishes during periods of economic 
downturn and uncertainty, however populism have still surged in countries with low 
unemployment with high economic growth (Judis, 2016). Thus, populism is not merely a 
response to economic oppression. The Pew Research Centre conducted a survey in 2017 that 
showed 15 democratic nations identified ethnocentrism and perceptions of national decline as 
a characteristic of populist voters (Palmer, 2019).  This emphasises that populism is used as a 
strategy rather than being intrinsically bound to an ideological orientation or political 
conditions. 
 
Halikopoulou (2019) states that populism can be used as an umbrella term to cover a broad 
range of political outcomes, from the rise of the radical left and radical right in Europe to the 
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election of Donald Trump in the United States and Brexit in the UK. These cases are in fact 
vastly different, but a similar phenomenon operating on different platforms. 
 
Moffit defines populism as a political style (2018, 9), ‘as a substantive democratic content of 
any political project’. There is a wide disparity in populist actors, ideologies, discourses and 
organizational strategies. On one hand, by defining the concept of populism as a political style, 
the performance of populists has greater resonance especially during electoral contestation and 
will be able to depict performativity and language during campaigns. However, the drawback 
of this approach, is when a populist leader claims to ‘speak for the people’, when it does not 
include all citizens, much like the Malaysian case, where the ‘people’ are comprised of 
heterogeneous ethnicities.  In addition, elites do not attempt to capture an already ‘existing 
cohort of people’ and are able to adopt some elements of populism- but are not considered 
traditional populists (Aslanidis, 2017,280). 
 
Pippa Norris (2019) examines a wide range of data to show that cultural issues have become 
the main factor in voter preferences, especially during times of economic decline and 
deepening of social tensions and the determination of populist candidates willing to go against 
the establishment that are deemed as accountable. Populists would rather emphasise the 
authentic culture of the people in contrast to the corrupt culture of the elite. She affirms that 
there are dangers to authoritarian populism because of a political strategy that inevitably poses 
a threat to liberal democracy through limitations of minority rights.   
 
Norris argues that political parties can be classified under three categories: authoritarian-
libertarian, populist pluralist and left or right- wing economic. The author asserts that the main 
rise of populism in Western Democracies had manifested itself from influential libertarian 
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populist parties and movements. She also views populism as a threat that is able “to undermine 
the legitimacy of democratic checks on executive powers, that will open the door to soft 
authoritarian leaders” (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Her analysis focuses on the attraction of 
parties that offers both populism and authoritarianism, which emerged from cultural backlash 
rather than economic grievances- and will also be used to analyse populism in Asian 
democracies. 
 
When analysing populist discourse, academics, journalists and activists often utilise the terms 
‘populist’ and ‘outsiders’ synonymously.  President Donald Trump, Jeremy Corbyn, President 
Rodrigo Duterte, Hugo Chavez and Bernie Sanders are political figures with a commonality- 
they are all considered as populists (Molloy, 2018). Even though each have differing political 
views and stances, these prominent political figures tend to define themselves as part of the 
people, and often use short, simple slogans and direct language to appeal to the masses (Norris 
and Inglehart, 2019). 
 
Jan Werner Muller describes a characteristic of populists, in addition to being ‘anti-elitist’, 
populists are also considered ‘anti-pluralist’. However, this populist formula does not 
necessarily portray all the people, it merely excludes the ‘enemies of the people’ (Palmer, 
2019). Anti-pluralist politics promotes majoritarian and exclusionary policies with strong 
emphasis on public order and accentuating on rights-based policies (Vatikiotis, 2019). The 
current global situation is an example of the failure of neoliberal projects and permitted fertile 





Nevertheless, the tendency of many politicians to emphasize populist themes have been 
prevalent in numerous political campaigns and electoral contestations (Verbeek and Zaslove, 
2019). It thus cannot explain the current (and past) popularity of populist movements and 
parties. However, it does help us understand the behaviour displayed by various mainstream 
parties that compete with populist parties, which often emulates both the rhetoric and the issues 
of populists, and thus are often ‘accused’ of being populists themselves, particularly by anti-
populists.  
 
Populism becomes a sign of concern when underlying trends feed right-wing party groups and 
would pose a threat to democracy in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, where the norms 
of democracy are weaker, and would therefore be easier to mobilise. The cause of right-wing 
populism is not identical in every democracy, but the common factor is that all have common 
strategies to co-opt an authoritarian sense of governance, often based on nationalistic 
tendencies. 
 
When nationalism is infused with populism, this enables a politics of resentment which turns 
into a battle against the elites as it is a reassertion of dominance over ethnic, cultural and racial 
divides (Moffitt, 2016). Anti-elite claims can become a driving force for ethno-nationalism, 
giving them an air of respectability. The political opposition is framed as a morally corrupt 
enemy of the state, this justifies the extraordinary measures against them, even though they 
require going against democratic norms. The relationship between populism and nationalism, 
is the similar concerns about the conceptual confusion of both terms, as they are not necessarily 
the same even though they do have an affinity to one another (Boninowski et al, 2019, 16). 
A populist leader will often claim to represent the unified ‘will of the people’ and claim they 
will stand in opposition to a common enemy, often embodied in the current political system. 
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Populists appear to be giving a voice to the silent majority, however they tend to polarise public 
debate via a divisive debating style (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2019, 7). 
Matijasevich (2018) states that the possibility that populism will continue to remain as long as 
there is a large cohort of social groups who feel that their needs and aspirations had not been 
taken into consideration within the mainstream political order. If dominant actors and populists 
are able to prove that the elites are unable to meet the demands of these ‘excluded groups’ 
through the logic of difference, then this provides the chance that these excluded demands 
could form a people for the purposes of contesting the dominance and exclusive politics of the 
elite. 
 
1.3 Features of Populism 
Although populism is potentially ambiguous in cultural terms of a political style (Taggart, 
2006, 273), it can exist depending on the conditions set by the institutions or the ideas of 
representative politics, potentially turning into a political force, with a distinct set of ideas. 
Features of populism include being anti-pluralism, anti-elitism and the juxtaposition of a 
virtuous people against an elite. Populism can be negative as it erodes respect for liberal 
institutions, minorities and reason (Kauffman, 2018). Rooduijn argues that populism is not 
compatible with the liberal side of contemporary democracies as it accompanies the danger of 
a ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Rooduijn, 2018). In theory, populism is democratic since it draws 
on the “will of the people”, but in practice becomes a “pseudo-democracy” as it translates into 
a transition towards authoritarianism (Pabst, 2018). 
 
It can be asserted that populism is a product of change, crisis and challenge which may stem 
from a sense of moral decay or as a result of suspicions of the current political state (Baker, 
2019). Some noticeable instances of populist movements have arisen as a result of times of 
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great change such as post-Civil War America and pre-revolutionary Russia (Taggart, 2006, 
275). 
Populism tends to emerge when there is a fervent sense of a crises, whether it is economical or 
in terms of the democratic system, populists will always take advantage to inject this sense of 
urgency and significance of their message. 
  
Populism constitutes as an agency to overlay a particular set of ideas, types of discourses and 
strategy. As the basis for a political movement, populism is able to fuel socio-cultural tensions 
and use differences in race, religion, patriotisms and income inequality, in order to magnify the 
nation’s problems i.e. as a political entrepreneur (Fieschi and Heywood, 2004, 14). 
 
In South East Asia, populism has, to some extent, advanced pro-poor welfare. For example, in 
Indonesia, on the wave of a populist campaigns and the necessity for those seeking election to 
make populist appeals for redistribution (Aspinall, 2013).  This has become a liberal myth that 
policy advance comes from rational/benign policy making from a bureaucratic class. This 
affirms that populism is not inherently ideological, however is explicitly linked to anti-pluralist 
right politics.  Populism has had both positive and negative effects on democracy, but 
noticeable increased the likelihood of democratic erosion due to an absence of bureaucratic 
parties (Kenny, 2019, 60). We can observe similarities across populist movements in Malaysia 
and Indonesia where populist politicians have inherently driven to erode or attempt to exclude 
intermediary institutions e.g. Jokowi’s criminalization of ulama’s (Fachrudin, 2019). 
 
South East Asian cases, such as the Philippines and Indonesia have revealed a ‘three-way 
tension’ between a patronage-based democracy, populism and authoritarian centralism. 
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Populism in this region shares the same core characteristics found in numerous scholarly 
definitions (Muller 2016, Laclau 1979). 
 
De La Torre (2007, 385) argues that with mobilization and participation in mass rallies, these 
social movements does not result in autonomy. Populist tendencies tend to be based on 
authoritarian appropriation of the people’s will. As populist politicians claim to represent the 
people, and that currently their will is not being expressed, populist regimes are able to provide 
rational deliberation, resulting in polarization of political and social cleavages. 
 
1.4 Populism as a Political Strategy 
By approaching populism as a political strategy, this thesis will show populism as a means of 
maintaining or building political power and can be defined as a mechanism of mobilizing 
support (Barr, 2018, 44). These types of mobilization are neither a singular notion or static, so 
an advantage of approaching populism as a political strategy is that it articulates a clearer 
theoretical relationship between defining characteristics and indicators for observers to assess 
(Barr, 2018, 51).  
 
Populism viewed as a political strategy focuses on the vehicle/ agency of populist actors and 
elites, in their ability to mobilise the masses and instrumentally appeal to the followers and 
maintaining a strong relationship between the populist leader and their followers. Populists can 
exploit any existing weakness in their institutions and will selectively target institutions and 
establishments. 
 
Populism as a strategy allows for a comparison to conceptualize the idea and makes possible 
to link up populist leaders/ parties in a more systematic fashion. (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2019, 
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14). It also permits the incorporation of following mainstream parties and their context’s in 
relation to the electoral system and how the political field game is being played. Populism is 
used to obtain or sustain power which thrives on conspiracies or through criminalizing 
opposition. The dynamics of populist politics is that the self-described majority or the people, 
feels threatened by pluralism and multi-culturalism (Galston, 2018).  
 
Graef (2019) asserts that populism as a political strategy is a multi-dimensional phenomenon 
where in some circumstances, populist actors seek to preserve power through a direct and 
unmediated organization and communication style. According to (Graef, 2019, 14), populism 
is regarded as a performance that leaves the public to decide whether ordinary representative/ 
identity politics are democratically disrupted as populists claim. 
 
The drawback of populism as a political strategy is that it is normally too closely tied to the 
political leader, as a top-down party organization structure and mass events (Barr, 2018, 47). 
Another problem with this approach is the role of rhetoric and appeals, where some scholars 
would prefer approaching populism as a style.  
 
1.5 Religious Populism 
With religious populism, more specifically Islamic populism, the Muslim collective 
community of Islamic ummah (Muslim collective) is threated by a significant bourgeois 
(dominance of ethnic Chinese) and that they feel deprived and frustrated by perceived 
injustices, and he argues that an economic grievances lead them to seek religious familiarity, 




Islamic religious populism began during the politicization of Shi’ism following the 1979 
Iranian Revolution (Zuquete, 2017, 449), when Ayatollah Khomeni proclaimed that the 
revolution was a cause for the ‘dispossessed’ against traditional elites in Muslim majority 
societies, through mobilization of the Ummah.  
Populism and religion can be linked together in terms of resemblance, as populist appeals can 
be represented through religious symbols, arguments and metaphors (De La Torre, 2007, 10). 
Populism legitimizing itself through an alliance with religious institutions is often contrasted 
to some religious force or religious group that poses an existential threat to the invoked 
collective and through the mobilizing unitary majoritarian ideas of religion e.g. Islam is Sunni 
Orthodox and not Shia (DeHanas & Shterin, 2018, 182).  
 
Hadiz (2016, 21) defines Islamic populism as a ‘design to attract many voters whose loyalty is 
based on political identity, namely religion and nationalism’. He argues that the rise in Islamic 
populism was a result of Muslim grievances against the neoliberal world that benefits solely 
the political elites and allowing more privileged political position for oligarchy of secular 
national elites. This thesis will extrapolate how elements of Islamic populism were a key factor 
in both case studies and how identity politics has become a threat to democracy being shifted 
towards an authoritarian and conservative rule, for both Malaysia and Indonesia. This thesis 
will argue that where new forms of Islamic populism threaten democracy in both Malaysian 
and Indonesia (in terms of the extent of secularism), it is the country’s inability to manage the 
nation’s economic standing, social failures and political implosions (Hadiz and Khoo, 2011, 
482). The devout and pious may view social problems in religious terms, and elites may use 
this as a strategy to garner voter support, however, this political exertion does not always 




As religion is perceived as an important aspect of a person’s life just like love, appreciation of 
art and spirituality, that by co-opting religion and fusing this with nationalist tendencies, 
populist movements will successfully tap into the transcendental stream of life (Coyne, 2019). 
Depending on the type of religion, “populist mobilizations and their journalistic amplifications 
contribute to a social climate that is increasingly governed by fear” (Palaver, 2019, 24). 
 
1.6 Authoritarian Populism 
This type of populism is defined as a political ideology whose beliefs include cynicism about 
human rights, opposition to immigration and promotion for a strong defence and foreign policy 
(McCarthy, 2019). Recently, there has been a sudden rise in far right, authoritarian populist 
movements, which is reminiscent of Europe during the 1930’s, formerly known as the age of 
authoritarianism (Palmer, 2019). 
 
There are numerous examples of authoritarian populist politicians in the Western World (ie. 
Europe and North America) which include the likes of President Donald Trump, Marine Le 
Pen (France’s Front Nationale), Geert Wilders of the Danish People’s Party in the Netherlands 
(Hattingh, 2019). The past decade has also witnessed authoritarian trends to continue as there 
is no class consciousness that breaks ethnic divide, especially with the Malaysian case (Chin, 
1997). 
 
Whilst most of the politicians have yet to come into power, all these parties and politicians 
share a commonality of themes, which involve Islamophobia and White Supremacy. These 
anti-establishment politics goes no further than blaming immigrants and/or minority groups for 
the problems faced by the nation. They claim to be against the unfairness of free trade but deny 
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the fact that an internal class rule is in fact the core of the economic inequalities faced that 
perpetuates such discontentment experienced by the people (Hattingh, 2019). 
 
The politics and political economy towards authoritarian and populist regimes are clearly 
complex, as many of these regimes came to power on a platform of reversing major elements 
of neoliberal globalization, yet they are often continuing to pursue and deepen neoliberal 
policies in many areas. This turn toward authoritarian and populist politics is directly rooted in 
the failures and successes of neoliberal globalization (Chacko and Jayasuriya, 2017). Starting 
as far back as the 1970s but with prominent acceleration in the 1990s, decades of increasing 
economic and institutional integration “failed to deliver the promised broad-based economic 
growth, producing instead wrenching economic restructuring, deindustrialization, intensified 
competition, and accelerating economic inequality” (Chacko and Jayasuriya, 2017). 
 
1.7 The Rise of Populism and Global Trends 
The rise of populism seeks to capture an array of dissatisfaction and can provide a common 
language and a simple set of explanations for the current political conditions. It has become 
both a product of a collapsed political ideology as well as a vehicle of resurgence in ideology. 
 
Since 2016, populism has been all the rage especially since the year brought forth the Brexit 
Referendum and the election of Donald Trump.  Recent academic studies have shown that 
many citizens view ‘the people’ as being betrayed or exploited by a corrupt elite. (Moffit, 2016, 
138). Cox (2018) argues that the rise of populism was very much a combination of 
globalization and the powerlessness of ordinary citizens faced by the constant global changes 




Populism has also been described as the politics of anger (Mansour, 2017) fuelled by the current 
global economic instability of global markets and how it has had a huge impact on its citizens. 
The notion of populism is often inflationary, which means higher prices with less spending 
power, with the middle income class not being able to catch up with such rising prices, 
inevitably resulting in increased anger and for populist leaders to take advantage to ‘save the 
people’ (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). On a national scale, such inflationary discrepancies can 
instigate trade wars, when countries (with populists in power) start to arrange policies in 
accordance to please the demographic masses. As populism begins to gain traction, more 
people will become uncertain about globalisation’s benefits and inevitably the country will 
have to depend on its own resources and people. 
 
The resurgence in populism in world politics have been often tied to two common sources. It 
is firstly linked with a growing distrust of formal institutions that organize social, economic 
and political power within individual countries (Mansour, 2017). The second, is the 
discontentment of these systems of power that seem preserve and embedded in prevailing class 
structures. More specifically in developing nations, social inequalities can be experienced as 
frustrating by the people who preached progress and the project of modernization. 
 
1.8 Populism and Democracy 
Historically, democracy and populism have always had a ‘complimentary connection’ with one 
another (Roodjuijn, 2018). This connection is established based on the firm and solid roots 
with the people and the significance of the people. The last decade has shown emerging populist 
leaders being able to govern and gain increasing support and many scholars agree that populism 




Populism can take numerous forms, depending on where it lies on the democratic scale (right 
or left politics) of each country and that one commonality is that populism lacks consistency 
and ideological coherence (McCarthy, 2019). Many political figures and regimes, however, do 
share commonality with regards to putting precedence of national self-interest and sovereignty, 
particularly with economic/global interests. Populism does not really explain who constitutes 
as the “national group”, and this lack of clarity is curious. Populists can instigate a populist 
movement by claiming to speak on behalf of ‘the people’ which is often not expressed 
explicitly in radicalised terms. However, some theorists have also argued that populism is also 
able to provide a progressive and democratic outcome, especially with populism’s affective 
and emotional elements to link in a common ‘counterhegemonic struggle’ (Laclau, 1977). This 
shows politicians being able to construct their maverick images to allow them to set themselves 
apart from the political establishment.  
 
In essence, populism is regarded as a tool that is used against the current establishment to 
mobilise a group of supporters to exemplify their agenda onto national scale issues (Ariff, 
2016). Whilst democracy does not deny that populism is an integral part of a governing body, 
it is able to generate mass interest in a politician’s main agenda (Liddiard, 2019). Enyedi and 
Whitefield (2019) states that populists are a powerful, progressive and transitory force who 
have the potential to provide State with moral status that it otherwise lacks. The type of 
populism in both cases made democracy become less pluralistic in political rights, however, 
has a more inclusive effect in social rights. As such, when minority rights are opposing to 





At present, majority of governments described as “populist” are now in power in countries such 
as Poland, Hungary, Mexico and Turkey (Palmer, 2019). These populist governments are 
shown to reject ideas of pluralism (people who are variegated and need to be involved during 
the political process), and liberalism (the idea of people have individual rights and part of the 
state’s power should be limited in order to protect these rights). 
 
When discussing the idea of democracy in today’s current world, it is not merely specific to 
the rule of the people, but of liberal or constitutional democracy. This portrays modern 
democracy as a hybrid nature or dual in nature that influences popular rule with anti-
majoritarian elements (Plattner, 2010).  
 
Boninowski (2019) states that the success of populist parties is varied between countries that 
are shaped by distinct historical trajectories, differences in electoral systems and governance 
institutions. In addition, it relies on the mutual dependency of core dimensions (Graef, 2019). 
 
1.8.1 Debates on Populism As A Threat To Democracy 
Many political scholars that we have examined thus far, would also consider populism as a 
threat to democracy. Populist politics have paved the way for this threat to emerge within the 
political landscape.  Some scholars (Laclau, Moffitt) fear that a rise in right wing populism is 
synonymous with fascism that occurred during the 1930’s. This thesis will argue that even 
though populist mobilization is able to increase democracies representativeness, it can 
undermine governance, where political elites are able to manipulate this populist movement 
towards a specific agenda; and this can be seen in both the Indonesian and Malaysian elections. 
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018) have emphasized that populism is not a direct threat to 
democracy, but a reaction by the people and voters to go up against an unfair and undemocratic 
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elites and liberal institutions (Liddiard, 2019, 2) especially when the people have no alternative 
for certain policies. In addition, Mouffe and Laclau argue that populists play an important role 
to ‘repoliticize politics’, and that those appointed into power should be determined by the 
people.  
 
In contrast, Mouffe (2018) asserts that populism is the only way to save democracy in the form 
of progressive populism through constructing an ‘us’ that is able to articulate resistance against 
the post democratic regression caused by the hegemony of neo-liberalism. This left-wing 
populism will be able to establish a synergy between a variety of social movements and 
progressive political forces. She states that right wing populists proclaim they will be able to 
give back to the people through reclaiming the people’s “voice”. She provides an example of 
the populist movement in Western Europe, where populist leaders are not mobilizing to 
establish a populist regime, rather to deepen and recover democratic institutions (Mouffe, 
2018). 
 
Katz and Mair (2009) argue a significant point that many of the mainstream parties (in the case 
of Malaysia’s BN Party) had spent many years to prevent a real political competition that 
included inhibiting new opposition parties to gain entry into the political field. This has resulted 
in creating new constituencies that are able to make democracy more democratically 
accountable and make valid populist claims. 
 
Jan Werner Muller argues that populism’s illiberal elements do pose a threat to democracy as 
populists in actual fact do not genuinely represent ‘the people’ and this leads to undermining 
of key elements required for democracy such as civil liberties for all citizens, the right to 
express political preferences and guaranteeing an unbiased competition between government 
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and opposition, especially when these populists reject the idea of pluralism and embrace 
cultural exclusion (Liddiard, 2019, 2). This creates a risk that newly established developed 
democracies such as Malaysia and Indonesia could succumb to illiberalism as populist leaders 
gain support. 
 
The emergence of populism into the mainstream is able to empower bureaucrats and non-
political elites into the political scene, mainly because in countries such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia, there is an overlap of pure populists and authoritarian technocrats. This creates 
higher stakes of political competition as such polarized electorates can contribute to increased 
risk in political instability and permanent institutional changes (Liddard, 2019, 10).  
 
Elites can urge governments to seize and maintain power to prevent populists from inhibiting 
their influence and maintaining stability through distinct political strategies. In particular, the 
Malaysian government has always been known to be hostile towards civil society 
organisations, as they are often viewed as potential political threats (Liddard, 2019, 18). 
However, when populism is seen as a less favourable term, populist movements would merely 
act as empty vessels for which to carry the message of the people (or in the case of both 
Malaysia and Indonesia, the elites).  
 
Populist parties can moderate their anti-establishment stances whilst in power, especially if the 
party coalition have had previous political experience. An example is with the case of Malaysia, 
as many of the current political government officials were once prominent members from the 
previous government and are aware of the pitfalls and mistakes of the BN government, and to 




In Indonesia, both Jokowi and Prabowo’s populist strategies had shown significant growth and 
popularity among the Indonesian people, especially during the last two presidential elections. 
With Malaysia, populists have benefitted from the electoral victory in the 2018 election, but 
now provides ample opportunity for UMNO to take up a more populist approach to foster fears 
of the ethnic Malay constituency within the new political environment, and therefore the fate 
of democracy remains uncertain. 
 
According to Metz (2018), the rise of identity populism will make the world more dangerous 
as this type of populism is a political strategy where a leader builds their power on a 
disempowered segment of society. Identity populism is able to come in several variants and is 
amplified to bring forth a greater difference between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, by accentuating on 
differences in ethnicity, culture or religious beliefs. However, identity politics is mainly driven 
by internet fuelled manifestation of malignancies that would be detrimental to progress of 
democracy (Taggart, 2006, 270). 
 
Verbeek and Zaslove (2019) see populism as a threat to stable democracies due to the 
polarizing nature of populist views and the fragmentation of political systems. With the current 
rise in illiberal democracies, there is a continued lack of trust in politicians and thus elites can 
take advantage to shake up party systems. Kaufmann (2018) argues that populisms role is to 
invigorate democracy especially where there are elitist structures in place. Countries such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia have rigid and influential elite structures in place.  The real danger to 
populism is that there is a potential shift to authoritarianism. According to Palmer (2019), in 
order to stop authoritarian populism, it is imperative to stop promoting a mentality of enmity 





This chapter began by summarizing some of the key characteristics of populism, before 
focusing on it as a political strategy. There are defining features of populism which involves 
being both beneficial and a threat to democracy. Populism can be defined as a style, an ideology 
or a strategy, as many political scholars have suggested. 
 
The recent rise of populist politics all around the world accentuates its significant nature and 
how it can occur as a reaction to a deep crisis in diverse, large democracies. Even though, in 
many cases, populism is regarded as right-wing in nature, populism can also be left-wing. 
Whilst many political scientists differ in defining the term, the main commonality is the idea 
that there is a concept of an in group and an out group, or even as two opposing sides of the 
political spectrum. 
 
Populism goes beyond the number of votes received by political actors/ populists. It is rather 
the extent of mainstream political forces are changing as a result of the rise in populism on a 
global scale. The success of populist politics is dependent on the capacity to accomplish both 
shaping public policy and setting a distinct political agenda. The impact on democracy is 
mediated by the role of these political forces and the extent to which they metamorphize to 
influence/ mobilise the masses (Barr, 2018, 54). 
 
The response to such populist movement cannot be lack lustre, and that there is a reason that 
people are disillusioned with ‘an establishment’. Ideally, politicians need to listen to the public, 
hear their concerns and combine it with a compelling vision and inclusiveness with the people 




Several political scientists have argued that it is possible to have a progressive and pro-pluralist 
populism (Galston, 2018, Mouffe 2018). With the Indonesian and Malaysian case studies, we 
can distinguish that this is possible, if elites and political actors are pro-pluralist, and 
nationalism is leftist and social justice based. This thesis will argue that approaching populism 
as a strategy will be able to examine the public’s distrust in core institutions as well as how 







This chapter will explain the types of populist narratives that politicians and elites have used 
when contesting in elections in Indonesia and Malaysia. Chapter 2 aims to explain the impacts 
this will have on democracy in terms of affecting national unity and rights of minorities, its 
link’s with illiberalism with a counter-populism of a pluralist national citizenship. In addition, 
this chapter will describe the inevitability of democratic decline through nativist and religious 
populist discourse, as part of an electoral strategy by elites and political entrepreneurs. These 
are in terms of issues with citizenship rights, minority rights and social cohesion, which this 
thesis will assert that the populist agenda has been one of drawing on ethnoreligious identity. 
 
This thesis will argue that in both case studies, political elites and political entrepreneurs have 
deployed populist strategies, in order to mobilise the masses, seeking to capitalise through the 
polarisation of the current political climate through religious and nativist discourse. These elites 
have attempted to cynically push the working and middles class to support their populist 
agenda’s through a specific type of populist discourse and this has resulted in different electoral 
outcomes. More specifically, religious conservatives are seeking to capture anxieties produced 
by economic uncertainty, and this will be comparatively assessed between two case studies; in 
terms of ‘alliances’ between populist parties with Islamic coalitions to investigate who and why 
these individuals/ groups have instigated this specific type of populist discourse during 
electoral contestation. 
 
Populism, as defined in the previous chapter, will be used as an analytical frame for interpreting 
and analysing the elections in both countries as a form of political strategy. The definition of 
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populism itself does raise questions about who the people are, the type of political parties, 
movements and characteristics of politicians. Populism is not merely reduced to how politicians 
and interest groups use populist strategies but helps to explain the outcome of electoral 
contestation (Werner and Giebler, 2019, 385). When analysing both case studies, there will be 
a focus on populist discourse as an electoral strategy and who, when and how it has been 
produced for mobilisation purposes. 
 
During a situation of political contestation, politicians, political coalitions and social activists 
that define social identity and use it as the basis for mass mobilisation are known as 
“entrepreneurs of identity” (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Populism can reveal concerns of 
threats of democracy and that approaching populism as a strategy will be able to examine the 
public’s distrust in core institutions as well as how elites are able to main political power 
through mass mobilization.  
 
Reactionary, conservative and right-wing groups and interested parties in both case studies 
have used Islam as a means of pursuing political power. This has been done by invoking 
understandings of normative Islamic identity that has been attached to a specific political 
agenda.  Prominent politicians utilised existing far right groups, strategically, through 
channelling their ideas into the mainstream. They utilised Islamic symbols to create an Islamic 
based constituency, that made it easy to mobilise (or influence) Muslims, aimed at 
differentiating between the ‘more pious’ and the ‘less pious’ within the community 
(Prasetyawan, n.d). This can explain how some are observant of Islamic doctrine but reject the 
use of religious doctrine for political purposes. Populists who make use of religion are only 
essentially to the degree that they are anti ‘others’ e.g., Christian is equivalent to merely being 
anti-Muslim (Roth, 2016). 
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Populism can be used as a strategy by politicians (and prominent elites) to disguise themselves 
for their own self-serving political agenda. Hadiz explains that populist discourse can engage 
in the politics of emotion particularly in the deployment of co-opting anomies over material 
conditions and rational self-interests. Islamic populism is used when the people’s word is used 
as an example of the struggles for Muslims interests exclusively (Hadiz, 2016, 21).   
 
By examining specific political strategies executed during each electoral campaign, this thesis 
identifies that there are a menagerie of political actors/ elites and state centred organisations 
role in mobilizing nationalist and religious populist rhetoric. It is still uncertain to what extent 
this change in development pertaining to populism has affected both countries and will be 
worth investigating possible unique populist elements that differ from other democracies (in 
Western democracies). There is a “chameleonic nature” of populism that makes a comparative 
case study research worth pursuing, especially when the current state of democracy for both 
countries’ now remains in a balance (Mikucka-Wojtowicz, 2019). 
 
This thesis will ask how specific notions of the ‘pure people’ vs. ‘the corrupt elite’ have been 
mobilised in both Malaysia and Indonesia during electoral contestation. With South East Asian 
politics, populist leaders are considered “strong outsiders with strong political influences” 
(Kurlanztick, 2018) and have identified their specific ‘target audience/ mass’ in order to gain 
popular voting support. This thesis will argue that both case studies (as many scholars have 
noted) has been an overall shift to the conservative right as both cases were drawn to utilise the 
conservative side of Islam, albeit with different faces. 
 
As previously stated by Boninowski (2019), populism can be employed as a political strategy 
and moulded to suit any political narrative to appeal to the masses. These populists do not 
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necessarily embrace the ideologies they preach but to present themselves in accordance to 
appealing the people. Populism can be manifested under democratic pretensions, and this 
chapter will argue that elites are able to use this to their advantage, particularly at the grass 
roots level in Muslim majority nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia. 
  
In South East Asian politics, there is a different category when defining a ‘true’, ‘morally pure’ 
and homogenous people (ie. Ethnically Chinese, Indian and Indigenous)- and this populist 
discourse will differ when they would instead target religious or ethnic minorities. These 
populists will accentuate ethno-nationalist rhetoric and that these identities should take 
precedence. In Europe, the ‘pure people’ are often defined in ethno-nationalist terms 
(homogenous), whereby right-wing populists, will undermine democratic institutions by 
claiming that the enemy are the immigrants (Poblete, 2015).  
 
The nativist populist discourses commonly articulate a construction of a ‘will of the common 
people’ as a mobilising rationale by which to reform and reconstruct the standing political 
order. This approach is effective when the people deem themselves as ‘oppressed’ and 
‘frustrated’ with the current administration as a result of economic and social disparities, 
increased insecurity and corruption (which is prevalent in both case studies) (Lee, 2019). 
Similar to President Donald Trump’s “Drain The Swamp”1 analogy, this was a means to appeal 
to widespread anger at perceived elite corruption by in way in which peoples agency was via a 
contesting elite with elite interests embedded. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are different kinds of populism and regional 
variations, and context and ideologies. Both Malaysia and Indonesia present similar types of 
 
1 A popular populist phrase used by Donald Trump both during his election campaigns and rallies was an 
effective populist slogan that gained traction amongst voters. Trump's promise to 'drain the swamp' was 




religious populism during electoral contestation, albeit with different outcomes: where those 
that utilised nativist rhetoric in their campaigns lost ie. Prabowo was oppositional and UMNO 
was pro-status quo. 
 
Based on the trajectory of both elections, the strong nativist and religious platform adopted by 
religious conservative groups and political groups (PAS and UMNO) in Malaysia, and Islamist 
groups, Prabowo and Jokowi in Indonesia, provides fertile ground for an emerging 
ethnoreligious populism, specifically relating to the institutionalisation of ethno-religious 
privilege ie. being Malay and Muslim. This builds on an already deeply institutionalised divide, 
thus, the opposition now proposed a counter inclusive form of populism. In contrast, the 
outcome of the Presidential election witnessed Indonesia’s ability to co-opt a brewing 
conservative current that was evident during political campaigns, albeit utilised differently in 
their respective campaigns. However, there is evidence that there are signs recalibration of 
these Islamic groups to try and reconstruct a conservative alliance against the current 
administration (Otto and Sentana, 2019). 
 
Often, the articulation of populist discourse entails an antagonistic construct of an enemy in 
opposition to ‘the people’ that is then mobilised and manipulated as a means of capturing a 
range of societal anomies and dissent and does not arise from the content of ideas (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2019). This thesis will argue that populism and channelling of dissent done by 
populists, can trigger a plethora of different outcomes depending on the political institutions 
and external elements towards the change in politics of the country. When doing a comparative 
study of populist discourse, it is important to note the intended political impact would only be 




It can also be argued that by analysing religious parties from an institutional perspective, it will 
be easier to understand why growing popular piety does not automatically translate into votes 
for religious parties (Hamayotsu, 2017). How this relates with the thesis argument is that elites 
utilising religion as a mobilising tool will be unsuccessful in gaining voter support and electoral 
victory. With weak institutions and fragmented political party structures, this can facilitate a 
pathway to challenge the religious populist rhetoric and a threat to democracy. Another 
argument is that religious worldview does not instigate a populist movement, however, 
economic uncertainty drives people to seek the familiarity of religious ideology (Hadiz, 2016, 
21). This thesis will follow Hadiz’ agreement and relate this to the Malaysian case. 
 
2.1 Malaysian Case Study 
The Malaysian political landscape is unique such that the 2018 General Election became an 
existential battle between ‘political mentor’ Dr Mahathir Mohammad versus his former 
‘mentee’ Najib Razak (Tan and Preece, 2018). This political rivalry was instigated in 2015, 
when the now infamous 1MDB scandal brought forward the verified claims of billions of 
dollars were stolen from the sovereign fund, with some million dollars ending up in Najib’s 
personal bank account (Petersen, 2020). This caused nationwide criticism amongst Malaysians 
and forced Tun Mahathir out of retirement, to re-join the political scene in the form of ‘saviour 
politics’ (Welsh, 2018, 95). Such issues including the 1MDB scandal, increased standards of 
living and the instability of oil prices dominated the minds of many Malaysian’s (Guller, 2019). 
It is important to note that prior to 2018, populism in Malaysia was not evident, however 
Munro-Kuo (1996) claims that populism was purely authoritarian with a combination of 




Mahathir served as Malaysia’s longest serving Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003 and was also 
the oldest serving Prime Minister to date, since regaining Prime Ministership in the 2018 
General Elections (Guller, 2019). As the former leader of the National Front (Barisan Nasional- 
BN), he founded the new Malaysians United Indigenous Party (Parti Pribumi Bersatu 
Malaysia- PPBM) in 2016, which then became a significant component of the fragmented 
political coalition Alliance of Hope (Pakatan Harapan- PH). This new coalition went up against 
the then Prime Minister, Najib Razak’s United Malay’s National Organisation (UMNO) party, 
which had always been a key component in BN for over 60 years (Guller, 2019). 
 
The institutional racism that had been in place since Malaysia gained independence provided 
the foundation for radicalised politics and the mobilisation of nativist sentiment through 
institutionalised populist “bumi-puteraism” (or ethnic Malay). With the electoral victory of the 
Pakatan Harapan (PH) Government during the 14th General Election in 2018, an unforeseen 
factor that had contributed to this victory was the way in which populist language had been 
used throughout the electoral campaigns. It was used to mobilise the people’s discontent and 
fan the fires of anger towards the previous Barisan Nasional (BN) government and the 
corruption that brewed as a result. 
 
A significant feature of PH’s victory was how they were able to neutralise the strong nativist 
rhetoric by the BN government that was strengthened by Malay precedence and conservative 
Islamic morality. PH were able to claim themselves as ‘saviours’ of the people (Welsh, 2018, 
103), especially due to the people were frustrated by the BN’s stronghold in government for 




This thesis will argue that the PH administration government does comprise of ethnoreligious 
nationalist tendencies as most of the candidates within the PH coalition were previously 
prominent BN leaders, and would still maintain a stronghold on precedence on Malay rights 
and protecting Islam. They were able to use an alternate populist discourse as a means to power, 
thus the election became an intense spectacle in determining who the people, the elite and who 
the others were. In addition to their use of ethnoreligious populist rhetoric, the economy was 
also weaponised to secure political power (Guller, 2019). 
 
The election presented the significance that the role of religion played in populist politics, as it 
indirectly created an image of the ‘sacred people’ ie. the Muslim Malays. The Malaysian case 
demonstrates the diverse consequences that occurs because of ethno-religious nationalism. It 
showed that populism was a way to promote a sense of ‘moral politics’ (Gidron and 
Boninowski, 2013). These moral and nationalist elements that were significantly used by the 
PH coalition, which led to electoral success. In addition, by reframing ethnoreligious 
sentiments in economic terms allowed PH to accentuate their moral claims (Shah, 2019, 61). 
 
The Pakatan Harapan Manifesto (or commonly known as ‘Buku Harapan’) was developed and 
was synonymous to the 2008 Great Recession Populist Movement: Occupy Wall Street (Azhari 
and Abdul Halim, 2019). Whilst the Pakatan Harapan administration’s main populist rhetoric 
was criticising the Barisan Nasional government for their corrupt practices in bringing the 
country towards an economic downward spiral, this thesis will argue that PH deployed a 
specific kind of populism that strategically targeted disaffections. The Malaysian people only 
wanted a clean government, where prominent political actors were able to spin a new narrative 
to manipulate the political process. This type of strategic populist discourse was able to work 
at that time, however, post-election BN and UMNO are now instigating religious populist 
40 
 
discourse in a strategic way, thus continuing the manipulation of the Malaysian political 
process. In addition, PH was unable to ignore the ethno-nationalist and religious cleavages that 
is embedded in Malaysian society, which makes garnering political support and mass 
mobilisation more challenging i.e. as a result of the fragmented Malay political landscape. 
 
In addition, this populist discourse was also able to offer a counter populism towards the 
institutionalised Malay supremacy by creating an idea that PH was of a pan racial citizenship 
coupled with ‘pro-people’ and anti-corruption line. The outcome was successful in being able 
to gain power in government, but currently this success has only been short-lived as current 
members of the new government have been involved with corrupt scandals just like their 
UMNO predecessors (Yunus and Armugam, 2020). 
 
The PH manifesto considers the plurality of views and interests within society. With regards to 
a populist, minority interests must be disregarded as they only detract from the overall general 
will of the people (Abdul Halim, 2019). Also, populism considers ‘the people’ as a 
homogenous entity with a unified voice on issues and political notions to cater on the view of 
majority.  
 
Populism has recently emerged and has taken its position within the opposition political parties 
such as UMNO and PAS. This has been achieved by adopting a populist-nativist or 
ethnoreligious narrative through capitalising on their rural support base. This is through 
mobilisation of the people against the ‘immoral’ and ‘liberal’ PH government that is trying to 
undermine Malay rights and are a threat to the sanctity of Islam in the country. This closely 
relates to Western democracies, where the ‘pure people’ constitutes exclusively to the Malays’, 
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and the ‘noncitizens’ are the minority Chinese, Indians and Foreigners are the ‘elite’ who are 
threatening the ‘pure people’. 
 
There is a surge in the combined forces for a Malay nationalist and Islamist agenda. Malaysia’s 
political scene now observes an uneasy (and unlikely) political alliance between UMNO and 
PAS where their strongest supporters are attempting to undermine the current government 
through mass mobilisation, synonymous to Prabowo and his Islamists in Indonesia (Malik and 
Edwards, 2018). On one hand, it can be argued that the PH government is still trying to ‘find 
their feet’ after the historic democratic transition, but on the other hand they feel the need to 
maintain ethnoreligious sentiments in order to stay in power, as they go against their new 
opposition, a new coalition of BN and PAS. This has the potential to lead to authoritarian and 
illiberal measures being implanted towards society that can have a detrimental effect to the 
state of democracy. 
 
2.2 Indonesian Case Study 
With regards to the Indonesian case study, populist elements are aimed at seeking to capture a 
range of grievances from those of the poor to the middle class through a unifying trope of the 
Ummah during electoral contestation. Populism within the Indonesian case study was deeply 
ideological that seeped into religio-ethnic majoritarianism with strong authoritarian and 
conservative undercurrents. This research will demonstrate that this has been orchestrated by 
elites that have used populist discourse precisely to capture and redirect genuine grievances 
over the distribution of resources and power. 
 
The Indonesian case study centres around the presidential campaigns of the incumbent Jokowi 
Widodo and his rival Prabowo Subianto. Both employed different populist strategies during 
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the 2019 Presidential Election. Jokowi presented himself to the people as a promising to 
improve the public service and country’s economy, whilst Prabowo attacked foreign companies 
for taking away Indonesia’s natural resources without compensation (Mietzner, 2017), and 
attacked domestic elites as cronies towards foreign parasites, when, he was very much a 
member of the Indonesian elites. 
 
Aspinall (2015) categorises Prabowo as populist in the way he invoked nationalism, citing the 
poor economy because of the country’s exploitation of foreign powers and condemning corrupt 
political elites and money politics fostered by many politicians. He advocated a return to the 
1945 constitution, with strong emotional appeals, but in political terms. His electoral theatrics 
during his campaign, essentially equated nationalism with military ideas of discipline and 
machismo (Aspinall, 2015, 13). He presented himself as a “political outsider” who was able to 
inculcate strong leadership skills that Indonesia’s current leader lacked. In contrast, Jokowi 
(according to Diani and Tornquist, 2017) was considered as a ‘non elitist mouthpiece’ for the 
people and is considered a populist due to his ability to network and liaise with civil 
organisations outside political parties.  
 
Identity politics was relevant during the Jakarta Gubernatorial election of 2016-17 and 
essentially set the political stage for the 2019 Presidential Election. What was significant about 
this regional election was that it showed the beginnings of a mass mobilisation of a conservative 
turn in Indonesian politicians. Through the mobilisation of identity, Anies Baswedan overtly 
deterred Muslim voters from choosing to re-elect governnor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama 
(commonly known as Ahok) in Jakarta. Despite high approval ratings as governor, Ahok’s 
defeat was primarily attributed to intense religious campaigning from the opposition (Setijadi, 
2017). In 2017, Anies met with Rizieq Shihab, a prominent Islamic figure who chaired the 
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Defender of Islam Front (FPI). This meeting emerged a unified Ummah with a commonality 
to protect the sanctity of Islam. 
 
Ahok, during one of his political campaigns had recited a verse from the Quran that Muslim 
and Non-Muslims should not be allies and should not be manipulated for political gains. This 
caused a backlash with Muslim clerics and leaders who accused him of blasphemy. A few 
weeks later, after his defeat in the election to be re-elected as Jakarta’s governor, he was found 
guilty by the North Jakarta District Court of blasphemy against Islam and was sentences to 2 
years in jail (Setijadi, 2017).  
 
Through the combination of nativism and authoritarianism, the Gubernatorial election showed 
that the political opposition now had a strong appeal towards voters. This mobilisation under 
religious reasons also brought forth a sense of will, to go against the corrupt elites who were 
colluding with Chinese counterparts. In this context, the success in deterring Ahok from 
winning the Gubernatorial elections, allowed the FPI and Prabowo to gain momentum as it was 
the first time, they had been brought forth centre stage in the Indonesian political field (Hara, 
2018). 
 
In summary, populism in Indonesia is similar in the context of pitting the ‘pure people’ against 
the ‘corrupt elite’. However, the variant in this case, is the definition of the people or the 
‘ummah’ and is difficult to be grouped into the 2 main populist frameworks; left or right wing 
populism, as both Jokowi and Prabowo had elements of using conservative religious rhetoric 




Islamic populism has its own specific definition of the people. Vedi Hadiz (2018) viewed the 
rise of Islamic populism as a result of economic (and political) downturn and should be traced 
to their historical and sociological origins of Islamic decline. This thesis will draw upon Hadiz’ 
2018 analysis in examining the populist movements during the Gubernatorial and Presidential 
elections that saw a rise in populist Islamic movements and parties not on the basis aspect of 
Islamic teachings, but from a basis of sociological and political strategy. He views this from a 
larger framework of resisting from Western imperialism (Hara, 2018) and does not reject that 
religious and ethnic influences affected this mobilisation of movement. In addition, to this, 
Hadiz affirms that Islamic populism was able to fill a void of discourse and ideology movement 
that was virtually non-existent during the New Order era. 
 
2.3 Populism as a Threat to Democracy 
Both countries have seen an extended retreat from liberal democratic norms. There are now 
challenges regarding the onward progression of democratic reform. Most concerning, in 
Indonesia, both popular pluralist candidates were no longer confident in running their electoral 
campaigns without a “conservative/Islamic” running mate and that Jokowi was evidently being 
more authoritarian as his government had come to treat law enforcement as a tool for repression 
of the opposition (Power, 2018, 334).  
 
Malaysia, on the other hand, had fears of a re-election of a BN government, and thus retreating 
to authoritarianism. With a new government in power, the people and critics have had a 
renewed hope for a ‘New Malaysia’. In actuality, there is now evidence that there was no real 
regime change and that the core of authoritarian regime has remained (Parameswaran, 2020). 
There was no real substantial change to broaden civil liberties and establish clean, fair 
elections, as now two years on, the PH government has been dismantled due to ‘Muslim 
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majoritarianism’ to now form a ‘backdoor government’ known as Perikatan Nasional (PN) 
(Dobell, 2020). 
 
Indonesia and Malaysia are still able to counteract the effects of populist elements because the 
people are made aware of how populism has the ability of hindering development of democratic 
values and principles (Hara, 2018, 109). This can be done through illiberalism, anti-pluralism 
and democratic decline pertaining to the diminishing of minority rights. 
 
There are many forms of populist movements in both cases. This thesis argues that populism 
poses a threat to national unity and democracy pertaining to minority rights, democratic decline 
through nativist and religious discourse, and illiberal tendencies by successful populist leaders 
that claimed victory during the elections. Even though populism does claim to enforce a united 
front of the people against a common enemy ie. the corrupt elites is merely a facade, as these 
populist movements often polarises societies and creates a cleavage between its citizens. This 
is especially prominent during periods of political movements or campaigns where many 
people gain traction and becomes easily mobilised (Pratamasari and Az Zahra, 2019, 100) 
 
To a certain extent, it can be argued that populism in many parts of the world, can have a 
positive impact on democratic development (Poblete, 2015). Populism will have differing 
outcomes, as this will depend on the variable factors of ‘who the people are’ and ‘who are the 
elite/others’. The commodification of religion within a populist movement has become an 
effective way for mass mobilisation to influence the people (Tan and Preece, 2018). Populism 
will have differing outcomes, as this will depend on the variable factors of ‘who the people 
are’ and ‘who are the elite/others’.  
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There is also an ongoing debate that goes back to pre-independence in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
over the relationship of Islam and the state in Indonesia and the colonial legacy of pribumism 
in Malaysia. It is important to recognize that there is a historical continuity and both case 
studies. It is important to note that Islamic populism does continue to have the potential to 
threaten the democratic development, more so in Malaysia rather than Indonesia, as any use of 
ethnic and religious sentiments are a danger to democracy country’s that are regarded as a 
multicultural and multi-religious (Bonikowski et al, 2019). The Malaysian case shows evidence 
of ethno-religious populism on both sides of the political spectrum. Normally, there is a strong 
prevalence of elements of racism and violation of principle human rights and democracy.  
 
Historical evidence has shown that the use of Islamic symbolism and framing of politics within 
the language of religion during electoral contestation was a way for articulating grievances. It 
was observed as being a powerful tool during both political campaigns to ignite a form of 
ethnoreligious nationalism (Hara, 2018, 108). But in addition to this, both case studies show 
the prominence of powerful and charismatic leaders to further ignite populist politics. In the 
long run, the potential threat of populism cannot be undermined as authoritarian tendencies of 
populist figures in both countries is capable to challenge democracy principles through massive 
populist campaigns and disrupt social relations in society. 
 
Populist appeals have always been inculcated within the core of anti-establishment parties such 
as Pakatan Harapan (Malaysia) and to a lesser extent, Prabowo and the Islamists (Indonesia). 
Arguably, the populist rhetoric that has been adopted by these political entrepreneurs and 
parties does not show any similarities with regards to overall populist discourse in other 
Western European nations. If anything, once a critical point is reached, radical left parties are 
exploited with corruption and perils of economic fluctuation. 
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However, given short term factors such as corruption, increase in political entrepreneurs and 
global uncertainty, it is likely that the degree of populism will increase and threaten their 
democracy. In Malaysia, the role of party leaders in shaping populist rhetoric has become 
increasingly affective in destabilising democracy (Welsh, 2020). Comparative research can be 
conducted to shed light on political determinants of populist discourse and the analysis of this 
thesis will show that electoral manifestos are not immune to party leaders discourse – in 
additional transnational alliances and external events may influence communication strategies.  
 
The real threat to democratic society is the transformation that is inevitable should populist 
movements/ mass mobilisation succeed in establishing a new authoritarian rule to combat the 
“elites”. With authoritarian populist leaders, this can lead to the ability to remove liberty rights 
and sidelining of minority groups such as in Malaysia, where BN have used effective strategies 
to ramp up electoral support with claims that only they can best serve the interest of all races 
in accordance with their predominantly ethnic based parties (Nair, 2007, 341). In both case 
studies, it is palpable that a specific kind of populism that is illiberal and authoritarian in 
orientation, has specifically invoked the people through religious and ethnic identity terms. 
This brings forward the significance of religious identities used in campaigns, especially during 






ANALYSING MALAYSIA’S POPULIST DISCOURSE DURING THE 2018 
GENERAL ELECTION 
 
This chapter will examine the populist discourse during the 14th Malaysian General Election in 
May 2018, that witnessed the transition from a decade’s old authoritarian regime to a populist 
driven administration. It will be argued that the Malaysian case did witness a populist upsurge, 
particularly with its exclusivity and precedence with respect to ethnic and religious terms, and 
that this has been deployed by elites and populist leaders on both sides of the political spectrum. 
Whilst Weiss (2020) does provide ample evidence to accentuate the Malaysian political 
structure is a ‘poor fit for populism (Weiss, 2020, 215), this chapter will show that populism 
was used as an electoral strategy during Malaysia’s 14th General Election, and that elites were 
able to strategically use ethno-religious populism as well as mobilising the masses to oust a 
‘common enemy’ ie. Najib Razak/UMNO cronies from government- to defeat the ‘status quo’.  
  
Malaysia is a country that uniquely demonstrated specific political features that is a worthy 
case study to examine within the context of populism. There is an established sense of 
ethnonationalism promoted by Barisan Nasional (BN) which brings forth the need to use 
conservative reactionary far right Islamic identity. This institutionalised populism provided the 
foundation for radicalised politics to come into the fore, and the mobilisation of nativist 
sentiment. In contrast, Pakatan Harapan (PH) deployed a specific kind of populism that 
strategically targeted disaffections of the endemic corruption and economic grievances and a 
need for clean governance. In addition, BN’s alliance with PAS after GE14 became a contest 
for power to uphold the sanctity of Islam and Malay Rights against the threat of DAP and 
Liberal Muslims within the PH coalition. Whilst Weiss (2020) argues that Malaysian politics 
is not deemed populist (even though affirming that Malaysia does provide conditions for a 
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populist upsurge), it is important to note that elites on both ends of the political spectrum have 
used ethno-religious rhetoric to gain voter support and power. 
 
Kua (1996) states that the function of populism in Malaysia ‘corresponds to an ideology that is 
created to manipulate the populace and to facilitate an introduction of policies against a broad 
class of interests (Kua, 1996, 143). The populist ideology of ‘bumiputraism’2 has justified 
several policies necessary to modernise the Malay community as a whole. 
 
With Islam as the official religion within the Malaysian Constitution3, an Islamic Malay 
identity has always been embedded within Malaysian politics, even though the country 
maintains to be a multicultural society (with an institutionalised hierarchy) (Ibrahim, 2004, 
115). Historically, prominent political parties have always accentuated along racial and 
religious lines, when Malaysia was governed by the same administration, Barisan Nasional 
(BN): a Malay led, multicultural coalition, for over 61 years of uninterrupted, authoritarian rule 
up until the 2018 election (Welsh, 2020). Prior to this, electoral manipulation and 
ethnoreligious politics ensured electoral victory for every election since the country’s 
independence in 1957 (Chin, 2020).  
 
This chapter will be examining populist discourse involving religion and nationalism and will 
examine who have utilised religion during electoral contestation and how they have used this 
 
2 Bumiputraism is the literal definition of “son’s of soil” pertaining to Malay dominant heritage that is 
embedded with the Malaysian constitution. The fundamental view is that a Malaysian citizen categorised as 
being ‘Malay’ will have ‘extra benefits’ and ‘precedence’ in most aspects of daily living ie. purchase of land, 
university quota’s etc.(Magcamit, 2015, p. 22-25). 
3 Constitution of Malaysia expresses Islam as the state official religion. Islam is treated as a special and highly 
precedented religion compared to the other religions. The legal consequence is that Malaysian Constitution 
regulate all issues related to Islam. The Malaysian Government can prohibit religious deviancy, apostate, inter-
religions marriage, etc. Ardiansah, A. (2020). Islam as the State’s Official Religion: A Comparative Study on 
Indonesian and Malaysian Constitutions. p.69. 
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as an electoral strategy. Populism brings controversial issues (e.g. ethnicity, religion, taxation, 
corruption) into the forefront of Malaysian politics (Azhari and Abdul Halim, 2019, 6), and 
begins where populist democratic elements are presented as an ‘antagonist’ representation 
rather than an ideology.  
 
Firstly, Malaysia is a Malay Muslim majority and second, Malaysia is a multicultural nation 
comprising of ethnic Chinese, Indian, Aboriginal Malays and “Others” (Zawawi, 2007). The 
BN government was a government based on race; whereby each component party was 
established to cater to specific communal or ethnic interest. This comprised of UMNO for the 
Malay’s, MCA for the Chinese and MIC for the Indian’s4. UMNO was considered the dominant 
party, as it frequently asserted their superiority and mission in pushing for a Malay nationalist 
agenda. More specifically, according to BN’s definition of ‘the people’, this was an 
incongruent narrative. As the Federal Constitution defines Malay as Muslims, this would 
directly fuse a notion of ethnic and religious identity. BN would utilise executive dominance 
to cultivate their network of influential and well-connected business leaders- both Malay and 
non-Malay- as part of their strong nationalism whilst at the same time, implementing a sense 
of multicultural symbolism. 
 
Malaysia’s regime is characterised as a hybrid political system where even though elections 
are carried out freely since the country’s independence in 1957, it has not necessarily always 
been fair. Governing bodies have utilised authoritarian tendencies such as repressive laws 
(Khoo, 2014, 98) and on numerous occasions, opposition were able to win limited 
 
4 For more than 50 years, Malaysia had an incredibly stable and highly institutionalised political party 
system, first in the form of single-dominant party coalition Barisan Nasional and its component 




parliamentary seats, but systematically hindered from forming a new government 
(Saravanmuttu, 2019, 23). 
 
For almost six decades, Malaysia’s democracy had been contested and would be tainted by 
rigged elections and authoritarianism (Chan, 2018, 110). Electoral contestation was constantly 
being politically manipulated with prominent gerrymandering and limitations on freedom of 
press, particularly before the election, which cemented the incumbent BN government’s power 
and advantage during every electoral contestation (Shah, 2019, 54). 
 
3.1 Before GE14 Election 
During the 1990’s, BN maintained their political power under Mahathir Mohamed’s 
leadership, however the economic crisis of 1997 triggered a political crisis. When Anwar 
Ibrahim (who was then Deputy Prime Minister) began to disagree with Mahathir Muhammad 
on aspects of national economic policies, he was suddenly sacked by Mahathir on charges of 
sodomy and corruption in 1998.  
 
Before Anwar’s detainment, he went on a national tour to rally on the ‘evils’ of Mahathir and 
the need for democratic change and reform, which brought forth a democratic reform 
movement known as “Reformasi” (Abbott, 2009, 176) that was initiated to dislodge BN during 
the upcoming elections. However, the ‘new contender’ in the political field was still in its 
infancy stage, and failed to bring down BN. This maltreatment of Anwar Ibrahim began an 
unprecedented intra- Malay and intra Muslim moral competition between UMNO and their 
Malay critics. Thus, UMNO portrayed Anwar as a traitor based on his alleged sexual 
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penchants5. The opposition coalition was on the verge of collapse after 1999, and when 
Abdullah Badawi became the 4th Prime Minister of Malaysia in 2004, this paved a way for BN 
to emerge with a stronger comeback, under an umbrella of ‘moderate Islam’6. 
 
In 2008, under the Abdullah Badawi administration, there was a prevalence of political and 
economic mismanagement that caused a feeling of dissatisfaction and anti-regime protests 
which only managed to weaken the foundations of BN’s power, yet they were still undefeated 
in the 2008 election. BN was able to maintain power, however after the general election, BN 
lost the two-thirds majority in parliament, against the PR coalition (opposition comprising of 
PKR, DAP and PAS), who began to pose as a threat, but had internal problems that stunted 
their potential7. This is partly due to the PAS party and their exclusivist focus on defending the 
sanctity of Islam and rights of Malay Muslims, taking precedence over the multiracial and 
multireligious coalition partners. At this point in time, both political rivals were seen to be 
promising financial aid and cash handouts (especially the BN government) to entice voters 
(mainly rural voters) (The Straits Times, 2018).  
 
 
5 CHRONOLOGY: The rise, fall and rise of Malaysia's Anwar: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-
anwar/chronology-the-rise-fall-and-rise-of-malaysias-anwar-idUSSP20752520080414. 
6 Abdullah Badawi implemented an Islamic concept known as Islam Hadhari (civilisational Islam) to build a 
nation based on Islamic universal principles and promoting a balanced and comprehensive style of practising 
Islam that would be free from extremism. Such fundamental principles of Islam Hadhari include: faith and 
piety in God, , free and independent people, a vigorous mastery of knowledge, a balanced and comprehensive 
economic development, a good quality of life, protection of the rights of minority groups and women, cultural 
and moral integrity, conservation of the environment and strong defence capabilities (Abdul Hamid, 2010, 
165). 
7 During PAS’ presence within PR, this provided a significant message and their Islamist credentials were 
evident. PAS’ exit from PR in June 2015 was a result of Its president Abdul Hadi Awang was criticised for 
pushing a bill on hudud without consulting his opposition partners. This led to the DAP announcing in March 





Under the ‘soft authoritarian’ leadership of Mahathir Mohamad, who was prime minister of 
Malaysia from 1981 to 20038, the BN government employed populist strategies to cement their 
popularity. This was in the form of an entrenched system of patronage especially amongst rural 
voters in Peninsula Malaysia and Eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak (Shah, 2019, 62). In this 
example, patronage-based system is evident in the increase in the party distribution through a 
network of brokers to mobilise voters. This increase in broker autonomy thus weakens the link 
between patronage parties and voters, and thus makes mobilisation easier for populist leaders 
from both BN and PH. 
 
During the 2008 and 2013 elections, the opposition coalition were able to achieve almost two 
thirds majority, to weaken BN’s hegemony as this was characterised by the increase in the 
people’s sense of power to unite and mobilise, through mobilisation strategies of ‘moral based 
politics’ ie. in the form of the Bersih movement9. 
 
When Anwar Ibrahim joined his political team- he provided a combination of nationalist and 
religious legitimacy that cemented UMNO (BN) as a competitive advantage that cemented 
their power and influence on the political stage. There were numerous attempts by UMNO and 
PAS to prove their strength of faith in the Islamic ‘brotherhood’ that would often overshadow 
the country’s multicultural tokenism. This would also increase the authoritarianism of the BN 
power. Examples include the detention without a fair trial for 106 activists, as well as members 
of the political opposition, under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 198710. 
 
 
8 BBC ASIA. Mahathir Mohamad: The man who dominated Malaysian politics 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44028023. 
9 A civil society movement comprising of 84 NGO’s calling for reform of electoral processes in Malaysia, first 
launched in November 2006 (The Straits Times, August 27th 2015). 
10 Francis Hutchinson (2018: 587-588) provides an extensive summary of BN’s repressive measures. 
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This next stage of political rivalry at this point was precipitated by the mass mobilisation of the 
people for cleaner and fairer elections known as Bersih. The leaders behind the Bersih rallies 
were regarded by the urban Malaysian’s as representing the people through a popular protest 
movement to demand democratic reforms in the country’s electoral system, and this was to 
include the heterogenous components of the Malaysian people. 
 
The Alliance of Hope (Pakatan Harapan) was a coalition constructed in 2015 to target Najib’s 
administration in the next election. The predecessor to PH was a coalition of political parties 
known as Pakatan Rakyat (PR) which had comprised of DAP, PKR and PAS11. Due to 
differences in governance and leadership, PAS decided to leave the coalition and compete in 
elections as a major third political contender. This latest phase of elite contestations, both 
within UMNO and from the opposition, had led to a further valorising of reform politics 
(Saravanmuttu, 2019, 43). Najib consolidated power through thieving from the public in such 
an audacious manner that a coalition was formed to counter this. 
 
The relationship between civil society organisations and opposition during the decade long 
hegemony of BN was often regarded as complementary. Many civil society organisations were 
often regarded as pro-opposition entities, so it was imminent that many civil society leaders 
would join the opposition party and compete to run for office. Many CSO’s have consistently 
tried to avoid any political involvement and would solely focus on social welfare services, 
however, during GE 14, many political activists involved many CSO’s to mobilise the masses, 
particularly through a construct of an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ (Ahmad Farouk, 2011,103). 
 
 
11 Reuters. (2015). ‘Alliance of Hope’: Malaysia’s Opposition Forms United Bloc Against Scandal Hit Najib. South 




Civil society in Malaysia does not fit the theoretical ideal of democratic, grassroots-oriented, 
politically transformative organisations for building social capital and keeping the government 
in line. Too few of them are truly independent, self-financing, and racially and linguistically 
inclusive (Weiss and Saliha, 2003, 43). 
 
Populism was deployed through these CSO’s as a strategy against the status quo of Malay 
supremacy (bumiputra) as a strategy for contesting power by ex UMNO members joining 
PPBM, who eventually joined the PH coalition in 2015. PH now gained party members who 
had established strong political backgrounds (from their political careers in UMNO). Through 
these ‘former UMNO elite members’, PH were able to offer a sense of assurance and continuity 
towards conservative Malay voters that a transition in power would not deter their position in 
ethnoreligious politics. The formation of Bersatu was regarded as an elite split, which in short, 
would suggest an undermined authoritarian rule and thus provides a counterweight with the 
effects of the fragmented opposition ruling (Ostwald, 2018). 
 
3.1.1 The Role of Bersih in People’s Solidarity 
The Bersih rallies were a product of widespread discontent and with the popular protest 
movement that spurred widespread challenge against BN’s hegemonic powers. It is worth to 
note that these extraordinary changes involved years of populist mobilisation (Welsh, 2018). 
The crux of this movement began from the 1998 Reformasi movement, prior to becoming the 
Bersih movement that had been organised since 200712. The growing public dissatisfaction 
combined with the weak political environment allowed for opposition parties and Civil Society 
Organisation’s to advance their political agendas and demands (Khoo, 2019).  
 
12 Bersih Reformasi became a real movement, when social media became a potent vehicle to mobilise 
Malaysian’s within every social class- Lim (2016). Sweeping the Unclean: Social Media and the Bersih Electoral 
Reform Movement in Malaysia. P.16. 
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Due to the rampant and pervasive political corruption, the Bersih Movement was formed as a 
‘counter effect’, where it first emerged from civil society members and leaders who originated 
from various opposition political parties and non-governmental organisations. The movement 
eventually morphed itself into a populist phenomenon to champion a monumental democratic 
change against the status quo.  By 2010, the movement had now become a myriad of coalitions 
(PKR, DAP & PAS) that revamped as a national movement for clean and fair elections, now 
known as Bersih 2.0 (Lim, 2016, 17). 
 
In 2016, the Bersih demonstrations showed thousands of Malaysians from different ethnicities 
coming together to demand for cleaner and fairer elections to “Stand United For A New 
Malaysia” (Selvanathan et al, 2019, 226.) The rally cry for a change in demanding electoral 
reform was somewhat answered on May 8th  2018, and continues to reshape Malaysian politics 
and state of democracy. 
 
Bersih 2.0 became a coalition of like-minded civil society organisations with its main goal to 
campaign for clean and fair elections in Malaysia13, where the movement was now endorsed 
by almost 92 NGO’s that served a variety of human rights causes, youth empowerment groups, 
progressive religious groups etc that were able to act as a driving force to carry out daily tasks 
such as voter registration, election observations and social media campaigns where peaceful 
protests gathered in front of the iconic Petronas Twin Towers in the city centre (Menon and 
Latiff, 2016).  
 
 
13 Bersih 2.0 raised concerns about the re-delineation of constituencies which was done in haste in favour of 
the ruling government, highlighted problems with the overseas postal voting system, publicized vote buying by 





As PH was established in a ‘populist way’, through a fragmented coalition of differing 
ideological and political visions, populist leaders were able to articulate a strong populist 
demand towards a common enemy i.e. Najib and UMNO. The success of populism through 
Bersih, the idea of the ‘rakyat’ (people) and a re-birth of Reformasi were orchestrated by 
political elites including Mahathir Muhammad, Ambiga, Anwar Ibrahim (who began 
Reformasi from its inception) and Lim Kit Siang14, to become the signifier for Malaysia’s battle 
against BN on a vehicle of nationalist mobilisation against the status quo. There was evident 
grassroots mobilisation during the days leading up to the 2018 election by Malaysians who 
were exercising their constitutional right to vote in the election. From the onset of the election, 
there was evidence of potential tainting of undemocratic practices that inhibited voter turnout 
and faith in elections (Chan, 2018, 113). Many criticised the unfairness in calling elections in 
such a short time frame, with only 11 days to formally campaign as well as holding polling day 
during a workday, which made it difficult for voters both who were overseas and out of state15. 
Bersih movement not only mobilised people to protest on the streets; it had also educated the 
public, both urban and rural Malaysians about mass corruption and increasing the awareness 
of democratic principles, accentuating the importance of exercising the right to vote. The 
election outcome had legitimised PH’s hopes for reforms and implementing measures to 
counter corruption and created a sense of moral politics. 
Many initiatives were undertaken to combat these challenges, especially through online social 
media platforms, and whilst these actions were not specifically linked by the Bersih movement 
itself, it did carry the populist spirit and mission, through creating a sense of empowerment for 
people to vote and to be involved in the political process. This proved successful when it was 
 
14 Khoo, Y.H. (2013). What About Bersih?. New Mandela. https://www.newmandala.org/what-about-bersih. 




announced that PH had won 113 out of 222 seats in parliament16, securing the two-thirds 
majority to create a government. 
The main goals of the numerous Bersih movements from 2008 to 2015, were orchestrated by 
several opposition leaders of the PR coalition that were able to contribute and inculcate the 
populist appeal to defend and protect the interest of the ‘rakyat’ (the citizens/ people) against 
the ‘elites’ of the BN government, especially after the 2008 election. In traditional fashion, BN 
responded through initiations of superficial reforms such as repealing the ISA. Another 
example of moral politics that is relevant to the populist movement was that BN sought to 
discredit one of the primary leaders of the Bersih rally’s Ambiga Sreenevasan, specifically due 
to her support to the LBGTQ community in Malaysia. Over the years, Bersih’s public 
demonstrations were considered successful in their attempt to enhance support for the growing 
PR coalition to the extent that in 2013, BN was very closely defeated from retaining power in 
government (Shah, 2019, 59). 
 
A diverse parade of prodemocracy reformists in Malaysia had to align themselves with political 
conservatists such as the late Nik Aziz (then President of PAS), in their attempt to oust the 
current BN administration at that time (Lim, 2016). Such strategic alliances between the 
fragment of coalitions and civil society were able to weaken the incumbents in 2008 and 2013. 
However, were unable to succeed in their attempt on both occasions due to the structural 
obstacles that BN implemented especially in rural areas of East and West Malaysia, through 
their use of repressive laws and the extensive networks of political patronage and 
gerrymandering through the delineation of electoral boundaries (News Straits Times, 2018). 
 
 




Many factors played a role in creating a new Malaysia, however the populist nature of Bersih 
created a massive impact on the outcome of the election. Bersih’s populist mobilisation 
continues to speak out against electoral malpractices of the new government, especially during 
the recent by- elections (Wong and Ooi, 2018, 665). The role of a social movement such as 
Bersih ensured that democratic processes were being upheld. The electoral processes had led 
to the creation of a new government, thus Bersih’s populist push will continue to play an 
important role in future Malaysian elections.  
 
3.1.2 1MDB SCANDAL 
In 2013, the BN government was plagued with the global corruption scandal of 1MDB. It was 
a state created sovereign wealth fund by then Prime Minister Najib Razak, however the mired 
scandal unleashed high levels of discontentment from the Malaysian public. In order to steer 
away from the public’s discontentment from the scandal, BN strengthened their political stance 
through the manipulation of Malay nationalist sentiments and Islamic rhetoric (including 
competing against the Islamic political party PAS). BN decided to implement authoritarian 
measures such as the Anti-Fake News Act a month before General Election, as well as 
exploiting government agencies to further complicate the political circumstances of General 
Election (Nadzri, 2018,154). 
 
Established in 2009 by the then Finance Minister (who was also Prime Minister Malaysia, 
Najib Razak), 1Malaysia Development Berhad (or 1MDB) was a private corporation that was 
originally a state sovereign invested fund, that was then converted into a federal entity. Initially, 
1MDB was assigned the role to become a strategic investment company in driving sustainable 
economic development to promote FDI and forge strategic global partnerships with its main 
sectors invested in were real estate and infrastructure development.  
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The company instantly became a global controversial phenomenon issue when its financial 
records surfaced to the public which was quickly followed by numerous allegations of 
embezzling, corruption and financial abuse17. Immediately there was a backlash from the 
public when there was a lack of transparency and consistency in information provided as a 
response to these allegations (Petersen, 2020). 
 
During the 14th General Election, the 1MDB scandal automatically became a political liability 
as critics and political opponents linked the financial woes of 1MDB to the rampant corruption 
and fraud under the political leadership of Najib and the BN political elites.  The PH coalition 
were able to use this scandal as to their advantage to mobilise the people under moral-based 
populist battle against their political rival’s (Shah, 2019, 61). 
 
PH’s populist rhetoric was evident in their characterisation of UMNO-BN, especially Najib 
was described as an ‘out of touch elite’18 that was allegedly embezzling and stealing money 
from the hard-working people. PH’s successfully used the 1MDB scandal to strike a chord 
amongst voters, even though BN used various tactics such as passing restrictive legislation 
against the media to squash the integrity of their opposition (Shah, 2019, 59). The Malaysian 
case witnessed competing populist strategies that invoked both identity and nativism on both 
 
17 Petersen, H. (2020). 1MDB Scandal Explained: A Tale Of Malaysia's Missing Billions. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/25/1mdb-scandal-explained-a-tale-of-malaysias-missing-
billions. 
18  It can be asserted that Najib and his counterparts constant denying of the 1MDB scandal showed how ‘out 
of touch with reality’ he was experiencing. Outside of Malaysia, the new of the case became international 
news and became the biggest corruption scandal in history and shaped their credibility in how Najib and his 
allies conducted business. Another reason as to why Najib denied any wrongdoing and calls the prosecutions a 
political attack on him, was he felt that as both his father and uncle have held the position of Prime Minister 




sides of the political spectrum, as the 1MDB case showed that it was the biggest corruption 
case in world history, and it was easy for PH to capitalise politically on this. 
 
3.2 During the Election 
Despite BN’s increase in the use of repressive tactics leading up to the voting poll’s; from last 
minute gerrymandering to preventing political opponents and civil society activists from 
succeeding in their political agendas19, their political opponents were still victorious, especially 
when a vast majority of worldwide political observers predicted that Barisan Nasional would 
retain power amidst the people’s discontent with the government’s rampant corruption and 
idleness in handling the 1MDB scandal (Shah, 2019, 65). 
 
There was a clear recurrent clash amongst intra Malay politics with conservative and liberal 
parties in what appears to be a return of classic style ‘old school Malay centric politics’ (Abdul 
Hamid, 2020). It can be asserted that even though religious conservatism has been inculcated 
by UMNO through the decades in power, largely built on a patronage system within rural areas 
in Malaysia, reform oriented politics had become increasingly prominent and captivated a 
substantial proportion of Malay Muslims20. 
 
It was at this point that there was a need for both sides of the political elite to come up with a 
more viable strategy in amplifying the salience of ethnoreligious rhetoric in order to reclaim 
this substantial proportion of the Malay votes. This vote comprises of more than half the 
electorate as support for opposition (BN and PAS) were significantly higher with these cohort 
 
19 Srivastava, S. (2018). Malaysia’s Long History Of Election Rigging. The Diplomat. 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/malaysias-long-history-of-election-rigging. 




of voters (Otswald, 2018,46). Even with the Bersatu political alliance within PH, this party 
comprised of former UMNO political elites who had ‘crossed over’.  
 
PH’s main strategy was to frame ethno-religious sentiments in the form of economic grievances 
and was used to calibrate a sense of moral politics that contributed to their populist appeals. 
This became a persuasive strategy as the 1MDB scandal influenced the people’s opinion of the 
current BN administration’s failure to improve the economic condition of the country and 
failure to uphold as guardians of Malaysia’s multicultural values and Islamic virtues. PH’s 
populist programmes became prominent in the form of financial handouts, affirmative action 
policies specifically for the Malay majority, even though their main political campaigns were 
mainly to uphold the rights of all Malaysians, regardless of race or religion. This accentuates 
the fact that PH elites have come to the reality of the political situation and were found to be 
using the same language as UMNO, recycling raced based language and policies (Yeoh, 2020).  
 
BN’s main strategy was considered flawed as they had attempted to divide the anti-incumbent 
vote. The Malay vote was essentially the ideal vote for determining the outcome of the 
Malaysian election, as PAS was not considered an ideal contender to execute the opposition 
fragmentation strategy (Otswald, 2018).  
 
3.2.1 Religious Populism During Electoral Campaigns 
Before 2018, the UMNO/BN government used Islam as a political weapon against PAS, which 
at the time was their most prominent political challenger to Malay Muslim voters. PAS spent 
numerous years trying to gain traction into turning Malaysia into an Islamic state, especially 
when the Malay Muslim population is experiencing a surge in conservativeness in their daily 
lives (Fernandes, 2017). UMNO, however, were hesitant in pursuing a completely conservative 
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Islamic state given that the core ideology of the party was akin to ethnic nationalism combined 
with only minor Islamic component. As per the constitution, it was accentuated amongst 
UMNO’s inner circles, that the party was established for the sole purpose of ‘Malay 
Superiority’ and not to turn Malaysia into an Islamic state21. 
Islamic rhetoric was prominently featured during the election, with three different political 
parties and coalitions offering varied notions of Islam and governance. These three coalitions 
included BN, PH and PAS. Each party coalition had differing variations with regards to Islamic 
political variances. BN generally supports bureaucratic Islamism, PH believe in the 
compatibility of universal values to be incorporated with Islam and PAS were hardliners who 
advocated for a more juridical Islamic state (Abdul Hamid, 2018, 684). 
Najib Razak’s use of Islamist rhetoric by aligning himself with conservative Islamic 
bureaucracies and his alleging that Islam and Malay’s were being threatened as never before 
and that unity must prevail to prevent this. It was through this endorsement with PAS (before 
and after the election), that it became a political strategy to deter voters from voting for PH. 
Religious NGO’s such as IKSIM and JAKIM had overtly attacked PH for their liberal agenda’s 
that was threatening Malaysia’s fragile ethno-religious equilibrium (Abdul Hamid, 2018, 688). 
It becomes clear in Malaysia that Islamic mobilisation is explicitly used in the theological sense 
to mobilise voters at the grassroots level. It was found that many rural voters deemed the 1MDB 
scandal as ‘old news’ and the rural Malay electorate disregarded the scandal (Chin, n.d.) 
 
 
21 There has always been distrust between the different ethnic groups and their nationalist orientations, that 
after the Second World War, the Confederation of States created a Malaysian citizenship for all, and with 
regard to religion, it was asserted in Article 3(1) in the Federal constitution that “ FC provides, in Article 3(1), 
that “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any 




PAS asserted that during their election campaigns, their main purpose as a political party was 
to uphold the sanctity of Islam. Hadi Awang stated that the party would not resort to populism 
as its main purpose as to follow the teachings of Islam22. In order to engage with the middle 
class, the Malaysian youth and pious Muslims, PAS understood that religious rhetoric alone 
would not be enough to garner voter support. PAS party strategists introduced the idea of a 
‘technocratic government’ as well as running events in town hall’s with young leaders with 
professional backgrounds. On many other occasions, there were many notable Islamic 
preachers that declared PAS as the only political party that was upholding the Islamic agenda 
in Malaysia and would make statements to the people that a vote for PAS would grant a ticket 
to heaven (Weng, 2018). 
 
ISMA was a notable non-governmental organisation that was infamous for its controversial 
statements. An example was when the organisation made a statement that ethnic Chinese (and 
Indian) Malaysian’s were ‘foreigners’. IKSIM and ISMA were both influenced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a majority of their members were educated and urban Muslim Middle Class 
professionals. The difference was that ISMA became more Malay centric and less inclusive 
and played an active political role during the previous 13th General Election (GE13) (Abdul 
Hamid, 2020). ISMA contested in some seats under a smaller political party known as Berjasa. 
This was a result of a disagreement of PAS’ alliance with DAP. However, in GE14, ISMA did 
not elect to compete in any parliamentary seats but positioned themselves as an electoral 
pressure group. By launching a campaign called ‘Voter Awareness Movement’, ISMA urged 
all eligible (Muslim) voters to only vote for credible Muslim candidates (Weng 2018). ISMA 
asserted that a credible leader was someone who was free from corruption, morally good and 
 




upholding Malay Muslim agenda. They would criticise DAP (and the Muslim leaders in the 
opposition coalition) of not being credible or a moral leader, even though the organisation 
claimed they were neutral. 
 
Perlis Mufti Mohd Asri Zainal Abidin (famously known as Dr Maza) is a popular Muslim 
preacher and has been perceived as being critical towards PAS whilst subtly giving support to 
Pakatan Harapan23. On the other hand, Ustaz Ahmad Dasuki is another prominent preacher 
with more than one million supporters on Facebook and despite not contesting in any of the 
elections- will always appear at many PAS social events. This is also true for Ustaz Azhar Idrus 
(UAI). It should be noted that not all Muslim preachers will automatically vote/ support for 
PAS. Especially when there are prominent Muslim activists and academics who support 
Amanah and PKR. An example is Dr Maszlee Malik who joined PPBM as a candidate for a 
parliament seat in the Southern State. In contrast, UMNO had their own equivalent Asyraf 
Wajdi who contested for a parliamentary seat in the Northern State, who had also been the 
former Deputy Minister in the Prime Ministers’ Department in charge of religious affairs. Both 
Asyraf Wajdi and Maszlee Malik were academicians at the International Islamic University of 
Malaysia who portrayed themselves as established, reputable Islamic scholars, that Malay-
Muslims would adhere and follow (News Straits Times, 2018). 
 
Besides PAS, in short, there are numerous political parties, NGO’s and prominent Islamic 
preachers who played significant roles in shaping populist religious discourse during the 
election. It is important to note that with Malaysian votes, religion is not the sole factor in voter 
decision, especially amongst pious urban Malay Muslims. Even though the out of GE14 may 
 





not entirely reflect on the extent of religious populism during the election, it did provide the 
basis that there is a surge in Islamic populist discourse, particularly with the current and new 
opposition (Weng, 2018). According to these activists, the majority of Malay Muslims in 
Malaysia are now under a threat from the alleged dominant minority ie. DAP Chinese within 
the PH government, and they claim that it was their duty to take back government’s power. 
 
With BN, there was a sense of an existential battle between ethnoreligious nationalism and 
unprecedented social changes, intertwined with privileges and interests. Leading up to the 2018 
general election, UMNO’s Malay nationalist and pseudo-Islamist agenda went into overdrive. 
Even though the economic dimension had not completely been excised from BN’s overall 
rhetoric, the coalition accentuated on its ethno-religious sentiments especially as a result of 
their own political repercussions. This was the driving force of the BN administrations 
characterisation of the ‘sacred people’ and ‘the others’. 
 
An example is when a former UMNO cabinet minister; Tengku Adnan Mansor, described the 
DAP party (a part of the PH coalition) as “chauvinist and that their leaders were evangelists 
(New Christians) that deems them untrustworthy”. (Alyaa, Malaysiakini, 14th April 2018). A 
statement such as this, suggests a recognition of religion apart from Islam, in a manner that 
portrays Christians an untrustworthy ‘other’. At the same, this perspective also differentiates 
from a ‘bad Malaysian Christians’ and the ‘good minority’, in Tengku Adnan’s eyes. This is a 
classic example of how UMNO’s idea of the ‘sacred people’ revolves around Malay 
precedence and identity. This ethnoreligious position brings forth an explicit moral position 
that can be differentiated at the expense of the ‘others’ casted as enemies by UMNO-BN. Such 




The political elites in PH were able to present the 1MDB scandal as a huge dent to the country’s 
economic standing and to claim the moral high ground, especially when defending Malay-
Muslim sovereignty against an existential threat from external Chinese (pertaining to the large 
influx of Chinese Foreign Investment) (Malhi, 2018). This was a stark contrast to UMNO’s 
narrative that portrayed the ethnic minority Chinese Malaysians as an internal threat (Malhi, 
2018). This added another twist to the populist mobilisation with regards to domestic moral 
panic on a larger scale. 
 
BN also intensified their ethnoreligious nationalist rhetoric against the others which include: 
Christians, Shia Muslims, LGBTQ and liberal Muslims. The competition between PAS and 
UMNO for which party is more religiously orientated than the other that created the stage to 
realign Malaysia’ political stage amidst the current polarised environment. BN was able to 
specifically target the Malay Muslim status quo, whilst PH was deemed as the party for liberals 
and those who were angered by the 1MDB corruption scandal (Welsh, 2018, 91-92). 
 
The UMNO-led brand of Malay nationalism was a competitive edge against PAS for Malay 
voter support. The fragmentation of Malay party politics expedited UMNO’s decline whilst 
continuing to cement their foundation of expressions of Islam, nationalism and moral claims 
on political legitimacy (Ufen, 2009, 322). 
 
The populist dimensions of the PH’s political mission was to ‘save Malaysia’ from Najib Tun 
Razak and his corrupt members of the party. These populist elements of PH’s ‘saviour politics’ 
were increasingly prominent during the election campaigns, when Tun Mahathir Mohammed 
addressed the people during a rally known as the Tsunami Rakyat (Citizen’s Tsunami) (Abdul 
Rahman, 2018). Populist politics was made complicated by the fragmentation of the Malaysian 
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political landscape. There were now four major Malay Muslim political parties competing for 
the Malay Muslim support. 
 
Whilst BN framed religious sentiments in nationalist terms, where being fully Malaysian meant 
being ethnically Malay and Muslim whilst PH framed religious sentiments in economic terms. 
The use of economic grievances calibrated the moral claims that contributed to the populist 
appeal. This political strategy was used to sway voters as household debt, shortage of 
affordable housing and inflation increased during the Najib Administration, contrary to official 
indicators of economic performance (Hutchinson, 2018, 588). The 1MDB scandal was 
heralded by the opposition as proof of the gigantic hypocrisy of BN’s claims of being the sole 
guardians of Malaysia’s Islamic virtues and multicultural values. 
 
PH leaders and allies did not, however, refer the people as ‘sacred people’ in their political 
campaigning and rhetoric, and imbedded the concept of the rakyat (the people) with more 
inclusive connotations, in relation to the concept of ‘honour and pride’. For example, Rafidah 
Aziz was a prominent UMNO cabinet minister who openly support PH during election 
campaigns and made a statement: “Redeeming our tarnished maruah (moral dignity) is what 
needs to be a priority. Not bribing with goodies (economic handouts) that the country can ill 
afford and will be more burdensome for the rakyat..24  
 
Both former UMNO prominent leaders and emerging prominent PH leaders indirectly 
incorporated ethnic and religious inclusivity in the PH’s representation of the people. It was a 
specific way for PH’s diverse coalition to be on the attack on BN whilst also battling internally 
with their contradictions on Malay nationalism and protecting the sanctity of Islam. The urban 
 
24 Malaysiakini, 2018. ‘ The Choice Is Clear – Rafidah, Rafizi And Rais On 'Pride Vs Bribe'’- May 9th2018. 
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middle-class Malaysian demographic was an obvious target for the opposition party to appeal 
to, pertaining to issues of governance, accountability and transparency. 
 
The PH rhetoric encapsulates recurring themes of references to the 1MDB scandal through a 
populist appeal of representing the people as a righteous, multicultural society that is taking 
back what rightfully belonged to the people and to redeem their honour, after being exploited 
by an entrenched elite. Another important note is that the demonising minority identities were 
widely used more so by BN than with PH during their electoral campaigns (Shah. 2019, 61). 
 
An important indication of the election is the loss of support for BN-UMNO by Malay voters 
by 20 per cent, which evidently showed that the pan ethnic appeals by PH for a clean 
government were successful. It was a vote to eliminate Najib and his BN kleptocratic members, 
regardless of whether it was PH or PAS that replaced the current government.25 
 
3.3 After the Election 
The 2018 Malaysian General Elections witnessed the incumbent regime BN defeated for the 
first time in Malaysia’s sixty-one-year history since independence (Whiting and 
Balasubramaniam, 2018). A comparative analysis of populist claims between Barisan Nasional 
and Pakatan Harapan can be derived from their respective electoral campaigns. 
 
Mahathir Mohamad (known to many as the grandmaster of Malaysian politics)26, was able to 
offer an assurance that the new coalition could remove the unpopular Najib Razak from power 
 
25 Ming, O. (2019). Winning the Malay and Bumiputera Votes, One Step at a Time. Malaysiakini. 
https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/463053. 
26 The Coverage. (2020). Mahathir The Grand Master Strategist : The First Independent Prime Minister That 




and presented with a new path to pave for Malaysia (Otswald, 2018). The 2018 elections 
witnessed a battle between old feuds and the introduction of new political players. BN was 
replaced by PH; a relatively new, yet patriotically tenacious, coalition that saw across racial 
divides. As Mahathir Muhammad as the face of the opposition, the coalition was able to win 
121 out of the 222 seats in Parliament in the 14th General Election (Wong, 2020). 
 
For many voters, there was an unprecedented abandonment of support towards UMNO and 
BN, solely due to Najib Razak and his political elites over their implementation of the Goods 
and Sales Tax (GST), which was a tax that oppressed the lower income earners in Malaysia27. 
There were a handful that only wanted the elimination of GST but were not prepared for an 
end of a BN rule. Thus, if the PH coalition were to fail to meet expectations and to improve the 
livelihoods, then in the next election they will see many Malay voters retreat back to a BN, or 
even consider a PAS rule. 
  
The aftermath of the elections showed immense change within the government. Most notable, 
the PH government had re-commenced investigations into the 1MDB scandal involving the 
misappropriations of funds into the former Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s bank account. 
One of the demands of the Bersih movement was the demand for the resignation of Najib as it 
was evident that he was involved in the misappropriation of the funds. 
 
PH’s electoral strategy created a coherent voter base which was based on a common desire for 
clean government and a potential shift towards a pan ethnic idea of citizenship (ie. to be 
Malaysian does not equate to being ethnically Malay or Muslim). Several progressive voters 
 




hoped for a “new” Malaysia that was leaning towards inclusiveness regardless of race or 
religion. This would mean altering the current racialized hierarchy where the Malay’s and other 
indigenous Bumiputera would no longer be granted economic privileges. For the number of 
conservative Malay voters, this form of social transformation would be deemed unpopular, thus 
UMNO and PAS were now able to leverage this to their advantage by claiming to uphold Malay 
and Muslim rights (Parameswaran, 2020).  
 
The electoral win for PH was particularly surprising despite the manipulation of the electoral 
roll, gerrymandering, corruption and vote buying to deter the election by BN (Ming, 2019). 
With Malaysia’s international ranking near the bottom with regards to perceptions of electoral 
integrity (Norris, Frank and Martinez, 2014,794), mainly due to the corrupt practice of the long-
time governing BN government, this marked a significant shift in the Malaysian political 
landscape with regards to the state and advancement of Malaysia’ overall democracy.  
 
The 2018 General Election saw an increase in young voters with an 83% in Voter turnout28, as 
Malaysians were fixated to overthrow an authoritarian and corrupt government in a smooth and 
peaceful fashion. Given the years of mobilisation for change in democracy, this proved that 
democratic change in Malaysia was possible and the populist nature of PH and its coalition. A 
significant feature of PH’s victory was how they were able to neutralise BN’s previously 
successful nationalism which often incorporated conservative Islamic morality and Malay 
political precedence (Weiss, 2020, 215). Besides the unprecedented changes in the country’s 
political stage, PH benefited from a ‘populist push’ in which their political candidates and civil 
 
28 Bridget Welsh compiled data to show the different age groups who turned up to vote- and what was found 
was that all age groups so an increase in voter turnout , particularly in the younger generation in which she 
referred to the ‘Change Generation’ (Welsh, 2018, 101). 
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society supporters indirectly redefined the meaning of ‘the people’, the elite and the others in 
order to defeat BN.  
 
The election victory showed that the PH party did not have similar elements of ethnoreligious 
nationalist tendencies like their predecessor BN. The ways in which both party coalitions, BN 
and PH fought extensively to define the ‘people, ‘elites’ and the ‘others’ was by utilising 
religious rhetoric (Welsh, 2018, 104). The recent election showed the significance of 
accounting for the role in religion in populist politics in the ways that it informs the construction 
of the notion of the ‘pure’ and sacred’ people. 
 
Religious rhetoric and ethnic nationalism are complimentary to one another, but the Malaysian 
case demonstrates a unique way that both elements formed a populist political scene that was 
indeed diverse. It is important to note another definition of populism is as a form of moral 
politics. This definitive framework allows for parameters to be used in defining the elites and 
the people and based on the moral appeals made by populist actors, (especially when ethno-
religious politics play a central role on both sides of the political spectrum) PH were able to 
capitalise on moral rhetoric and neutralised BN’s conservative religious nationalism (Shah, 
2019, 66). Majority of fiercely contested issues such as economic grievances and minority 
rights in a country like Malaysia become inherent stereotypes as predictable outcomes of 
tensions within a Muslim majority country. 
 
Both political camps of the same conservative Islamic rhetoric, however it is likely that UMNO 
and PAS will eventually split regarding their other political agendas. PH was able to attract a 
large portion of Malay voters who had prioritised more pressing issues pertaining to the failing 
economy, which was the main populist focus of their campaign (Otswald, 2018). The 
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UMNO/PAS alliance does provide a simple narrative that is simple, yet effective. That the PH 
government was now being controlled by the Chinese who are plotting to work towards 
diminishing the concept of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay Superiority) and diminishing the special 
privileges given (Weiss, 2020, 222). 
 
In the wake of the 2018 election, the Election Manifesto articulated an important element 
regarding inter-ethnic and religious relations. The coalition promised to ‘Create a Malaysia that 
was inclusive, moderate and respected globally’ as it went on to assert: 
 
“The diversity of races and religion should be seen as a source of power, not as an 
obstacle…..Therefore the Pakatan Harapan government will implement policies and 
programmes that unite the nation and create an inclusive society and maintain the 
harmony of multiracial and multi religious Malaysia.”29 
 
The outcome of the elections showed that each of different strands of Islamic rhetoric were 
assumed to be accepted one way or another, as PAS still controlled Northern territories (in the 
state of Kelantan and Terrenganu), UMNO still controlling central Malaysia (Pahang and 
Perlis), and PH dominating the remaining states (Wong and Ooi, 2018, 663). 
 
When there is a change in a political regime, economic and political reforms are inevitable. 
After being ruled by a dominant single party for a long duration of time, such reforms can be 
particularly drastic. The sudden change in regime also brought about significant implications 
pertaining to public and economic policies post GE14. More specifically, the populist electoral 
promises assumed that the country’s economy would flourish under PH’s governance and 
 
29 Buku Harapan. (2018). https://pages.malaysiakini.com/100days/Manifesto-PH-MY.pdf. pp.129-156. 
74 
 
leadership, however, the weak fiscal capacity and the severe debt left by the previous 
government, has proven to be difficult to keep. What is interesting to note, the Malaysian 
economy was doing well under the Najib administration30. 
 
The transition of power from BN to PH proved to be a smooth regime change through fair 
electoral outcomes, without bloodshed or chaotic protests. This represented a monumental win 
for Malaysia with regards to democratic values. Clearly, Malaysia had embarked on a new 
democratic journey amidst a critical time (with regards to global economy). It can be asserted 
that certain facets of populism may undermine a country’s economic progress (Sheah, 2018), 
but in the Malaysian case, this created a likelihood for positive reform. 
 
In addition, PH’s victory also caused concerns with regards to populist promises made and that 
this could result in undermining economic prospects (Zaharia, 2018). Mahathir, as Prime 
Minister, could very well steer the country from economic downturn. The strategy to abolish 
the Goods and Services Tax (GST) to appeal to voters worked, as many Malaysians trusted that 
Mahathir would be able to save the country’s economic state, as he had previously done in 
1997 during the Asian Financial Crisis (Zaharia, 2018). While these new economic policies 
may have moderated populist politics to some extent, it has potentially weakened the 
government’s fiscal standing. With a strong opposition alliance in UMNO and PAS, this has 








The current government has now experienced the difficulty in implementing these policies and 
that some of the proposed reforms would require a two thirds majority in parliament. In 
addition, with a stronger political opposition formed (UMNO PAS’ informal alliance) and the 
polarized ethnoreligious mobilisation, this has made the implementation of the proposed 
institutional reforms much more difficult. 
 
After GE14, there were still further remarks of populist discourse during electoral campaigns 
made by UMNO members included Nazri Aziz who, during the Semenyih by-elections claimed 
that non-Malays should not question Malay privileges. This resulted in MIC and MCA 




In Malaysia, the ruling party has shored up its weakening appeal by playing to religious and 
ethnic prejudices, and to an extent has attempted to challenge the deeply institutionalised ethnic 
and religious privilege that has been structurally embedded in the country’s constitution. 
Malaysian politics have always played on divisions; in every country that has an electoral 
process, political activists will seek to exploit divisions for electoral gain.  
 
In the ASEAN region, which has a tradition of strong leaders and weak institutions, some 
leaders have tended to exploit identity politics to increase their electability.GE 14 showed that 
there was increased intra Malay feuding between Malay political elites that turned into a 
competition for the Malay vote that led to adopting strategies to mobilise people through 




The religious frames within the context of the last election and previous elections have offered 
a palpable populist potential, and a populist protest movement emerged in terms of ethnic 
divisions, economic inequality and social status claims.  
 
The Malaysian political scene is now seeing a political backlash of maintaining influential and 
powerful ethnoreligious nationalists in opposition, comprising of an unexpected alliance 
between UMNO and PAS, with their supporters who are attempting to undermine the new 
government through mass mobilisation, like the events in Indonesia prior to their election in 
2019 (to be examined in the next chapter). Populism in Malaysia is a relatively new concept in 
terms of the style of electoral politics as compared to Indonesia’s populism, but it can be 






ANALYSING INDONESIA’S POPULIST DISCOURSE DURING THE 2019 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
Post-authoritarian Indonesia has become a country where populism has taken centre stage 
during electoral contestations. The nation has seen a myriad of populist elements and 
challenges since 2014, and there has been debates on the role religion plays and the extent to 
which populism has affected democracy during the post-New Order era31.  
 
This chapter will identify and analyse elements of populism that was evident during the 2019 
Presidential election. It will be argued that elites had deployed a populist agenda drawing on 
ethnoreligious identity as part of their campaigning strategies. A battle between oligarchic 
elites brought forth a unique populist discourse that oligarchic elites chose to use ethnoreligious 
identity in the hopes of gaining voter support during electoral contestation based on a clear 
strategic calculation. It was through partnership of political and long-term advocates from FPI 
and other Islamists that initiated the ‘rival camps’ This phenomenon thus created differing 
poles of mobilisation that resulted in strong erosion to Indonesia’s democracy, due to the slow, 
insidious, illiberal drift in the laws and regulations governing civil liberties in Indonesia 
(Warburton and Aspinall, 2017). 
 
In 2014 and 2019, both Presidential elections became a battle between President Suharto’s 
former son-in-law: Prabowo Subianto, against the former governor of Jakarta, Jokowi Widodo. 
Both campaigns capitalised on discontentment with economic policies and advocated for a 
 
31 The term ‘New Order’ was coined by Indonesian President Suharto to characterize his regime 
upon coming to power in 1966. The term was intended to contrast his rule with that of his 
predecessor, which he dubbed as the ‘Old Order.’ The falling of Sukarno’s regime arguably started 




return in economic nationalism (and to some extent Jokowi pitched for deregulation and foreign 
investment), with each representing themselves as the voice of the common people (Bourchier, 
2019, 722).  
 
Drawing upon sentimentality for his former father-in-law, Prabowo vowed to “Make Indonesia 
Great Again”32 by returning strong leadership qualities combined with strong so -called 
‘indigenous’ values. His manifesto was strongly nativist and claimed to be in line with 
Indonesia’s nativist foundation33. He was regarded as a charming populist on the campaign 
trail by his staunch supporters, as he engaged members of his coalition to implement divisive 
and racist tactics by blaming the country’s economic problems on the wealthy ethnic Chinese 
minority. He was able to gain support from the Defenders of Islam Front (Front Pembela Islam, 
or FPI)34 in addition to alliances with other conservative parties in parliament. Jokowi’s 
rejection of Islamic extremism and association with Indonesia’s Democratic Party (PDI-P), in 
contrast, portrayed him as supportive for a pluralist and more tolerant Indonesia.  
 
4.1 Populism in Indonesia 
Populism in Indonesia has deep roots, tracing back to President Sukarno’s populism, 
characterised by his strong stance that Indonesia is not based on a particular religious ideology 
but rather a synthesis ideology: nationalism, religion, communism.  He was popularly known 
 
32 The Economist. (2019). https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/04/11/jokowi-the-better-candidate-is-
leading-in-indonesias-election. 
33 Prabowo’s strategy was to utilise the winning formula used when Trump was elected as President in the 
2016 elections. This was on the background that Prabowo has a strong military history and like Trump, is part 
of his country's economic and political elite Massola (2018). Viewed on 31st July 2020 at: 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/prabowo-wants-to-make-indonesia-great-again-20181020-p50awr.html 
34 Front Pembela Islam is a far-right Islamic vigilante group, with long links to the military: Founded in 1998, 
the group has been predominantly depicted as a predatory and an association of opportunistic association of 
thugs whose interests have been more economic than pious. Through the building of ties with existing 
networks such as MUI and establishing themselves as a “protest-party-in-waiting”- Woodward, M. (2019). A 
Kinder, More Gentler FPI?. Inside Indonesia. 
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as a fiery anti-imperialist above all and was a leader who drew on anti-colonial nationalism, 
revolutionary socialism, popular religion and other contemporary ideologies. Through his 
charismatic and flamboyant style, he was able to maintain power and control up until his 
removal from office in 1967 (Lashmar, and Oliver, 1998). 
 
Indonesia first gained independence on 17th August 194535 and has experienced significant 
changes to its political and social landscape. This was generally categorised into three political 
periods known as the Sukarno Era, the New Order Era and the post-Suharto era. It was during 
the last period (also known as the reform era) that populism initially emerged alongside 
electoral democracy. During this period there was a contextual shift from authoritarian New 
Order to a post 1998 democratic progression. 
 
For over 30 years, Suharto had been President of Indonesia since 1967, and his regime was 
known as the New Order. After taking over the Presidency, he removed his political opponents 
and introduced Functional Groups (also known as the Golkar) as his political vehicle to 
consolidate his position and eliminated the 3rd biggest communist party in the world through a 
violent coup that resulted in 1 million deaths (Zakaria, 2019, 636).  Such authoritarian electoral 
practices cemented Golkar’s affirmation of most votes and a Suharto re-election every five 
years. 
 
Through Sukarno’s strong use of populist appeals during his regime, populism was then used 
as a mobilising tool for mass support. He made genuine claims of a generic Indonesian identity 
 




based idealised traditional values to deny the legitimacy of contending ideas and rejecting 
representative institutions (Hadiz and Robison, 2017, 491).   
 
In 1967, when Suharto took over, he strategically employed an exclusivist type of governance 
and it was during this time, only a handful of elites (comprising of army officers) and western 
technocrats that effectively influenced Suharto to develop his economic policy. Indonesia had 
now become a democracy under an oligarchic and globally capitalistic leader who excluded 
oppositional groups that were regarded as threats to his Presidency and established a 
‘fundamental discursive dichotomy’ of the extreme left and extreme right groups and 
movements.  
 
Indonesia is viewed by some observers as having entered a transitional phase from authoritarian 
rule towards a new democratic system of government in which civil society will play a more 
prominent role. This transition is, moreover, accompanied by a process of decentralisation that 
emphasises regional autonomy and is expected to bring democracy to the people while making 
government more transparent that a shift from a centralised to a decentralised government is 
not synonymous with a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule nor does it automatically 
imply a shift from a strong state towards a strong civil society. The weakening of the central 
state does not automatically, in other words, result in more local democracy. On the contrary, 
decentralisation can under certain conditions be accompanied by authoritarian rule (Nordholt, 
2005). 
 
By 2014, Indonesia’s populism had now become a battle between two populists: Jokowi 
Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Jokowi may not have been as aggressive and passionate in his 
populist rhetoric as compared to Prabowo, but he was able to cultivate an image to the people 
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that he was one of them (not part of the elite’s circles compared to Prabowo) and could best 
represent the people and affirming his piety. It is important to note that Jokowi is not a liberal 
politician, as his five-year tenure as President has witnessed an authoritarian turn (Massola, 
2018). 
 
Populism and Islamism are closely related but are distinctly different (Case, 2016, 23.) Many 
forms of Islamism featured a persuasive populist narrative in accordance with who the people 
are ie. the conservative and pious Muslims, standing up against a corrupt elite of ‘nonbelievers’ 
or liberals. Prominent Islamist leaders have made forceful claims of embodying the will of the 
people who they defined as a collective to abide by God’s law. 
 
For instance, Habib Rizieq Shihab is a prominent Islamist, regarded himself as the ‘Great Imam 
/ Leader of Indonesian Muslims’ and was appointed by the heads of the 212 movement, and in 
turn became the Head of the Islamic Defender’s Front. His involvement in the recent elections 
was to preach to his followers to support and vote for Prabowo. He had performed his 
pilgrimage in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 2017, and following an alleged pornographic scandal36, 
he was exiled and remained in Saudi Arabia. It was an orchestrated case designed as a counter-
attack due to Habib Rizieq’s role during the 212 movement and the ousting of Ahok.  He 
embedded this notion into the minds of his followers that only he can best voice the people’s 
desire for a more pious life and to remove those who threaten the sanctity of Islam in Indonesia 
(Fossati and Mietzner,2019, 774). This bears a striking similarity with right-wing populism in 
 
36 Habib Rizieq’s was caught in a controversial scandal where a woman who was not his wife, alleged he had 
exchanged sexually explicit text messages. Rizieq had fervently denied the allegations and his supporters 
claimed the allegations to be fake news (Emont, 2017). 
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the West, as the hybrid of populism and Islamism have become crucial elements for populist 
actors to utilise and mobilise the masses for their own political agenda37. 
 
In this respect, Prabowo was seeking to distance from moving the country’s religiously pluralist 
constitution by ‘borrowing’ an Islamist agenda, without having to fully endorse it, whilst a vast 
majority of the Islamists sided with Prabowo on the basis that he ‘wasn’t Jokowi’ (Fossati and 
Mietzner, 2019, 775).  
 
In addition, populism in Indonesia challenges the country’s political structure, system and 
practices. Jokowi, and the Islamists were not the creation of an oligarchic elite, rather populism 
has been utilised by the elites to consolidate their interests (Mietzner, 2017, 72). In particular, 
the rise of the Islamists has shown that populism can be transformative, however, it has shifted 
the nation away from traditional voter preferences towards religious identity politics. Religious 
identity themes in campaigns have become a crucial element with political actors and their 
respective platforms, particularly in recent elections (Fossati, 2019, 775). 
Many forms of Islamism feature a compelling populist narrative, in which the ‘pure people’ 
(conservative Islamists and pious Muslims) are standing up against a cohort of corrupt elite 
(non-believers or liberal Muslims). 
 
As the world’s third largest democracy, the country witnessed populist challenges since 2014, 
both during and after electoral contestations. Whilst many scholars of Indonesian politics 
acknowledge the presence of populism, some have come to the conclusion that political actors, 
politicians, Islamic NGO’s have used populist strategies to target a specific demographic and 
 
37 Examples include Turkey and Egypt who have all utilised similar populist strategies to gain voter support: 
Hadiz, V. (2014). A New Islamic Populism and the Contradictions of Development. 
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using religion to play into Indonesia’s populist surge, as a new form of polarization within 
Indonesia’s electoral system. (Hadiz, 2017, Fossati & Mietzner, 2019, Hara, 2019) 
 
During the Sukarno era, his charismatic populism was historically rooted with Anti-colonialist, 
anti-west, leftist nationalist and Islamic-oriented forms of populism that became entangled 
within elite conflicts, which turned Indonesian politics into competitive political battleground 
that involved maintaining of oligarchic influence and dominating his political stance through 
mass mobilisation via his charismatic leadership (Chalmers, 2019).  He was able to maintain 
an anti-foreign rhetoric throughout his political regime and condemned international 
corporations. 
  
4.2 Before The Election 
Prior to 2014, Indonesia was not experiencing a prominent economic or political downturn 
(Kimura, 2017), however deep structural and political problems persisted. Populist politics 
became prominent in certain aspects of society. At the time, President Yudhyono engaged in 
nepotistic tendencies through pushing of power to his family members, which eventually led 
many voters to abandon his party, which influences the prevalence of populist politics (Kimura, 
2017).  
 
By the time of the 2014 Presidential elections there were signs that a majority of Indonesian’s 
were ready for a change, as the two contenders: Jokowi Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, offered 
striking differences in their political performances compared to President Yudhyono. Jokowi 
presented himself as a down to earth and fresh-faced politician drawing on his own ‘humble 
experiences’ starting out as a furniture seller/exporter to work his way up to become the Mayor 
of Solo, a mid-sized city in central Java. As Mayor of Solo, Jokowi became a popular household 
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name, by implementing pro-poor reform policies in healthcare, education and welfare. During 
his tenure, the city of Solo was ranked at the top in terms of national governance (Mietzner, 
2017). Jokowi’s popularity soared and continued when he ran for Governor of Jakarta, and then 
when he became a contender for the Presidential elections. It was evident at this time, that 
Jokowi’s ‘technocratic populist’ appeal was linked to his local beginnings (Kimura, 2017). 
 
Prabowo, on the other hand, portrayed an angrier and demagogic populist style (reflecting on 
his previous military background) in his political campaigns. Prabowo’s style can be compared 
to the style of President Sukarno and Mussolini in style and aesthetics, with similarities in 
calling for economic nationalism and rallying against corruption (Kimura, 2017).  
 
He was represented as a classically authoritarian populist challenge that is common in 
democratic regimes characterised by patronage politics, weak political institutions and a highly 
decentralised governance (Aspinall, 2015, 1). He would invoke a sense of nationalism, pointing 
out that Indonesia’s poor economic conditions were a result of the country’s exploitation by a 
foreign entity, whilst at the same time he condemned political elites and corruptive state of the 
current political system (when ironically he was also a part of this elite circle) (Aspinall, 
2015,1). Similar to President Trump, Prabowo exemplified oligarchic populism because he 
condemned the corrupt political elite, yet he himself had elite political origins. (Aspinall, 2015, 
2). 
 
By comparing Prabowo to President Trump, there are notable similarities and differences. 
Firstly, both are part of the country’s economic and political elites, respectively (Massola, 
2018). With regards to the nationalist tendencies, Jokowi’s was pluralist, Prabowo’s was 
majoritarian. A notable difference, however, is that Donald Trump’s populist tactics resulted 
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in an electoral victory, whilst Prabowo lost to incumbent Jokowi, and Jokowi won via the 
popular vote but Trump only won the electoral college. This accentuates that even with similar 
populist traits; the extent of the success of these strategies differs from one democracy to 
another. Despite the differences in their ideologies, those they represent and their strategies, 
both embodied potential threats to their respective democracies through the use of democratic 
pretensions in their populist delivery. With Prabowo, his threat was able to manifest into a 
strong alliance with conservative radical organisations that, similar to him, resonated with 
authoritarianism, whilst Trump demonstrated his attempts through his concept of ‘fake news’ 
(Pratamasari and Az-Zahra, 2019, 122). 
 
4.2.1 The 2017 Gubernatorial Election 
The election campaigns for the governorship of Jakarta in February 2017, was a significant 
example of how conservative nationalist politics had become inculcated with Islamic populism. 
When Jokowi stepped down in 2014 to take over as President of the country, his Deputy 
Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (more popularly known as Ahok), took over his position 
as Governor. This new appointment was not welcomed by a majority of the conservative 
Islamic communities in Jakarta and fuelled outrage38. Prior to the Presidential election, Jokowi 
ran for governor of Jakarta in 2012, and chose Ahok as his running mate. Ahok was 
immediately established as an effective administrator in a city that was rampaged by corruption 
for many years (Bourchier, 2019, 724). 
 
As a double minority, of Chinese descent and Protestant Christian, Ahok was at a disadvantage 
to compete in a country dominated by Javanese Muslims, even though he was already an 
 





established politician on his own right, since he started his political career in Golkar39 . Similar 
to Jokowi, Ahok was known to be a pragmatic, progressive and transparent leader (Nugroho, 
2018). As Ahok was increasingly popular with his policies to provide affordable housing, 
improving the country’s traffic congestion and long standing flood problems, he was depicted 
by many nativists and Islamists as ‘an enemy of Islam’ (Wilson, 2017) . For example, Islamists 
capitalised in particular when his ‘affordable housing program led to large scale forced eviction 
regimes, which instigated a flurry of street protests of anti-Ahok demonstrations, particularly 
with the poor. 
 
After a period of high approval ratings for Ahok, he suddenly faced unprecedented backlash 
and weakened political base after allegations of blasphemy (Nugruho, 2018, 45). FPI a hard-
line Muslim group were vocal in their opposition of having a non-Muslim become governor.  
Populists mobilised this sentiment against him, citing the Quran, the same verse he was accused 
of blaspheming which meant that a sizable portion of Indonesian’s would have not considered 
voting for him (Sebastien and Nubowo, 2019, 14). 
 
Backed by PKS and Prabowo’s Gerindra Party, Anies Bawedan was Ahok’s main opponent. 
Even when Ahok was in the lead in the poll’s, Baswedan’s campaign was supported by a 
mobilised group of Islamists that were aggrieved by the idea of a ‘non-Muslim’ ruling Jakarta 
and inevitably Indonesia. When the FPI and HTI organised a rally on the 4th September 2016 
to spread the Koranic verse that Muslims were not allowed to support Christians or Jews (Jones, 
2016), that same month, Ahok gave a speech to public servants, which was recorded and 
uploaded. He stated that his opponents and the Islamist groups were wrong into thinking that 
 
39 Ahok used to be a Golkar lawmaker at the House of Representatives until early 2012. He left Golkar because 
he could not get the party's support to join the Jakarta governor race that year as a deputy governor for 




it was against Islam to vote for a non-Muslim leader and that voters should follow their 
conscious on choosing their candidates. This video circulated online and was regarded as 
controversial, as it seemed that Ahok was criticising the sanctity of the Koran, and thus 
Islamists immediately demanded that Ahok be charged for blasphemy (Bourchier, 2019, 725). 
This sectarianised discourse was capitalised by Prabowo now became even more explicit 
during the campaign against Ahok during the 2017 Gubernatorial Elections. At the time of the 
protests, the protagonists invoked old resentments about the Chinese dominating the country’s 
economy (Warbuton and Muhtadi, 2019). 
 
This sudden growth and influence of conservative Islam in Indonesia was partly due to the 
sporadic influence of ‘celebrity ustads’ utilising social media to become mainstream to reach 
out to the tech-savy masses (Sebastien and Nubowo, 2019, 16). These conservative figures 
were able to channel their anger towards the blasphemy allegation and thus enabling a 
mobilisation of the masses were not overtly pious or committed conservatives. According to a 
number of observers (Fealy, 2008, White, 2008, Heryanto, 2014), Indonesian society as a 
whole has become more pious in religious practices, in particular with public expressions of 
Islamic identity, becoming more evident in daily life than before. Salafist groups have also 
inculcated an exclusive Islamic concept of citizenship (Bourchier, 2019, 727.) 
 
In addition, with the protests against Ahok, this dramatically pushed Indonesia’s democratic 
progress back with regards to pluralism and religious tolerance. Two key organisation members 
that were noticeably present during the protests, were NU and Muhammadiyah members, who 
belonged to a much larger Muslim organisation as compared to FPI and Hizbut Tahrir. Whilst 
leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah refused to endorse the protests due to the intolerance of the 
street level politics, that they regarded as ‘apolitical’ (Syechbubakr, 2017), a large number of 
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their 75 million members proudly joined the protests in solidarity with the Islamists to bring 
down Ahok. Islamists were adept at using this controversial issue to advance to the forefront 
of the anti-Ahok movement, and with the full support of Vice President Maaruf Amin (who 
would later become Jokowi’s running mate in the 2019 Presidential Election), this created a 
powerful populist movement, that threatened the democratic position of the country. 
 
NU and Muhammadiyah have always considered themselves as ‘non-political’ organisations 
(Syechbubakr, 2017) as these organisations are still influential and will directly engage with 
political activity and agendas. In this example, was NU’s Vice President and Head of MUI40 
Maaruf Amin, being nominated as Jokowi’s running mate. Under the New Order, NU and 
Muhammadiyah withdrew from their involvements in politics and focused on their sole role as 
a socio-religious organisation (Syechbubakr, 2017). This involved representing the country in 
international seminars and promoting their global image as a plural and tolerant religious 
Organisation. Both NU and Muhammadiyah had been previously linked to The National 
Awakening Party (PKB- an Islam based political party in Indonesia), the aftermath of the 2004 
election resulted in severed ties between both NU and Muhammadiyah with PKB. 
 
On this note, it is important to assert the fact elites within NU and Muhammadiyah have 
benefitted from ‘political favours’ and even gaining ministerial positions, in addition to 
receiving large financial assistance from both the public and private sectors (Fealy, 2018). 
Another example is that Muhammdiyah have been able to successfully implement 
‘Constitutional Jihad’ when they challenged a law regulating national oil and gas regular BP 
Migas41. This asserts NU and Muhammadiyah’s key and influential roles in shaping electoral 
 
40 MUI is the Indonesian Ulama Council that is a powerful New Order era organisation. The Jakarta Post. 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/08/09/who-is-maruf-amin-jokowis-running-mate.html. 




support for political candidates, and that these candidates are aware of the strategic significance 
in gaining their support towards a possible electoral victory.  
 
Hizbut Tahrir and FPI, accentuate their political agenda’s explicitly, in promoting 
implementation of Sharia-based laws, restricting the allowance of alcohol consumption in 
public area’s and even suppressing rights of ethnic Chinese and Christian Indonesians and even 
minority religious groups (such as Shiites and Ahmadis’) (Arifianto, 2021).  They have been 
able to participate in electoral contestation in the past to infiltrate on a governance level (until 
the 2019 Presidential elections provided them with an opportunity to advance their political 
agenda’s). 
 
Numerous electoral opinion polls over the years have conclusively shown that Muslims in 
Indonesia do not want to live in an Islamic state (Menchik, 2019), and it is not morphing into 
a theocratic autocracy. It can be asserted, however, that the core of this ideology has shifted ie. 
Indonesia is becoming less democratic, less pluralist and less cosmopolitan. Both the 
government and opposition have proven to constantly trying to ‘out-Islamise’ one another by 
claiming their opponents are too secular or liberal (Bourchier, 2019, 729).  
 
It was at this point that the Jokowi administration began to fall under the pressure because of 
their close association to Ahok, that there was a palpable rise in anti-Chinese sentiments 
derived from the anti-Ahok campaigns. Both on social media and by prominent Muslim 





The electoral outcome of the Jakarta gubernatorial election held on 19th April 2017, witnessed 
the defeat of Ahok against Anies Baswedan who won by a landslide victory42. This victory is 
indicative that religious sentiments played an important role in voting behaviour and showed 
hard-line Muslims groups were extremely influential. Ahok had lost support from a vast 
majority of Muslim voters despite being happy with his performance and policies as Jokowi’s 
incumbent and that he received last minute endorsements from PKB and PPP (Setijadi, 2017). 
 
The success of the anti-Ahok protests and Ahok’s two-year imprisonment is widely regarded 
as an important pivotal moment in Indonesian politics, that marked a sharp deterioration with 
the country’s democracy (Mudhoffir, 2016). This exemplified the ‘winning formula’ of the 
collaboration between conservative nationalists with radical Islamic politicians. It also 
accentuates an emerging tendency for Islamists to illustrate their struggles and agenda’s in 
nationalistic terms. 
 
Jokowi and Yudhuno ruled under the People’s Representative Council. By co-opting with NU, 
Jokowi was able to embrace a more moderate populism. Their populist strategies have shown 
that their political power is not dependant on their policies to better the country’s economy and 
infrastructure (Kenny, 2019, 62). By being a ‘moderate populist’, Jokowi took steps to erode 
his rival’s and their organisational capacity by proving his support to the Islamist movement. 
 
Political elites in Indonesia were seeking to capture several grievances from every level of 
social class, in the hopes of unifying the Ummah (Hadiz, 2018). This was considered deeply 
ideological that seeped through the religio-ethnic majoritarianism with a strong authoritarian 
 
42 Setijadi, C. (2017). Ahoks Downfall and the Rise of Islamic Populism in Indonesia.  ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. 
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undercurrent. These populist strategies were used specifically by elites to redirect actual 
grievances involving the unequal distribution of resources and power. 
 
By using the “Islamic Card”, populists were able to use this tactic as a political strategy to 
marginalise Ahok. By fabricating a speech to affect a large segment of the population into 
believing that he was insulting Islam, issuing a fatwa to sanction the speech as an insult and 
mobilising a movement by starting a series of protests and demonstrations to brand Ahok as 
guilty of blasphemy. 
 
The framing of the gubernatorial elections in terms of polarising identity politics (both sectarian 
and pluralist) has subsequently led to an array of social conflicts. Baswedan’s campaign 
embraced the political benefits of fanning identity politics, ad his support networks have 
exploited anxieties and raised xenophobic rhetoric (Wilson, 2017).  
 
4.3 During the Election 
On April 17th 2019, the Republic of Indonesia held a presidential election, that portrayed an 
intense and significant populist discourse. It was unique such that both political contenders 
were regarded as part of an entrenched elite power, which encouraged immense polarisation. 
Moreover, the apparent rise of religious conservatism (Hadiz & Robinson, 2017), decentralized 
corruptions, personalist politics in the regions and structural problems are also additional 
reasons behind the emerging populism in Indonesia (Kimura, 2017). This was Prabowo’s 
second attempt in running against Jokowi since the last election in 2014, and he was determined 
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to be victorious, and claim to take legal action on the basis of fraudulent electoral practices, 
should Jokowi be re-elected43. 
 
This issue of individual piousness emerged during the election was whether Jokowi or Prabowo 
were staunchly religious or not. An intense debate triggered an army of online trolls on social 
media and on both sides for moderate Islamic groups, Jokowi’s proof of individual skill is the 
inauguration of the National Santri Day. On the other hand, Prabowo’s religious commitments 
were not staunch as one would expect because he comes from a family of different religions, 
divorced from his wife and attends Christmas mass where the video is widely spread44.  
 
Jokowi’s camp carefully crafted their own counter discourse against Prabowo and the Islamists, 
and was thus forced to choose their vice presidential candidate by directly electing Ma’ruf 
Amin as a representative. These included images of Jokowi-Ma’ruf holding hands in a ‘sarong’ 
and ‘kopeah’ (Adiwilaga, et al, 2019, 447) further reinforced the symbolisation that Jokowi’s 
campaign was conservative and was in favour towards all Indonesian Muslims. This 
symbolisation also showed Jokowi was able to distance himself away from the controversial 
Ahok case. Jokowi’s Islamic discourse was an electoral strategy in the 2019 election and the 
strongest support was given by NU, popularly known as the largest Islamic organisation in 




43 Prabowo proceeded with legal action during the aftermath of the Presidential elections, but the Indonesian Courts 
rejected his appeals. Lamb (2019). Indonesian Court Rejects Appeal Against Election Result. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/27/indonesian-court-rejects-appeal-against-election-result. 




Ma’ruf Amin and the conservative elites in NU and their modernist counterpart 
Muhammadiyah had agreed to ally with anti-democratic Islamists and autocrats on a number 
of issues. Menchik (2019, 61) argues that by aligning themselves with a pluralist such as 
Jokowi, makes them appear to be democratic, and that these conservative institutions show 
their willingness to align themselves with the President. 
 
Prabowo held rallies in large stadiums such as Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, where tens of 
thousands of his supporters, all garbed in traditional white Islamic attire (Yulisman, 2019). He 
rallied against corruption within the Jokowi government and claimed it was akin to ‘Stage 4 
Cancer’, and he also used the idea of ‘kebocoran’ (leaking) as an explanation for all the political 
and economic issues plaguing the country, whilst at the same time blaming on the elites for 
being weak to allow the ‘leakages’ to occur (Hatherell and Welsh, 2020, 58).  This was clearly 
evident during the 2014 Presidential campaigns, as Prabowo implied that the involvement of 
‘foreign’ others (whether they were other nations or international companies) were clearly a 
threat to the country and only he can provide a solution, through his own strong leadership. 
Prabowo used populist political discourse to provide a clear distinction between the people and 
others as his rally’s helped to mobilise the opposition, who were afraid of the prominence of 
the Islamist groups taking a unified stand. 
The 2019 elections witnessed both Islamist and secularist ends of the spectrum claim to possess 
high levels of nationalist rhetoric. Prabowo’s alignment with the Islamists was deemed an 
unlikely alliance, but essentially Prabowo’s dependency on a narrow base of Islamic hardliners 
(amid intense political competition with Jokowi for Muslim votes), Islamists felt compelled to 
side with Prabowo to gain leverage and bargaining power, especially after the anti-Ahok 
movement. The Islamists felt this time around, with a strong potential for Prabowo to win the 
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election, he could accommodate their aspirations when in office45, as he had signed a ‘political 
contract’ with them beforehand (Fachrudin, 2019). 
 
There was an ideational competition during the 2019 campaigns that was also shaped by 
Jokowi’s technocratic emphasis in contrast to Prabowo’s populist challenge that Jokowi’s 
camp was ‘ineffective’ during his first term in office and that only Prabowo would be able to 
protect Indonesia’s national wealth. Jokowi’s message during the campaign was built on an 
‘optimistic tone with the slogan’ Optimisme Indonesia Maju!’ (With optimism, Indonesia will 
progress!) (Hatherell and Welsh, 2020, 62). 
 
4.3.1 Islamic Populism during the Election 
Islamic populism imagines Muslims have been sidelined in both socio-economic and cultural 
aspects (Adiwilaga et al, 2019) to create a sense that “Islam is under attack”. Islamic populism 
played a pivotal role leading up to the 2019 Presidential election. The concept was used as a 
strategic tool when imagining an ‘ummah’ to express a particular set of grievances and forming 
alliances across the different classes to go up against despised ruling elites (Hadiz, 2017, 189). 
Hadiz asserts that the trajectory of the articulation of Islamic populism is dependent on the 
politico-economic circumstances on the nation. 
 
At present, the debate of what role Islam ought to play in Indonesian politics and society 
remains unsettled, and elite politicians and movement entrepreneurs alike have identified Islam 
as a potential mobilisation device in recent years (Pepinsky, 2019). To compare with the 
historical roots of populism in Indonesia, this can be traced back to the Sukarno era, where he 
 
45 In September, Prabowo signed a 17-point integrity Pact outlining promises Prabowo should fulfil for the 
National movement to Safeguard fatwa of Ulama (known as GNPF-U), if he were to win the election. This 




was a prominent archetypal populist, displaying a mixture of traditional, legal-bureaucratic and 
charismatic styles. In contemporary Indonesian politics, Islamic populism has now diversified 
into a significant debate (Mietzner and Fossati, 2019, 773). 
 
The new Islamic populism envisions the state to be led by a righteous leader who would 
facilitate and mobilise in favourable ways to the Ummah- however, at times, this does not 
necessarily require the establishment to be overtly Islamic. For example, Prabowo created a 
new level of polarisation in Indonesian politics and a state of democracy was formed, partly 
due to the choice in his radical political campaigning with Islamists, when he does not consider 
himself inherently pious (Mietzner, 2019, 7). 
 
Islamic populism has also caused tensions on what role Islam should play within state and 
society. Both pairs; Jokowi-Maaruf and Prabowo-Sandi had provoked deep polarising 
cleavages between Nadhatul Ulamah and Muhammadiyah regarding intensity of Islamic 
expressions between secular and nationalist Indonesians (Arifianto, 2019). 
 
By appointing Maaruf Amin as Jokowi’s running mate, this sparked controversy and 
disapproval amongst Jokowi’s secular supporters and many progressive young, moderate 
Muslims, as his conservative track record was not evident of promoting religious diversity and 
pluralism. (Sebastien and Nubowo, 2019, 24). In addition, Ma’ruf also had a pivotal role in the 
incarceration of Ahok. The Ahok case accentuated that Islamic populism has become 
increasingly anti pluralist and illiberal in nature (Hadiz, 2018, 566). This type of political 
identity becomes a cultural resource pool from which cross-class alliances might evolve to bind 
a section of the populace, in their grievances against perceived economic and cultural 
oppressors, which includes domestic and foreign sources of threat (Hadiz, 2016). 
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We can observe the power relations that emerge from each symbolisation and discourse of 
Islamic populism in Indonesia as an electoral strategy, and that it is increasingly emphasised 
that in the Indonesian Elections Indonesian Muslims and Indonesian Islamic groups have 
significant power to attract elite attention (Mietzner, 2020) Prabowo had expressed anti-elitist 
sentiments, putting blame on political elites for their corrupt practices and involvement of 
foreign investments. This is evident from the following statement he made during the 2014 
Presidential election: 
 
“We must remember, the Indonesian nation is on the threshold of becoming a joke 
republic”46 
 
Based on this view that Indonesian political elites are the source of corruptive practices in the 
country, Prabowo portrayed himself as the ‘saviour’ for this problem, when he went on CNN 
in 2018 to state to the extent that the ‘Indonesian nation would become extinct if he did not win 
the 2019 Presidential Elections’(Regan, Hollingsworth, Quiano and Faidell, 2019), which 
presents as a paradox, as Prabowo is originally from the inner circle of Indonesia’s political 
elite. His father, a former minister during the New Order era, and his former father-in-law was 
President Suharto (who was notorious for corruption during his 32-year tenure as President). 
 
The election outcome showed that Islamic populism’s influence was limited and not 
significant, as voters who chose religious based parties were only 4%47. Prabowo’s party 
coalition comprised of Islamic based parties such as PKS, PAN and Gerindra, with each party 
promoting their own individualised ideologies, but simultaneously discrediting the current 
 
46 Satrio, A. (2019). A Battle Between Two Populists. The 2019 Presidential Election and the Resurgence of 
Indonesia’s Authoritarian Constitutional Tradition. p. 8. 
47 Hara, E. (2019). The Failure of Islamic Populism in Indonesia’s 2019 Election. P. 262. 
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government as being ‘anti-Islamic’. However, some parties within the Prabowo coalition 
(Democrat Party) were more reluctant to use Islamic rhetoric within their campaigns and kept 
a distance from associating themselves with the coalition parties (especially after the 
Presidential election) (Hara, 2019, 263). 
 
The Indonesian case gave rise to a new form of Islamic populism which appeared to shift the 
battle between the people and the elites. The battle that ensued between two groups that were 
portraying Islamic populism movements, were both fighting for executive power. According 
to Hadiz, the new Islamic populism constitutes to a specific form of mobilisation based on 
symmetrical multi-class coalitions (Hadiz, 2018, 20). The strength of Islamic populism 
depends on the actions carried out by Islamic groups as a response to their disapproval for neo-
liberal modernisation and globalisation. He asserts that the main factor that contributed to the 
anti-Ahok mass mobilisation was the marginalisation of the people and that the ethnic Chinese 
minorities are the social groups that benefitted from economic development (Hadiz, 2017).  
 
In addition, he argues that the growth of Islamic populism is directly related to the people’s 
disappointment in democracy. In contrast to classical populism, that aims to curate and 
construct democratic processes to the demands of the people, Islamic populism differs in that 
the ‘Ummah’ is used as a proxy for populists who are exclusively fighting for the Muslims. In 
addition, Hadiz argues that Islamic populism supports a system of democratic interfaith 
governance such as a shariah-based government and emphasizing on the aspect of 
strengthening of identity-based politics under the symbol of religiosity.  He argues that 
religious worldview doesn’t instigate a populist movement, but such that economic uncertainty 




Prabowo began to mobilise the Muslim constituency that felt disenfranchised by the status quo, 
which he claimed was caused by the privileged ethnic Chinese and Christian minority, as the 
Chinese Indonesian community are disproportionally represented by the country’s business 
class (Warbuton and Muhtadi, 2019). Their concentration of wealth lies within a narrow 
political class in particular with the Indonesian Chinese elite who had strong ties with 
Indonesian politicians. The message infused by Prabowo was that there was an inequality with 
sectarian sentiments (although he was careful with his speeches and campaigns to not overtly 
target Christians, and left his Islamists to do the job i.e. preaching racist remarks), and that the 
economic disparities of the country were the fault of a cohort of privileged ethnic Chinese and 
foreign involvement. This is derived from the following statement: 
 
“We are not anti-foreigner but we need to take care of our own people, if we open our door to 
foreign workers, then what is left for us?"48 
 
Prabowo’s populism used ‘anti-asing49’ (anti-foreign) attitudes similar to the West, but they 
added the issue of religious teachings and religious identity to appeal themselves towards the 
populous Islamic community. The merging of these issues did provide a rise to militant and 
loyalty among Prabowo’s loyal followers, to draw between lines of identity between ‘us’ and 
‘others’. 
 
Prabowo’s brand of populist strategy was adamant on attacking the elites (which ironically, he 
was a part of) whilst claiming to represent on behalf of the will of the people. In contrast to 
 
48 Henschke, R. (2019). Indonesian 2019 Elections: How many Chinese workers are there? BBC News Asia. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47881858. 
49 Anti-Foreign sentiments was a popular rhetoric used by Prabowo and his Islamist coalition. 
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Jokowi, who was not as aggressive in his populist rhetoric, he also cultivated an idea that he 
was also not part of the elite and would refer to his humble beginnings selling furniture. 
 
By defining nationalistic and religious identity allowed Prabowo to appear more moral and 
pious to some as compared to the current government. Prabowo supporters succeeded in 
mobilising power both during and after the Presidential election, that they considered rejection 
of election results as legitimate especially when they considered the government as not 
religious, immoral and pro-China (Hara, 2019, 260). 
 
In addition, prominent Islamist leaders had made intense claims to embody the will of the 
people, in which they have defined as a collective determination to abide by God’s law. An 
example is Habib Rizieq Shihab, who proclaimed himself to be “The Great Leader for 
Indonesian Muslims”, providing a voice for the devout and to eliminate all of ‘Islam’s enemies’ 
(Sheany, 2018). In this respect, this hybrid of a specific version of Islamism and populism is 
similar to right-wing populism in other parts of the world, where religious identity have become 
significant elements for a populist actor’s platform (Stavrakakis, 2002, 36). 
 
Islamists in the Prabowo camp began pushing for a move in the direction towards a more 
Islamic/Shariah orientated democracy, even though Prabowo himself did not accentuate on the 
matter in his campaigns (Lane, 2019, 6). It was not surprising that during the election, issues 
pertaining to identity, were being utilised so that parties could gain support from different 
regional areas. This is where Rizieq Shihab’s role in the election was significant, as he 
articulated to implement the NKRI Bershariah (implementing Shariah Law in Indonesia as 




At the height of the election campaigns, ethnoreligious populism was prominent in Indonesia. 
The 212 rally was a prominent example of the extent of the power of religious narratives 
through the support by several political parties, including the FPI. An oath of allegiance was 
given to the leader of the FPI, Habib Rizieq. The preacher had once argued that it was 
considered forbidden in Islamic law to vote for a President who condoned Blasphemy. The 212 
rally was also used by those who felt they were being economically marginalised, especially 
as Ahok was considered to be close to prominent Indonesian elites, that it was easy to link 
economic marginalisation with religious and ethnic sentiments as a political strategy (Malik 
and Edwards, 2019). 
 
The Jokowi administration was able to control the rise of Islamic populism that was brought 
on by their opponents. This involved the use of illiberal measures and a revival of socio-
religious and ethnic politics. The opposition used similar methods employed by Jokowi that 
was mainly used to foster a direct communication between a leader and a ‘unified people’ 
against a common enemy (Törnquist, 2019, 464). Whilst Jokowi and Ahok remained focused 
on creating public programs for urban and infrastructural development that would benefit all 
Indonesians, Prabowo and his Islamists focused on development that would benefit only 
Indonesian Muslim’s. 
 
This prevalence of religious based identity politics during the campaign and increasing political 
polarisation in support of Jokowi and Prabowo, witnessed an increase in voter turnout of 154 
million, which was an 11% increase from the previous election (Arifianto, 2019, 47). At the 
time of the 2019 election, the cleavage of pluralist vs Islamist became a determining factor 
with regards to voter behaviour on both sides of the political spectrum. Voters who were akin 
to pluralist and pro-democratic views became a small minority and fell under attack who were 
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now exclusively fixated in defending multiculturalism. This tactic of defending democratic 
rights was noticeably absent during the campaign. During the Indonesian election, the 
significance of protecting minority rights is vital to a democracy and that cutting off the defence 
of such rights from advocacy and other liberal rights can have an antidemocratic effect 
(Aspinall and Mietnzer, 2019, 116). Both argue that the 2019 elections caused a deepened 
divide pivoting the country towards democratic regression. 
 
4.4 After the 2019 Presidential Election 
President Jokowi was officially inaugurated as President of Indonesian for a second term on 
October 20th 201950. When Prabowo found that he lost to Jokowi a second time, he immediately 
claimed election fraud (Pierson, 2019). When the Indonesian Courts found no legal basis to 
pursue Prabowo’s claims, he accepted defeated and left his supporters in the lurch, where he 
eventually joined Jokowi’s cabinet as Minister of Defence51. It confirms argument that it was 
purely strategic by Prabowo, and he felt no loyalty to his Islamist campaigners, who were no 
longer of any use. Even though Prabowo had lost the Presidency, he was still able to influence 
both Jokowi and oligarchs. In a Minister position, he has pursued nationalist and militarist 
policies, with no explicit religious component at all.  
 
The main reason why Islamic populism failed to provide an opposition win was that Prabowo 
and the Islamist groups promotion of Islamic populism was not considered ‘mainstream Islam’ 
in Indonesia (Amal, 2020, 585). The elites who supported Prabowo utilised simple ‘moral 
politics’ as an electoral strategy so that the public could easily accept their notion. The problem 
 
50 Adiputri, R. (2019). Indonesia After Election 2019- Politics As Usual. Viewed at 
https://politiikasta.fi/en/indonesia-after-election-2019-politics-as-usual-2. 





arose when oligarchs in opposition used religious issues to achieve their political goals, 
following on the success of the mass mobilisation during the Ahok case, only to realise that the 
same strategy resulted in a different outcome in the Presidential election. Islamic populism was 
mobilised for the sole political purpose of winning an election and had been ‘metamorphosized’ 
from an oppressed ummah (Hadiz, 2018, 571). 
 
The emerging identity politics and polarisation developed on both sides, on one side there were 
conservative Islamists, and on the other side, moderate Muslims and secular nationalists who 
support Jokowi (Arifianto, 2019, 52). A comparison of the strategies from both political actors 
indicates the religious angle of attack was the most effective strategy to win over voters. Since 
Prabowo had made the decision to reconcile with the President and joined him in his cabinets, 
many of the conservative Islamist leaders have pledged to continue in their battle as opposition 
against Jokowi. 
 
There is ample evidence of a growing Islamist cleavage in Indonesia, but not specifically 
caused by Islamist parties responsible for the mobilisation of social movements (Pepinsky, 
2018, 62). The main reason for the increase in clientelist democracy was due to social 
movements, strategic coalition making and elite endorsements. Even though Islamists are 
unlikely to win majority of votes or become successful in presidential campaigns, there is no 
doubt that their influence has had a huge impact on Jokowi’s new administration. 
 
By choosing a renowned conservative cleric, Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate in the 2019 
Presidential Elections, a threat to Indonesia’s democracy became apparent. Amin had an 
apparent bad track record of instigating discrimination and obvious persecution against 
religious minorities in Indonesia (Hendrianto, 2018). This choice by Jokowi had been of a 
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result of pressure from his coalition partners, the National Awakening Party. In actuality, this 
choice had turned into a win-win solution for Jokowi, as the support of the whole NU institution 
was able to protect Jokowi from the sectarian campaign brought on by the Islamic political 
groups who were responsible for overthrowing Ahok from a successful election win. This NU 
support assisted Jokowi in securing votes in East and Central Java that were central bases for 
NU and its activities (Fealy, 2018). 
 
With regards to Indonesia’s democratization process, both extremism and freedom of 
expression could come to the fore, as both were facilitated by the increased fuelling of Islamic 
populism and political strategy to instigate hate targeted at discrediting their political opponent 
(Fauzi, 2018). This provided the ability to combine hate speech and a ‘manufactured offense 
taking’ as a successful strategy. This creates a ‘democracy grey area’ as this tactic brings about 
a sense of manipulation by populist politicians who are not necessarily sincere to challenge 
legal democratic institutions (Fauzi, 2018).  
 
When democratic erosion occurs, this inherently becomes an elite project (Aspinall et al, 2019, 
3). The Indonesian political elite contributed to the democratic regression, although Aspinall 
also argues that the Islamist inspired populist campaigns and the lack of response from the 
Jokowi administration towards these authoritarian interventions, have been the cause of the 
emergence of illiberalism in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2019, 280). 
 
What remains in the current Indonesian political climate, is a growing cleavage between a more 
pluralist democracy and illiberalism. This is not a cleavage of secularism versus religiosity, for 
the Indonesian constitution reaffirms that that the country is a religious (if not Islamic) state, 
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with all nationalists of any prominence embrace their faith, and no non-Muslim candidate has 
any hope of serving as president.  
 
It can be asserted that Indonesia does not have a typical left or right-wing divide and 
antagonistic political ideologies on key policy areas (on economy, infrastructure etc). There is 
also the belief that similar to populism, support for Islamism is treated as a complex ideological 
concept, with some authors claiming populist rhetoric in Indonesia resonates with people with 
strong Islamic views within public life (Mietzner and Fossati, 2019, 778).  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Religion has become a potent vehicle for mobilisation in both Indonesia and Malaysia, for both 
Muslims and non- Muslims. Similar to Malaysia, the Indonesian election witnessed a three-
way battle between the Islamists, religious nationalists and secular nationalists that have 
become increasingly prominent and in Indonesian politics, thus pitting two candidates against 
one another essentially turning into a battle between Islamist and Non-Islamist.  
 
The elite political struggle has now been branded with “Islamic credentials’ and is now 
embedded in the current Indonesian political scene and is constantly changing. To show the 
dominance of Islamic discourse in Indonesian politics, historical events have shown that 
Islamic groups have always been the political barometer in issues of identity representation and 
election issues within the political superstructure (Bland, 2019, 9) and that it intersects with 
majoritarian idea that the ‘majority’ should be in power and governance. The discourse that 
arose from Islamic populism has been evolved from populists and their fight for the interests 
of Muslims. These are repetitions of discourses that occurred the 212 movement and anti-Ahok 
movement. On one hand, Islamic populism that was used by the Islamic groups had differing 
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views to get closer to the elites and to gain influence. On the other hand, discourse was easily 
influenced by narratives on social media and used as a political propaganda tool. 
 
According to Hadiz (2018) political movements were only able to succeed in using identity as 
an underlying strategy, only through the personality of the populist leader, and not necessarily 
because of the universal values of Islamic teachings that are able to resolve problems within 
the society. This is the case between Jokowi and Prabowo, as both similarly used religious 
rhetoric in their political strategy and not necessarily considered the epitome of piousness. He 
provides a solid argument of the kind of post-authoritarianism in Indonesia and that the 
emergence of Islamic populism cannot be differentiated from the people’s pessimistic attitudes 
towards democracy.  
 
Within the context of the 2019 election, the power of electoral contestation was evident in the 
confrontation of the ultranationalist Prabowo versus the ‘moderate populist’ Jokowi which 
resulted in the involvement of civil society groups to fight for power as a means of their struggle 
for power. The Ahok case granted access for FPI to enter the main political domain to generate 
attention from those in political power to allow them to forge strategic alliance such that they 
can gain access to power via their patron that holds executive power. 
 
When pluralists on Jokowi’s campaign were able to defeat Prabowo and his Islamist allies, this 
will come at the expense of civic and democratic freedoms, which can be categorised as 
‘illiberalism pluralism’ (Mietzner, 2018, 267). This is when Indonesian populism is considered 
both pluralist secularist and Islamic, however, the recent elections showed this to be increasing 
authoritarian illiberalism and maintaining democratic norms on both political sides rather than 
a shift towards a conservative turn. 
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The next chapter will now provide a comparative analysis of populist strategies used during 





RESULTS OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, populism has been used as a political strategy in both case studies, 
where the populist agenda has been one drawing on ethno-religious identity under the influence 
of political elites and oligarchs. Chapter’s 3 and 4 have outlined the different types of populist 
discourse undertaken by political elites during electoral contestation in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
to mobilise populist sentiments as a means to garner voter support. There are similarities to 
note in the populist discourse, such that there were political and religious elites on both sides 
of the political spectrum that were strategically co-opting and re-directing legitimate grievances 
within the public (such as growing inequality, economic downturn and reduced living 
standards) through a common nativist, identity-based populism, whilst on the other side, there 
were various constructions of a pluralist unity. In addition, both case studies showed that 
populists who utilised primarily nativist discourse failed in gaining electoral victory (Prabowo 
in Indonesia, and BN/UMNO in Malaysia).  
 
In contrast, there were also notable differences in the use of religious populism between both 
countries and the democratic conditions (with respect to electoral contestation and varied 
degrees of freedom of speech) in Malaysia and Indonesia that allowed political elites to utilise 
populism for their own political agenda and were able to achieve this using nationalist and 
religious populist discourse.  
 
It was found that in the Indonesian case, religious piety and religiously framed discourse 
generated some electoral support. Albeit the support was not specifically towards Islamic 
parties, it did translate into support for Prabowo, enough to generate mass mobilisation 
particularly in response to an increase in religious conservatism, especially in the West Sumatra 
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region, and mainly because the provision of social welfare and control of state resources take 
precedence, even when Islamic organisations have at times played significant mediating and 
influential roles during the process of electoral contestation (Hicks, 2012). 
 
This chapter will identify common themes during both elections which include: the use of 
nativism combined with religious populism, the emergence of ‘unlikely alliances between 
Islamic coalitions and populist group’s, framing of economic issues in identity terms and 
counter-populism invoking a pluralist national identity and citizenship.  
 
5.1 Nativism Combined with Religious Populism  
The previous two chapters presented that religious mobilisation is attributed to the primary 
motives of self-serving political elites. Thus, the majoritarian approach towards Islamic identity 
has served to marginalise minorities with the aim of implementing a specific political agenda 
to gain power and resources. The connection between ethnicity and religion has always been 
strongly associated, with affirmative action closely linked to giving precedence to Bumiputera’ 
and Pribumi’ (Ufen, 2009). This has brought a rapprochement towards ethnic and religious 
minorities and could eventually lead to a diminishing of minority rights, particularly in 
Malaysia, as the ruling government are continuing to sideline more ethnic Chinese and Indian’s 
even though they play an integral part of the democratic process.52 In addition, there has been 
a gradual increase in the type of religiosity within Malay society that has cleaved Malaysians 
in terms of ethnicity and religious beliefs, that can lead to deviation from a more inclusive 
secular Malaysian government (Welsh, 2020). 
 
52  Chinese and Indian Malaysia’s have always felt like second class citizens in their own country, which is why 
majority have decided to leave the country in search for a better life. It is interesting to note that Malaysia 
loses a substantial number of talented pool of skilled and intellectual citizens as a result of the precedence on 





In Indonesia, there was a repression of Islamic groups by Jokowi in the name of guarding 
pluralism (Fealy, 2020), whilst at the same time its populisms combination with secularism has 
led to endorsement by pluralists of anti-democratic measures to combat Islamist threats 
(Aspinall and Mietzner, 2019, 116). In Malaysia, there were elements of an inclusive kind of 
Islamism, within various political parties such as Amanah, PKR and Bersatu. The dynamics of 
Malay politics post GE14 were being defined as a rivalry between two major coalitions that 
each contained elements of Malay nationalist and Islamist forces i.e. PAS-UMNO versus 
Amanah-Bersatu (with DAP and PKR). 
 
Both case studies show that elements of Islamist and ethno-nationalist rhetoric has become a 
‘compulsory pre-requisite’ during periods of electoral contestation, especially during the age 
of social media. What was noticeable in populist discourse for both the Malaysian and 
Indonesian case studies was significant involvement and influence of the NU support for 
Jokowi and Mahathir’s inclusiveness of Amanah and Bersatu, that were crucial in achieving 
electoral victory. For example, the breakdown of the overall Indonesian votes showed that 
Prabowo succeeded in gaining voter support in the more conservative parts of the country such 
as Aceh but was unsuccessful in gaining support from non-Islamic area’s such as Bali and 
North Sulawesi (Juoro, 2019). 
 
Indonesia’s political parties are abundant in their opportunities to politicise Islam and mobilise 
supporters, and thus, the 2017 gubernatorial elections provided a unique opportunity for such 
parties to exercise this strategic approach through populism. The Pancasila promise53 was still 
upheld, as historically Islamists parties have had little support and limitations in their ability to 
 
53  Pancasila is Indonesia's longstanding formula for secular rule. The idea of Pancasila was formalised on June 
1, 1945 as the basic foundations of a newly formed independent Indonesian state. It comprised of 
philosophical components that embodied a harmonious society based on religious tolerance, humanity, unity, 
democracy and social justice (Bourchier, 2019, 715) 
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mobilise supporters. Key conservative groups in Indonesia always attempted to mobilise 
sectarian sentiments, even during the 2014 Presidential election. What was noticeably different 
during the 2019 election was the involvement of elites and oligarchs who helped expand their 
popularity on a bigger and broader political stage. 
 
Malaysia, on the other hand, demonstrated that ethnoreligious sentiments remain even after the 
election. BN’s surprise defeat provided fertile ground for ethnoreligious populism to play a 
central role in electoral contestations, and provided a contour for a moral contest between PH 
and BN. A pure Malay-Muslim identity had been constantly upheld by UMNO and PAS and 
have reinvigorated UMNO’s popular support to protect the Malay’s from the liberals from 
within PH and their supporters. The fact that PH was an internally diverse coalition to begin 
with, proved difficult to eliminate any remnants of ethnoreligious sentiments for those who 
planned to stay in power (Aminuddin, 2020,13). 
 
In addition, during electoral campaigns, there was evidence of accentuating Islamic rhetoric 
that a vote for an Islamic leader will grant voters a ‘ticket to heaven’. This was promoted during 
PAS campaigns in Malaysia and in Indonesia, there was a campaign rhetoric that states: ‘do 
not choose leaders of different religions because the sin is heavier than drinking alcohol and 
eating pork’ (Chew, 2019, Aminuddin, 2020). In addition, this use of hard approach was greatly 
accentuated during religious sermons in Mosques and Musollah’s (prayer area’s), where some 
placed banter’s stating that voting for an ‘kafir’ (non-believer) were not welcome to enter and 
even not be granted the right to an Islamic burial54. 
 
 




The analysis also showed how Malaysia is following suit to Indonesia’s religious political 
strategy in terms of movements and installations of similar Islamic institutions. For example, 
both 212 and 812 movements had similar mobilisation in terms of support for a Malay 
dominated and Islamic orientated government but were not necessarily outright racists or 
conservative Islamists. These two movements were strongly related to the political competition 
in both countries, even though 212 occurred prior to the 2019 Presidential election, and 812 
after Malaysia’s GE 14. However, they were not based on a coherent ideological course, their 
incline was for a ‘Muslim orientated nation’ based on a common perceived enemy; Ahok and 
non Pribumi’s in Indonesia, and DAP/ non-Malay’s and ICERD in Malaysia (Weng, 2018). 
 
The ethno-religious populists, including PAS elites in Malaysia have influenced the masses to 
forgive the scandalous sins of corruptions and abuses of power committed by leaders from the 
previous government with some even going to the extent of arguing that better a corrupt 
Muslim leader is better than a non-Muslim leader (Akmar, 2019).   
 
With Malaysia, PH’s populist language changed somewhat where new ministers talked about 
the current issues facing the country have been the result of the failings of the previous BN 
government. The current opposition parties of PAS and UMNO are now seeking to find their 
ground in the new political climate. From the previous populist electoral victories and 
successful political platforms from the right wing, similar to Europe and the United States, 
there is a great possibility that the current opposition will adopt a more populist stance to 
combine more Malay nativist and Islamic sentiments, especially when the new regime have 




By examining the contours of the political strategies between BN and PH, this chapter affirms 
that these political strategies were a crucial ingredient in populist politics in the 2018 election. 
The unexpected institutional and demographic changes in the country’s political landscape 
introduced a fresh and new ideological cleavage that enabled PH to capitalise on moral rhetoric 
through a concise political strategy that was able to combat BN’s conservative religious 
nationalist rhetoric. However, the PH victory and their viability as a government, now proves 
that this cannot be taken for granted. There is strong evidence to show that the ‘new 
government’ still show similar ethnoreligious traits as BN, and there is still a potent clash of 
differing ideologies between the fragment coalition (Chew, 2019) to allow for a conservative 
ethnoreligious wave to take over democracy (to be elaborated in greater detail in the next 
chapter). 
 
Whilst PH may have won on a wave of populism during GE 14 in May 2018, a majority of 
political critics have predicted that the UMNO-PAS alliance will adopt a different 
ethnoreligious populist stance for the next bi-elections and general elections, similar to what 
occurred during the Indonesian Presidential Election between Prabowo and Jokowi. This would 
be more affective within the rural Malay majority populace. To a certain extent, this specific 
kind of politics can be similarly compared within PH, with the Parti Pribumi Bersatu and 
Amanah to instigate a similar Islamic populist rhetoric. Islamic populism will most notably be 
evident during the next general election, especially when every party coalition will battle it out 
over the rationale to win and rule (Tee, 2019). 
 
The surprise outcome of the election introduced new elements to analyse political changes in 
authoritarian regimes, and this thesis has focused on the direct (political elites) and indirect 
ways (civil society organisations and party’s fragmented institutions ie. IKSIM, PERKASA, 
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ISMA) that influenced the role that religion plays in analysing populism as a political strategy. 
The characterisations of populism as nationalist and/ or religious (or both) do not specifically 
differentiate between the dynamics of countries with more diverse populations with less 
dominant religious majorities.  
 
PAS achieved electoral victories in northern states in Malaysia which are almost exclusively 
habituated by Malay Muslims. Electoral authoritarianism has been the framework for both 
cases and authoritarianism has been in control of the coherent state policies on the role of Islam. 
The Malaysian case showed that the populist battle between PH and BN showed unprecedented 
institutional and demographic change that enabled PH to take advantage of a moral rhetoric to 
neutralise BN’s (and PAS’) conservative religious nationalism. However, PH maintained to 
make appeals to the people, especially where religion and ethnicity played a central role during 
electoral contestation.  
 
The rise of Islamism in Malaysia has been mainly state-led and the expansion on religious 
bureaucracy has been influenced by central government agencies (ISMA, JAKIM). The 
competition with PAS and the ruling government had brought forth impulses for further 
Islamisation, however, the Federal government had always been able to contain these opposing 
forces (Arakaki, 2009, 84).  
 
With Indonesia, the rise of Islamism was derived from populist Islamists who viewed 
Presidential candidate Prabowo as a leader who could challenge Jokowi in bringing forth their 
populist Islamist agenda. Despite the Islamists disagreement in Prabowo’s choice of running 
mate (Sandiaga Uno, a pious investment banker), the support from Muslim voters for Prabowo 
did not decrease and remained strong. Meanwhile, Jokowi picked well known Muslim Chair 
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of the Indonesian Ulama Council, Maaruf Amin, to be his running mate, in the hopes it would 
satisfy his party’s requirements and to be in the running to gain further support from Muslim 
voters (Juoro, 2019). 
 
5.2 Alliances Between Islamic Coalitions and Populist Parties 
A form of mobilisation found in both cases were the new (and unlikely) alliances formed 
between political parties, specific civil society organisations and prominent political elites.  
Identity based populism facilitated cross-class alliances to offer an identity transcendent of 
conflicting material interests. This was an appeal towards both the people and elites, as a notion 
of a collective identity. With reference to the organisations and movements, a myriad of civil 
state organisations and interest groups aligned themselves with populist political parties. 
 
An example of such groups include Sisters in Islam in Malaysia provided support to PH, whilst 
conservative radical groups, ISMA and IKSIM in Malaysia supported BN/UMNO. In 
Indonesia, groups such as Jama’ah Tabligh and FPI, Hizbut Tahiri came in support for 
Prabowo. These specific alliances/ connections played a prominent role as part of a strategy as 
ISMA and IKSIM aligned themselves with BN- even though they were not political 
organisations, still mobilised Malay -Muslims in support of the then BN government. In 
Indonesia, FPI aligned themselves with Prabowo as he was their key to promoting their agenda 
on the larger political stage and to become one step closer to gaining access to power and 
resources. 
 
Islamic populism emerged as a party platform representing a unified set of Islamic values and 
identity that crosses class and social lines, in response to problems in the nation.  It was evident 
that the same strategy of ethnoreligious populism applied to their political opponents as a 
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‘counter-discourse’ to gain sympathy and support from the people (Adiwilaga, Mustofa 
Rahman, 2019, 451). Interestingly, this strategy has been used by both opposing parties (and 
in Malaysia’s case with BN and PAS), as it creates a sense of competition to decide which 
party/ political candidate is more religious than the other as a strategy to gain votes. 
 
In Indonesia, the ‘unlikely alliance’ between Prabowo and the Islamists was a significant aspect 
of populist politics because it was evident that the alliance was purely strategical and not as a 
result of a common ideological denominator ie. to uphold the sanctity of religion from ‘the 
non-believers. This link was primarily majoritarian, as both Prabowo and FPI both adopted 
authoritarian interpretations of the Indonesian constitution. It was not specifically about 
religion, as Prabowo was not the epitome of a perfect Muslim55, however, the political 
interpretation was that it underscored illiberal and undemocratic politics. Islamists decided he 
was their best chance in gaining leverage and power of influence during the Presidential 
Election. In contrast, there was also the pluralist approach that articulated with inclusive 
visions; however, this was deemed illiberal by Jokowi and his camp (Mietzner, 2018, 280). 
 
Whilst in Malaysia, an UMNO-PAS collaboration appeared to gain leverage with voter 
support, despite their current limitations in power and governance and the fact that the same 
strategy failed during the GE14 Election. By-elections in Sungai Kandis, were held three 
months after GE14, is illustrative of the fact that the new ethnoreligious mobilisation is gaining 
traction with voter support. PAS have claimed that a PH candidate would threaten Malay rights 
and the sanctity of Islam, which is taken right from the textbook of UMNO’s political narrative 
(Otswald, 2018). 
 
55It is important to take into account Prabowo’s own Islamic credentials were dubious, as his mother was 
Christian and he was vocal about attending Church (McBeth, 2019). 
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5.3 Framing Economic Issues in Identity Terms 
Another feature of populist politics between the two case studies through identity-based 
populism leads to a shrinking middle class and increased job insecurity. Ethnic group members 
within larger numbers of societies, have shown popular support to populist parties as increased 
job insecurity. Populist party leaders have attributed to the deepening of international economic 
integration or economic globalisation (Mughan, Bean and McAllister, 2003). Relating to both 
the Malaysian and Indonesian case, the global financial crisis resulted in the lower class to 
resonate with populists who utilised identity and religion to gain support. 
 
The important take on the 2018 election in Malaysia was the new PH coalition being able to 
successfully mobilise a populist narrative that was largely based on economic grievances and 
anti-corruption (and to a lesser extent ethnoreligious nationalism). BN maintained the use of 
‘defending Malay rights and the sanctity of Islam’ as per their previous tactics during elections 
that had always ensured a victorious electoral win (Nadzri, 2018, 145). This strategy was used 
to accentuate that household debt, job insecurity and poor indicators of economic performance, 
strengthened PH’s populist appeal.  
 
It was not difficult for political actors and groups such as Prabowo and UMNO leaders to link 
economic marginalisation with ethnic and religious sentiments. For example, Ahok was close 
to the rich elites, and Malaysia’s richest elites were ethnically Chinese56. This played into the 
institutionalised perceptions of Ethnic Chinese as rich elites, implying that they were to blame 
for the economic stagnation and being labelled as ‘foreign’ (Abdul Khalid and Yang, 2019). In 
addition, despite the ethno-nationalist tone that the PH leadership rhetoric often took, Mahathir 
 




and other PH leaders attempted to instil the idea for reform, but nevertheless the PH leadership 
remained entrenched in racialist schemes and failed to address economic disparities in other 
ways than purely based on race57. Many ‘populist’ coalitions combined seasoned political elites 
with more extreme partners whose task is to “hype up” the rhetoric, which had succeeded in 
mobilising support eg. Prabowo with his Islamists, and the UMNO-PAS alliance. 
 
It is important to note that Mahathir Mohmad had once famously written a book entitled “The 
Malay Dilemma”58, that aptly describes the presence of an economic (and political) plan to 
always favour the country’s Malay Muslim majority, normally at the expense of reducing 
similar rights to ethnically Chinese and Indian Malaysians. This is important as Mahathir 
during the 2018 election, was a prominent leader in promoting for a “New Malaysia”, which 
many perceived to involve the implementation of equal precedence for all ethnicities. The 
aftermath of the election has confirmed this was not the case, as ethnoreligious policies with 
the PH government will still prevail (Abdul Hamid, 2020). 
 
5.4 Counter-Populism Invoking A Pluralist National Identity and Citizenship 
In Indonesia, senior FPI officials were in control of Prabowo’s election campaign and became 
politically influential. It was this secondary status that resulted in Jokowi targeting them or 
criminalisation due to their ability to mobilise and maintain their strong grassroots network 
(Ahnaf, 2017). Even though their mobilisation tactics worked against Ahok back in 2017, the 
same strategy used during the Presidential Election two years later, however, did not produce 
the same outcome. Jokowi (through his own illiberal and populist tendencies during the 
 
57 Sin Chew Daily (2020). Mahathir’s ‘Rich Chinese’ Assertion. Viewed on 20th July 2020 at 
https://www.sinchew.com.my/content/content_2299071.html. 
58 Mahathir Mohamad’s political manifesto entitled The Malay Dilemma, which was published in 1970, 
highlighted the economic disparities between Malay’s and ethnic Chinese, and accentuating the precedence 
given to the Malay’s in terms of University Quota, Property pricing, and business ownership. The book was 
published eleven years before Mahathir officially became Prime Minister in 1981 (Liu, 2019, 1). 
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campaign) was able to counteract the oppositions’ use of Islamic populism, to be re-elected for 
a second term in office. 
 
The 2018 election saw three unequal actors BN, PH and PAS battling out in pursuit of power 
that was a consequence of intra Malay elite feuding. The competition for (rural) Malay votes 
had led to an emergence of contestations between Malay Political elites and leaders, who both 
utilised identity politics and religion in their campaigns (more so with BN and PAS, rather than 
PH). This resulted in a fiercely contested issues such as ethnicity, religion, cost of living 
(Welsh, 2018) was being sidelined, but it is not solely by the traditional Islamists. Such issues 
were being contested by different factions of the PH coalition, PAS and UMNO members in a 
unified rhetoric to redefine the notion of the people and the nation.  
 
Nonetheless, many conservative Malay voters remained in the safety of UMNO’s nationalist 
agendum is as they felt the core elements of PH’s manifesto were marginalising their rights as 
Muslim Malays (Parameswaran, 2020). The trajectory of reform politics was now under threat 
due to the consequences of elite struggles within PH component parties. PH knew it needed to 
create a sense of championing Malay Muslim rights in their electoral campaigns, to emphasise 
on not appearing racist. Specifically, during the aftermath of the election, there was the 
emergence of ethnoreligious rallies in Malaysia (Ng, 2018). The main aim by the BN 
government during their campaigns, were to shape the perceptions and discourses amongst the 
Malay Muslim majority to portray the PH government as ‘anti-Malay’ and ‘anti-Islamic’.  
 
Jokowi was considered by political a technocratic populist (Mietzner 2018, Arif 2019, 
Hatherell, 2020) which was also the term to describe the PH coalition (Lee 2019, Whiting, 
2020 Balasubramanium, 2018). The appeal of technocratic populism is that in both cases, PH 
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and Jokowi did not promise to return power to the people, but rather they promote the 
increasing need for voters to renounce politics and political parties (Bland, 2019). This is 
particularly the case as there is a growing challenge with pluralistic forms of representative 
democracy (Guasti, 2018). However, in order to attempt this, both PH and Jokowi had to ensure 
there was a religious base accentuated within the campaigns to create a sense of reassurance to 
the people, however, the way in which this reassurance was implemented, was through illiberal 
and, to some extent, authoritarian means i.e. restricting freedom of rights for Islamist groups 
(Power, 2018, 321). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
With BN’s surprise defeat, and Jokowi’s re-election, both elections have provided ample 
material to analyse social and political changes in democracies that are susceptible to shifting 
towards authoritarian regimes, even when similar populist strategies were being used, albeit 
with different electoral outcomes. The previous two chapters have shown that there have been 
both direct and indirect influences on utilising religion as a form of populist politics and that 
there was an increased use of religion and ethnicity during the elections by prominent political 
actors, CSO’s and NGO’s. 
 
What has been evident in the elections in Indonesia and Malaysia, is the increase in the use of 
emotional messages and symbolism drawing on Islam, as an electoral strategy. This is used as 
a political strategy in order to legitimise, through populist appeals, both political candidates on 
opposite sides of the political spectrum, parties and policy platforms. Both cases show the way 
populism has impacted on current governance, as it bypasses substantive policy debate for 
emotive symbolism, especially when the opposition have become less pragmatic and 
increasingly nationalist, as well as using religious rhetoric in their election campaigns.  
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In Indonesia, the people’s acceptance of populist appeals is stronger, but were not limited to 
Prabowo’s electorate. With a strong correlation between populist attitudes and support for 
Islamists, populists are equally represented in the opposing camps i.e. the constitutional 
pluralists. There is also evidence that the people perceived unfairness within the current 
politico-economic system rather than having grievances towards specific modes of governance 
(Fossati and Mietzner, 2019, 793). 
 
Malaysia’s state and Islamic political parties have acted on their own political strategic routes. 
Electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia became a conducive to a form of religious mobilisation 
dependent on the actions of political parties manipulating religious populism during the 
election campaigns (Munro-Kua, 1996). The analysis has shown that in the Malaysian case 
study, the state themselves have mobilised part of the population through religion for their own 
political agenda. 
 
With Muslim majority countries, it is tempting to conclude that electoral contestation is a clash 
between secular and liberal religious political figures, and such stereotypes can be perceived 
as being embedded in monolithic notions of nationalism and populism (Prawesetyaran, n.d.). 
These characterisations, however, do not explain the dynamics of countries with religious 
majorities and with a more diverse population. What is evident during both electoral campaigns 
were that it was not merely a battle between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ but contesting 
majoritarianism with implications for democracy (discussed in more detail in the next chapter). 
There is one side of the political spectrum that promotes a more pluralist definition to Islam 
and the other that promotes a more exclusive majoritarian form of Islam, which was prominent 
in both the ruling governments and the opposition groups for both case studies. 
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Both cases possessed prominent signs of increasing use of Islamic idioms by conservative 
nationalist groups, with the counter mobilisation with 212 rallies and pro-pluralists (in 
Indonesia) and Bersih and the 812 movement (in Malaysia). Bersih comprised of mainly ethnic 
Chinese and Indians with a cohort of urban Malay’s and as such, there was less emphasis in 
‘defending the rights of Muslims’, and more emphasis on ‘defending the right of Malaysians’. 
The mass mobilisation of the 812 movement was geared by mainly Malay Muslims and Islamic 
Non- Governmental Organisations such IKSIM and ISMA (Weng, 2018) to try and ‘mimic’ 
FPI’s mobilisation strategy in Indonesia during the 212 movement. 
 
In some instances, the Indonesian case did show similarities to the right-wing populism in 
Europe, as the region’s autocratic leaning populists- Jokowi who is ruling (and was later re-
elected) and Prabowo who was a fierce political contender, both used similar strategies to 
position themselves as outsiders who can solve problems where the elites failed, whilst offering 
brutal approaches in targeting the minority groups within society, inevitably undermining the 
status of democracy as a whole (Kurlantzick, 2018). 
 
It is important to note the difference between the mainstream civil society organisations and 
Islamic civil society organisations that oppose critical views on state policies.  An example in 
Indonesia is NU and Muhammadiyah that have developed strong links to political parties with 
institutionalise traditionalism and modernism. In Malaysia, such organisations are smaller in 
comparison to NU and Muhammadiyah and are traditionally weaker in traditional nationalist 
movement. This shows that the level of influence of CSO’s during populist discourse is larger 
in the Indonesian case study as compared to the Malaysian case study, mainly due to the strong 




In addition, PAS and UMNO political elites have always had a not-so-subtle tendency to frame 
Malaysia’s political narrative as an existential battle between protecting the sanctity of Malay 
Muslim rights against the non-Malay’s, framing it as a political struggle, even when they 
attempted to exhibit superficial ethnic tolerance. It is important to note that GE14 showed only 
25-30% of Malay’ voted for PH, whilst the remainder of voters sided with either BN or PAS, 
so the potency of a populist Malay nativist/ Islamic populist platform is strong and inevitable 
to garner support/ mobilise for the next election. 
 
A notable difference between the two cases was that Malaysia utilised institutionalised 
religious populism through an incumbent, whilst Indonesia was through a populist contender 
for power with strategic alliances with Islamic groups. FPI’s appeal were more populist in that 
they alone believed to be defenders of Islam and their influence centres on forging alliances 
(as well as lobbying) with political elites (Nabbs-Keller, 2018). With PAS, they can be given 
the authority to implement the changes they see fit within the state the party controls. There 
are limitations to their power as, even if PAS pushes for more hard-line conservative policies 
(like Hudud Laws), these can be deterred by the federal government. 
 
The concepts of the people, the elite and ‘the others’ is being construed as valuable in defining 
populism within the context of this case study. It is important to focus on the different resources 
that were made available to the populist leaders and their supporters through the use of the 
people to demonise the ‘others’. Another important aspect in analysing populist discourse in 
both countries is majoritarianism. When un-Islamic elites invoke the use of Islam as a majority, 





Both elections showed why it is vital to account for religion in populist politics because both 
case studies show that each political scene have now seen a backlash of powerful ethnoreligious 
nationalists trying to undermine one another through mass mobilisation each displaying 
different electoral outcomes and turns into an imminent threat to democracy and norms. 
 
Prabowo has abandoned the Islamists and is now a member of his former political rival’s 
administration. His Islamist allies have been left out to dry and this confirms the argument of 
ethno-religious populism as an instrumental strategy (not a deeply held belief) on the part of 
elites and oligarchs.  This form of repressive pluralism through Jokowi is now targeting 
Islamists critics; the same people who had been core allies in the previous election. This again 
underscores the instrumentalist approach of elites pertaining to populist rhetoric. In Malaysia, 
the newly formed back-door government, PN, have now become a ‘fusion’ of both BN and PH, 
each with their own ethnoreligious tendencies to uphold the sanctity of Islam and protection of 
the special rights of Malay’s. 
 
According to Pepinsky (2019), a notable feature of Asian populists is the way in which they 
target a corrupt a ruling elite, whilst notably being a part of the same cohort of the corrupt elite 
they are targeting (Pepinsky, 2019, 595). These populists accentuate the inability of such 
existing political institutions in addressing the disarray in fixing such ‘social elements’ in 
society and that they claim (and in Prabowo’s case he merely seeks) to hold the solution to ‘fix’ 
these broken political systems and social elements.  
 
Populists will pose as a threat to the state of democracy as these populists often run-on 
platforms, whilst emphasizing on vague terms, pertaining to the people’s social welfare. Within 
each of the case studies, these populists have used ethnic and religious cleavages to bring light 
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on the differences in economic status and people’s social welfare, particularly as a result of 





CONCLUSION: POPULIST DISCOURSE A THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 
 
Several scholars (Urbinati, 1998; Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013; Levitsky and Loxton, 2012) 
have branded populism as a dangerous threat to democracy because of its illiberal and 
authoritarian tendencies, as well as its antagonist response to liberal core values. The last 
decade has seen more democracies transitioning into electoral authoritarianism created by a 
combination of populist challenges and a lack of government response (Mietzner, 2018, 280).  
 
Populism is not a temporary threat nor is it a minor phenomenon. There is a great challenge in 
defending core values of a pluralistic society that is free and equal, especially in established 
and growing democracies such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Such fragile liberal democracies are 
prone to subversion by populist leaders that have been elected by populist programs. According 
to Ratnapala (2019), the most dangerous type of populism was founded on nativism that 
identifies with race or religion with the nation and state with a charismatic national saviour 
(Ratnapala, 2019, 17). 
 
The relationship between populism and liberal democracy is ambiguous, as it can be both a 
threat and a corrective measure to democracy. However, this chapter argues that populism 
posed a threat to growing and established democracies such as in Malaysia and Indonesia, as 
the recent elections have exacerbated majoritarian tendencies and served to accelerate some 
illiberal and, to some extent, authoritarian tendencies, orchestrated by oligarch’s and elites as 




The global rise of populists poses a dangerous threat to human and minority rights, and 
according to Roth (2017, 79), today’s new generation of populists is reversing the role of 
human rights protection from governments. Other scholars have outlined the broader 
conditions that have facilitated populism globally, particularly in Europe and the United States, 
which has now emerged in South East Asia. Indonesia and Malaysia are both democratic 
nations that are both simultaneously experiencing the commencement of democratic 
regression, which has become a prominent feature as a result of populist politics that emerged 
during recent electoral contestations. In both countries, populists and political figures had not 
been able to successfully counteract the effects of populist elements, because the people were 
made aware of how populism has the ability of hindering development of democratic values 
and principles (Hara, 2018, 109). 
 
Populism works both ways where not only can it bring the people’s voice to appeal to a more 
pre-people rhetoric, but populism can also be used to mobilise to intimidate the court in the 
name of ‘the people’.  Whilst it is important to note the potential threats populism has to liberal 
democracy, the manifestation of populism provided the Brexit vote raised issues pertaining to 
parliamentary sovereignty, in addition to focusing on policy concerns and outcomes (Galston, 
2018). Even though populism has developed strong movements in both countries, but due to 
the fragmented and various groups involved (political parties and political elites), this can lead 
to a threat to democratic development. 
 
From the perspective of politicians, populism has now manifested as a ‘pre-requisite’, short 
term and opportunistic electoral strategy as a means to counter their political opponents. This 
has come at the expense of going against their liberal foundations i.e., through authoritarian 
and illiberal tendencies, as seen with Jokowi in the Indonesian case. The ‘populist hype’ has 
127 
 
always been a symbol for the powerlessness and that they are evoked in claims of popular 
demand (Mondon and Winter, 2020). Thus, both case studies show populists mobilising at the 
grassroots level which has now become an essential component in the democratic struggles, 
especially when being mobilised by elites.  
 
Majority of political scholar’s and academics (Kaltwasser, 2012, Roth 2017, Norris 2018) are 
prone to assume that elements of populism can be regarded as ‘bad’; include, illiberalism, anti-
pluralism, democratic decline, regimes claiming to act based on God’s will rather than the 
people, ethno-national autocracies and populists who seek to cleave between liberalism and 
democracy (Galston, 2018). The link between populism and democracy is the conceptualisation 
that elements of populism attempt to capture the anti-elites and the distinctive modes of 
political organisation which involve the elimination of political and civil society organisations. 
Populists are seeking to mobilise people against an established power, through negative 
rhetoric’s, and are able to deepen the distrust towards democratic principles (Kyle and Mounk, 
2018). 
 
Historically, ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia’s populist politics have been 
mainly driven by States and political elites, which has now resulted in both countries slowly 
pivoting towards a more democratic progression (Kofi Annan Institute, 2017, 39). In general, 
South East Asian countries are all similarly witnessing a threat to pluralism as a result of a 
combination of populism with poorly regulated democratic politics and a surge in ethno-
religious identity (Kofi Annan Institute, 2017, 39). 
 
Whilst many would argue that democracy in Malaysia, in a deep institutionalise sense, is very 
much in progress rather than consolidated, the country’s current democratic position has now 
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regressed under PH’s rule, who have been known to possess authoritarian tendencies when 
their party members were originally alumni’s of UMNO. This does not mean that these 
democracies are on the verge of collapse but are in danger of populists expanding their power 
and influence in an ‘illiberal’ way, to deter minority rights and amend legislation, whilst 
continuing to foster widespread corruption (Aspinall, 2019).   
 
Evidence from the Tony Blair institute in 2018, have shown that populist leaders who succeed 
into power, are far more likely to damage democracy, regardless of whether populist leaders 
were right or left wing. For example, from 1990 – 2014, both ring and left-wing leaders who 
were in power curtailed civil liberties and political rights with respect to their own democracies 
(Tony Blair Institute, 2018). The study shows that there is a strong empirical link between the 
increase in democratic decline with the rise of populism. In both these cases, this is palpable 
that both elections experienced similar decline in their respective democracy as a result of 
populist politics. 
 
This thesis affirms that populist discourse became an equal threat towards democracy for both 
Malaysia and Indonesia, as recent elections have shown how populism has played a 
contributing role towards this threat. This is in the form of democratic decline (in terms of 
diminished minority rights, rule of law), majoritarianism, and illiberalism with counter 
populism and the collapse of separation of power. 
 
6.1 Challenges to Democracy  
As briefly discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, populism becomes a challenge for democracy as those 
who practice it fervently believe that they embody the ideal representation of the people and 
will reject other notions of representation by the opposition. These populists do this by invoking 
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a myriad of reasons to criticise those in power and undermining their capabilities through 
various kind of conspiracies. When this is infused with misinformation or ‘fake news’, the risk 
for political instability becomes inevitable, especially when both countries have strong 
backgrounds in corruption.  
 
Populism becomes a challenge when populists believe they embody the needs and wants of the 
people and refuse to accept a legitimate opposition. If this type of populism persists and is 
combined with false information and viral hoaxes, this will risk the emergence of political 
instability within the country. With countries that already have corrupt elites in power 
(applicable to both Malaysia and Indonesia), populism becomes a vehicle for pro-democracy 
activist and nationalists. This provokes an opposition to rise and increases the use of non-
democratic measures when going up against the ruling elite (Wisnu, 2019, 50). 
 
According to Markar (2018), most notable political scientists deter from declaring that a direct 
form of democracy is the ideal form of governance. Even though there are various types of 
populism (as discussed is Chapter 1), populism as a type of brand does promote the opportunity 
to implement good governance, uphold democratic ideals and socio-economic development, 
which is beneficial to the people as it encouraged democratic activism and reduces any 
likelihood of threats (Markar, 2018). 
 
In order to present their illiberal messages and consolidate their power and influence, populists 
exploit the underachievers and faults within the society (Mudde, 2015). Both countries have 
shown strong cleavages within all three categories: religion, social class and ethnicity. Through 
the use of social media and electoral platforms, populist politicians were able to communicate 
with the people directly and would target freedom of press and judicial independence.  
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Populist mobilisation can increase democracy representativeness but undermine governance. 
Such mobilisation strategies can polarise electorate into exclusionary groups and able to be 
successful due to lack of state control and strong civil society organisations within the 
opposition. Polarisation was a recurring feature in both case studies. With a higher polarisation, 
this means there will be fewer moderating blocs within the society and increases the risk of 
political instability and inevitable democratic breakdown. This is especially true if strong 
partisanship override’s voter’s considerations of democracy (Liddiard, 2019). When populists 
are challenged by the opposition, governments in power will appeal to the will of the people to 
remain in power. 
 
Populist dissatisfaction arises as a result of differing grievances from each social class, and is 
no longer accentuated by economic crisis, but rather a precariat that turns to populist leaders. 
For example, the upper class feels threatened by immigrants and foreign competition, whilst 
the populist middle class (and other elites) are concerned with protecting their social status 
from poor governance or inability to stabilise their achieved social status (Pabst, 2018).  
 
The real challenge to democratic growth is also the inevitable of populist movements/ mass 
mobilisation succeed in establishing a new illiberal rule to combat the “the others”. This can 
have a significant impact in terms of democratic growth as illiberal leaders appear to embrace 
the procedural aspects of democracy, yet only express a superficial commitment to minority/ 
individual rights, which can inhibit significant democratic growth (Aspinall, Fossati , Muhtadi 
& Warburton, 2019, 2) of both countries. If elected leaders are not inclined to commit to 
democracy, then this becomes a warning sign for democratic decline. Jokowi appears to be the 
new possible threat to democracy, and this thesis argued that his illiberal and technocratic 
populist approach can deter Indonesia’s democratic progress. 
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6.2 Linking Illiberalism with a Counter-Populism 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the idea of a counter-populism that invokes the idea of a pluralist 
national citizenship has an attached illiberal notion. There are two important sets of 
observations to note during both elections: the point of forming a multi-party electoral has not 
only succeeded in garnering voter support but has led to the emergence of illiberalism and 
eventually begun the process of democratic decline. In addition, there are no opposing political 
teams with articulate opposing views i.e., conservative vs liberal. Both case studies show that 
populism was used as a sense of distraction through engagement of emotions to push for a more 
illiberal agenda for those candidates that were successful in being successful in their respective 
elections, even when both sides of the political spectrum were regarded as ‘right-wing 
conservatives’. 
 
There has now been increasing signs of illiberalism that has eroded the stability of both 
developing and established democracies. Populist politics does not necessarily target the weak 
and marginalised sector’s; however, populism becomes a threat to liberal democracy when it 
becomes culturally exclusionary (not necessarily racist) and exhibits contempt for pluralist 
notions that intrinsically respect differences (Rummens, 2017, 554), in particular when it 
implies restrictions on basic rights such as freedom of speech to maintain equality for 
democratic institutions and processes. 
 
Suffice to say, Indonesia can be categorised as an illiberal democracy (Aspinall, 2019, 280), 
where a democracy has free and fair elections held alongside a denial of basic rights such as 
freedom of speech. Warbuton and Muhtadi (2019) have illustrated that after two heavily 
divisive electoral campaigns in 2014 and 2017, where there were problems of economic 
distribution that were being mobilised and manipulated by political and religious elites. There 
132 
 
has been widespread debate on inequality within the Indonesian electorates which has been 
divided along partisan lines. When the nature of populism is majoritarian and illiberal, this will 
inevitably pose a threat to democracy if it meddles with prejudice against cultural minorities 
and thus developing dilemmas for democracy, as well as potential damage to existing 
institutions and weaken/ destabilise democracy itself (Diamond, 2017). 
 
Indonesia has seen growing vulnerability in its democratic process and its regression is driven 
by the government itself. To some extent, Jokowi was able to implement concentric 
containment strategies in dealing with Prabowo’s ‘undemocratic political forces’ through the 
advocation of a non-inclusionary approach towards populist actors during the election, whilst 
simultaneously he was advocating an inclusivist accommodative strategy towards the people 
ie. voters (Mietzner, 2018, 266). 
 
From oligarchs to hard-line Islamists wanting to implement Shariah Law, these actors shared 
a common interest in pushing back the democratic growth of Indonesia. What can be observed, 
is Jokowi was unable to implement or foresee long term political change and would rather 
invest in short-term political stability (Bland, 2019). As Bouchier (2019) affirms, Indonesia is 
not on the road to become an Islamic state, but rather a technocratic autocracy. Populism ushers 
in a new type of political system known as illiberal democracy that undermines the rights of 
minorities under an umbrella of liberalism. What has (re)emerged in Jokowi, is a ‘non-
democratic pluralist’, that becomes a threat to Indonesian social cohesion and national identity 
posed by Islamism to justify restrictions on freedom of association e.g. Banning Hizbut Tahrir 
in 2017 (Gammon, 2019). It can be asserted that the promotion of aggressive nationalism 




In contrast to Malaysia, this combination of aggressive nationalism has led to a more 
legitimisation of Islamic movements (through BN and PAS), which has now provided a way 
to remove liberty rights and sidelining of minority groups (Weiss, 2020). Previously, BN have 
used effective strategies to ramp up electoral support with claims that only they can best serve 
the interest of all races, when, they continue to give precedence to support Malay based parties 
and limit other ethnic based parties within BN (MIC – Indian and MCA- Chinese) (Nair, 2007, 
341).  
 
It is palpable that a specific kind of populism that is illiberal (and to some extent authoritarian 
in orientation for the Malaysian case) has specifically invoked the people through religious and 
ethnic identity terms in both cases. This brings forward the significance religious and ethnic 
identity will continue to play a significant component to influence electoral support during 
periods of electoral contestation.  
 
6.3 Majoritarian Identity and Democratic Regression 
Populists use of majoritarian identity was a key driver of electoral politics that threatens liberal 
modes of democracy and civil rights in both case studies. In both countries, it has been 
increasingly evident that, populists who have gained access to executive power (Jokowi and 
the elites within the Pakatan Harapan Government) and are no longer inclined to de-radicalise 
to push through democratic reforms.   
 
Populism, in both cases, became a threat to national unity and democracy pertaining to minority 
rights i.e. Chinese and non- Malay/ non Pribumi. Even though populism was used to enforce a 
united front of the people against a common enemy i.e. the corrupt elites these populist 
movements polarised the people and created a cleavage between its citizens. This is especially 
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prominent during periods of political movements or campaigns where the larger number of 
people gained traction and became easily mobilised using emotive tools pertaining to 
nationalism and religion (Pratamasari and Az Zahra, 2019, 100). 
 
More specifically, the Indonesian case accentuates the fact that even though the protection of 
minority rights is significant in democratic progression, by utilising authoritarian measures and 
severing defence of liberal rights and freedoms, this will have a negative impact on democracy 
(Aspinall and Mietzner, 2019, 116). ‘Repressive pluralism’ aptly describes the current 
democratic position of Indonesian democracy as it describes a potential ‘anti-democratic’ form 
of political mobilization by minority groups that put precedence over ethnoreligious and 
cultural pluralism over democratic progression (Fealy, 2020). The ‘radical pluralists’ also have 
the potential to be illiberal when they seek to limit and constrain other aspects of democracy 
from the opposing groups.  
 
In Malaysia, religious identity has now taken precedence over ethnic identity, and society has 
become aggressively Islamised that it has now become a variant of Malay ethnonationalism. 
When PH gained electoral victory, there was an emphasis on creating equal opportunities for 
all Malaysians, inclusive of minorities. However, there was an immediate backlash by majority 
of Malay Muslims that the new government was a threat to the on continuing to give special 
concessions to Malay-Muslims which created fears of the same authoritarian rule of the 
previous government (Weiss, 2020). 
 
The new manifestation of populist political discourse was palpable in both case studies as it 
appeals to fundamentals of Islamic conservatism, but not having to explicitly be conservative, 
as being charismatic and powerful populist leaders is enough to ignite this form of populism. 
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The commodification of religion during populist movements has now become an integral part 
of mass mobilisation that is able to hinder democratic development and principles, in the 
context of a poorly institutionalised democratic systems, diminishing of minority rights and a 
creating a tendency for authoritarianism. 
 
In the Malaysian case, the PH government failed to contain the anxieties of majority of the 
Malay Muslims who believed their rights were under threat by the ‘liberal Malay’s and non- 
Malay’s. This enabled the opposition to use identity politics to attack PH’s populist agenda and 
members of their own coalition ‘joined forces’ to popularise on the ‘Malay-Muslim’ 
insecurities and anxieties and forming the ‘backdoor- government’ in an undemocratic manner 
(Wong, 2020). 
 
Despite Mietzner’s view that he does not regard populism as a danger to democracy, during 
Jokowi’s five-year tenure as President had shown that he essentially weakened fundamental 
democratic elements such as inhibiting rights of free speech (with ethnic minorities), casting 
doubt on the integrity of legal institutions and democratic electoral system (Satrio, 2019).  
 
In addition, the biggest surprise in Jokowi’s cabinet picks was appointing Prabowo Subianto 
as the Defence minister, which brought forth questions as to the point of having an election, if 
the opposition leader accepts a major position in the government, instead of remaining an 
opposition leader (Anuqrah, 2020). In addition to this appointment, Jokowi also picked Tito 
Karnavian as the Head of the National police, which was a controversial pick, as he had gained 
notoriety for how he handled the various violet mass demonstrations (Anuqrah, 2020). These 
appointments are similar to the Suharto Era, which provides an important insight that the 
Suharto era is making a possible comeback, speeding up the democratic regression. 
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As outlined in Chapter 2, elites have used populism as an electoral strategy to mobilise the 
people during electoral contestation. This has now led to a threat to democracy as populists 
seek to demonise and marginalise the ‘outsiders’ in terms of diminishing minority rights and 
the rule of law. Populists have used religion as a way of forging a new accord to engage the 
people who feel as if they have lost their moral cores and values (Pabst, 2018). 
 
6.4 Threat to the Rule of Law 
A prominent feature of populist regimes is hostility towards law and order. Asian populists 
have been shown to not fully abide by the rule of law, and this could lead to a potential danger 
to democracy, especially when you have cases where populist leaders in Malaysia, have been 
able to politicise the courts (Drussel, 2020, 21). Asian democracies have shown that their weak 
institutions can be easily dismantled, especially with both Indonesia and Malaysia’s stagnant 
economic growth have not alleviated the general public dissatisfaction over corruption and 
inequality amongst minority rights (Kurlantzick, 2017). 
 
The main actors behind the recent democratic decline in Indonesia, has been religio-political 
elites, that took advantage on an opportunity to continue their anti-democratic push, and 
limiting access for civil society groups to mobilise protests and thus creating ideal conditions 
for such conservative politicians to push for their agenda on a more executive and legislative 
level. This would mean the opposition would be unable to compete and, ultimately weaken 
democracy and its progress (Mietzner, 2020, 15). 
 
Malaysia has seen its fair share of political elites, post GE14, who were able to influence in 
autocratic ways to apply Shariah based laws to be applied to all companies with Muslim 
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director’s (Lim, 2019), which Sisters In Islam (SIS: a Muslim Women Rights Advocacy Group) 
considered as backdoor ‘Shariah-sation’ of Malaysia law and the entire Constitution. 
 
6.5 Authoritarianism 
As noted by other researchers (Norris 2019, Rupprecht 2018), populists have often united under 
a common transnational network and that some political parties are able to influence policy 
through agenda- setting, especially when the populists are already in government with access 
to power and resources. The limitation of coalition governments, as in the case in Malaysia, is 
that populists within a coalition government are restricted and unable to act how they please.  
 
Many liberals in South East Asian democracies are experiencing a challenging paradox to 
combat the appeals of populism, and in doing so, would require undermining the very liberal 
principles they are preaching that distinguishes them apart from their populist antagonists. This 
would place autonomy above any other ethical priorities. (Kenny, 2018, 132). For example, the 
two key political figures: Mahathir and Prabowo are champions in the popular democratic front 
and are also known for their authoritarian tendencies. Despite differences between the two 
Indonesian presidential candidates (Prabowo and Jokowi), whether this be differences in their 
ideologies, the people they stand for, or their strategies; both embodied a potential threat to the 
practice of democracy by using democratic pretensions to deliver populist rhetoric. In 
Prabowo’s case, this threat was manifested in his tendency to support extreme and radical 
organisations that favoured authoritarian regimes. With Jokowi, it was his illiberal tendency to 
inhibit the rights of minorities through authoritarian measures. 
 
In addition, both Jokowi and Prabowo show evidence of authoritarian tendencies, as there are 
dangers in embarking in a conservative discourse and agenda’s via similar political strategies 
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leading Indonesia’s democracy towards a democratic decline. These elements of 
conservativeness on both sides of the political spectrum, show that religious conservatism is 
palpable and fully supported by the elites in the political arena and Islamic NGO’s. Islamic 
populism was further reinforced, as political elites knew that in order to win the election, they 
needed to approach Islamic groups, as they can affirm the people will be able reproduce Islamic 
populism phenomenon. 
 
Whilst the Jokowi government outplayed the rise of sectarian, identity politics through the co-
opting and criminalising of radical, conservative hard line Muslim critics (Fealy, 2020), this 
has shown that Jokowi and his government portray an authoritarian side, with the efforts in 
putting armed forces back in the barracks (Sambhi, 2020).  
 
In the Malaysian case, the opposition were able to band together with Tun Mahathir 
Muhammad as their head of the newly formed party coalition and were able to win votes to 
oust Najib Razak who had an authoritarian track record (Kurlantzick, 2019). It may appear that 
the new government would have been able to bring the country back on track on the road 
towards democracy, however, this has not been the case, as it appears the new government 
have shown the same authoritarian governance as the previous BN government (Kurlantzick, 
2019). 
 
6.6 Democratic Decline Through Nativist and Religious Discourse 
The decline of democracy can be observed not only through the actions of populist leaders 
themselves, but also by the extent to which citizens can be misled by false information, be 
emotionally manipulated by candidates to support a certain cause and be inclined to cast their 
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votes based on a candidate who perceived identity rather than the values or policies they 
represent. 
 
Religion has become a unifying tool, especially with Muslim voters. Religious piousness does 
not translate into voter support, however, to strengthen their position and support during 
electoral contestation, elites have used religious rhetoric as a key strategy (Hamayotsu, 2017). 
This is a unique form of populism because it does not explicitly attack the elites per se but 
attempts to create a need for bureaucratic reform. 
 
In both cases, there was a tendency for elites to use religion as an electoral strategy to 
delegitimize their opponents and thus invigorating ‘democratic noise’ through the people. This 
provides a valid explanation that populist politicians and political actors are able to easily 
develop into authoritarian leaders (Rummens, 2017, 554). 
 
With the Malaysian case study, the country’s colonial and political history has always been one 
to utilise racial and religious discourse to gain voter support and power. The PH government 
fell into the current of divisive racial and religious discourse that eventually became the major 
cause of their downfall. A classic example was the leftist party, DAP, that turned capitalist in 
nature to cater to the prominent Chinese businesses and their interests to maintain political 
survival (Dass, 2020).  It is inevitable that Malay Muslim politicians will continue to use race 
and religious identity for political leverage and ensure precedence is given to Malay-Muslims, 
whilst sidelining minority rights in the process. When ethnoreligious identity is embedded 
institutionally, regardless of the political agenda, previous, current and future governments, 




This thesis has accentuated that there is a high degree of religious populism prevalent in the 
Indonesian case, however, the threat to democracy is now equal for both case studies. The 
Malaysian case has ethnoreligious populist discourse in full swing, with both the current 
government and the opposition. The Indonesian case study affirms there is a markedly 
increasing linear fashion of political modernisation that is moving towards maturity through 
increasing tendency for voters. However, it should be asserted that Islamic populism has 
provided populists to a platform to manipulate a large portion of Indonesian voters, specifically 
the younger generation. If populism continues in Indonesia and people are being mobilised 
through ethnic and religious sentiments, this will breed authoritarianism and present as a moral 
threat to the principles of pluralism (Muhtadi and Muslim, 2020) 
 
One of the main determinants of populism in the Indonesia case is the increasing trend of 
political and religio-cultural intolerance that coincides with the rise of populism. Due to the 
reinforcing of dynamic cohort of voters with the deteriorating of social economic inequality, 
this decline is not solely due to the influence of mere political elites (Muslim and Muhtadi, 
2020) but also on global economic grievances. Even though populism did not feed off on 
economic decline, but rather its was facilitated by the strengthening of pre-existing sectarian 
ideologies and ethnic, religious identities that has continued to influence on voter’s disillusions 
with democratic politics (Warbuton, 2020). 
 
The involvement of religion in populist movement has become an effective vehicle for mass 
mobilisation but it decelerates the development of democratic values and principles, as well as 
consume social issues (Galston, 2018). When campaigns utilise religious sentiments to 
mobilise the masses, this will inevitably lead to an unbalanced electoral competition. With the 
use of ethnic and religious sentiments, this is certainly not quite typical to Indonesia (as 
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compared to Malaysia). It contains racist sentiments that goes against the principles of 
democracy and equality. In addition, the mobilisation of the people’s power had exceeded its 
limits when the Ahok case was brought into full swing in a kind of ‘street court’ (Hara, 2018, 
110). 
 
6.7 Political Elites and the Collapse of Separation of Powers 
This research found that both populists and political elites were successful in their respective 
elections, having seen a displacement in power away from parliament and government 
(Malaysia) as well as retaining of power (Indonesia), which has now resulted in a hybrid of 
networks in which elites, private and public stakeholders are now involved in providing 
solutions to societal problems via electoral contestation. 
 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, the presence of elites within mainstream politics, through the strong 
influence of Muslim elites and radicalised Islamist groups, have become a ‘pre-requisite’ for 
successful Muslim mobilisation against what these groups deem as ‘others’ ie. Non-Muslims 
and liberal Muslims. For example, had it not been for MUI’s co-operation with FPI and other 
Muslim organisations, the Anti-Ahok rallies would not have resulted in the massive turnout of 
Muslims eager to express their agenda’s and opinions on a larger political stage (Hamayotsu, 
2017). Similarly, Malaysia’s religious elites and political parties have adopted a more explicit 
antagonist position against religious minorities such as Christians, all in the name of defending 
Islam. This was palpable during the 812 movement, that mimicked Indonesia’s 212 movement 





Whilst Mietzner (2019) argues that one of the reasons for the erosion of Indonesia’s democratic 
institutions involved “an exceptionally broad mix of actors”, Aspinall, Fossati, Muhtadi and 
Warbuton, all assert that Indonesia’s democratic decline was not specifically orchestrated by 
the elites, rather voters being disillusioned by the capitalist democratic system of the 
government and socio-economic inequality.  There was also an increase in the trend of political 
and religio-cultural intolerance amongst voters (Aspinall, Fossati, Muhtadi and Warbuton, 
2019, 520). 
 
Mietzner argues that the administration was combining (albeit in an illiberal way), the 
ingredients to fuel right wing populism such as exercising state authority, accommodating 
political actors and feeding on voter’s worries and insecurities (Mietzner, 2018, 276). In short, 
even though there was a successful facilitation of a peaceful election with no violent 
repercussions, it arrived at the expense of the current administration stripping of political 
liberties, programmatic politics and rule of law. 
 
As a result of this, Jokowi faces a challenge to his democracy. He must face two sets of groups 
namely, the Jakarta elites who supported him in his re-election campaigns and the growing 
conservative Islamists on a mission to undermine him during the next campaign. These groups 
and the way in which Jokowi will combat these groups through potential authoritarian measures 
will pose a threat to Indonesia’s democracy (Arifianto, 2019, 53). 
 
For example, Mietzner and Muhtadi have shown that the aftermath of the anti-Ahok movement 
deterred any non-Muslim from running for office and asserted the notion that Muslims were 
economically worse off as compared to Christian/ Non-Muslim Indonesians (Mietzner and 
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Muhtadi, 2018). In addition, the rise of Islamists after the anti-Ahok movement continued to 
surge in creating distrust in their politicians and community leaders.  
 
The PH coalition’s populist leaders have embodied the potential threat to the practice of 
democracy. Currently, the PH coalition has now been dismantled, with a ‘backdoor 
government’ being formed and Tun Mahathir creating a new Pribumi party that is ethnically 
Malay (Wong, 2020, Weiss, 2020), deeming the power of Malaysian elites as impervious to 
democratic changes and voter rights. Similarly, due to their strong influence, oligarchs in 
Indonesia are infallible mainly due to struggles for civil and political rights and a leftist within 
democratic conditions. Populism has created a war of identity politics orchestrated by 
oligarchs. Therefore, populism may provide different outcomes for different democracies, 
where the commonality is that oligarchic power is able to perpetuate an authoritarian push and 
deter democratic progression in the process (Gusti, 2019). 
 
The ‘comfortable victory’ of Jokowi showed how his populist electoral strategies worked. 
‘anti-democratic impetus of populism lies with its coupling with a stronger primary ideology- 
ie Islamism and ethnoreligious pluralism. - this is paradoxical as it combines populism and 
illiberalism amongst Indonesian pluralists.’ (Fossati and Mietzner, 2019, 793). Jokowi’s 
victory during the Presidential election should not be regarded as a sign of positive democratic 
maturity. It reflects the increasing salience of intense competition between religious pluralists 
and proponents of Islamization. 
Whilst Jokowi may not be a perfect political leader, he does present himself to have intentions 
to lead Indonesia down a liberal and pluralist path. Having said this, he has taken a page out of 
Rodrigue Duterte’s books, by calling on the police to shoot criminals if they caused trouble 
(Chan, 2017). There is no evidence to show that Jokowi is illiberal, but this type of rhetoric 
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poses as a significant underlying threat and considered dangerous to the state of Indonesia’s 
democracy.  Jokowi’s strategy to exclude and repress any Islamist rivals and to deny them of 
their rights of expression, will deepen the divide of the country’s pluralist divide. This will 
inevitably lead to a polarising campaign and the backlash from Islamist campaigns (Warbuton, 
2020). In addition, Indonesia journalists have been facing increasing pressure and threats of 
litigation with elite power brokers trying to block in getting the news out59. This also includes 
the threats of institutions that have so far served democracy so well in Indonesia eg. Anti-
Corruption Agencies. 
In Malaysia, Mahathir’s populist push to gain electoral support through unlikely alliances with 
former nemesis’ and political groups succeeded in gaining electoral victory and thus instating 
a populist government in power that succeeded in its own mobilisation of the people through 
ethnoreligious as well as nationalist rhetoric. The threat to democracy in the Malaysian case 
study was the formation of the backdoor PN government that was a result of intra-feuding 
between the coalitions and denied every Malaysian’s right to contest this newly formed 
government (Wong, 2020).  
 
The Malaysian case shows the superficial depoliticization and introduction of neutrality into a 
new government coalition and implies there is a shift towards populist pandering in marginal 
seats held by MP’s to implement Malay centric policies to appease the Malay majority (Abdul 
Halim, 2019).  This constitutes as a threat to democracy towards minority rights for non-Malay 
Muslim citizens, as the strategy used by PH served its purpose, as it continues to implement 
the precedence of prioritising the rights for Malay-Muslims. Even with a newly formed PN 
 
59 In 2017, Human Rights Watch documented several incidences where 18 journalists and 6 Humans Rights 
activities in differing parts of Indonesia had their equipment vandalised and were thrown physical and verbal 
attacks which were never reported by authorities (Humans Right Watch, 2017, April 26). 
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government, this does have the potential to be a strong game changer within the populist 
politics arena, especially with their strong appeal to Malay voters (Parameswaran, 2020). 
 
Mass media in Indonesia is not restrictive and is free from government control as compared to 
Malaysia, where there is intense government supervision and restrictions on the extent of 
‘freedom of speech’ (Hunt, 2020). Nevertheless, Indonesia has now seen its fair share of extra-
judicial threats by religious and entrenched economic elites, normally through agents of 
violence and intimidation. As corruption is rampant in these types of democracies, these acts 
of violence and intimidation are able to proceed because the judiciary system has failed to 
provide any sense of protection to liberal elements within Indonesian democracy. 
  
There is certainly a widespread sentiment of the pluralistic philosophical concept of Pancasila, 
in that there is no longer a sense of tolerance amongst Islamic sects and non-Islamic faiths. 
This growing intolerance instigated by a coalition of groups including FPI and fatwas from the 
MUI, have originated from such populist strategies and fuelled by the anti-Christian prejudice, 
most notably the Shia and Ahmadiyyas Islamic sect’s (Irawan, 2017, 170). During times of 
electoral contestation, the Chinese-Indonesian community have always been the scapegoats in 
the midst of social tensions from the wealth they are reputed to possess (Arifin, 2016, 312) 
 
Since the aftermath of recent elections in the ASEAN region, there have been numerous 
discussions of “democratic populism” in ASEAN countries, but have limited relevance to 
Malaysia, given its competitive electoral-authoritarian regime (Case, 2018,313) Malaysia has 
what it might take for a nativist and ethnoreligious populist movement to emerge, per 
experience elsewhere: ethnic divisions and status-claims, economic inequality and lures, and a 
remarkably corrupt recently ousted government, key players from which have continued in 
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office (in UMNO, or having jumped ship to Pakatan or other PN parties), combine to offer 
fertile ground . Granted, these attributes are not new in Malaysia, but inequality and corruption, 
at least, have noticeably increased in recent years, likely lending volatility. So even if it seems 
a stretch to say either the BN/PN or Pakatan is populist now, one or both will be angling in that 
direction (Weiss, 2020).  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
Populism played a prominent role in both elections in Indonesia and Malaysia. An important 
feature to note was that two similar Muslim majority democracies had different electoral 
outcomes, albeit with similar electoral strategies by elites utilising populism as a political 
strategy. The literature has revealed the emergence of populism and how both countries’ 
democratic has been able to forcefully threaten democratic principles, mainly due to the 
political institutions’ fragmented nature (particularly in the Malaysian case study) and that 
populism was used by several groups ie. political parties and political leaders to advance a 
specific political agenda using ethnoreligious and nationalist identity. 
 
This thesis affirms that the scale of threat towards democracy in Malaysia and Indonesia has 
not been slightly exaggerated. Whilst populism is still a potential threat towards both 
democracies, it is important to attribute the populist’s core characteristics as well as its 
historical, social and political context’s. The populist tactics used have been used to emulate 
the opposition as an electoral strategy which worked to some extent, but not enough to 
dramatically alter the state of democracy. It is important to note populists who claimed victory 
after the elections would not have been successful on their own, electorally or ideologically 
and if they continue to use populism as an electoral strategy, this can irreversibly threaten the 
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principles of pluralism and function of a growing/ liberal democratic system (Muhtadi and 
Muslim, 2020). 
 
In both case studies, populists who emphasised on intolerant religious populism lost during the 
electoral contestation, and in order to measure the success of populism during political 
contestation, it is important to observe with regards to the impact on democracy, which in both 
case studies have been strongly mediated by the role of mainstream political forces (and 
conservative forces). 
 
Identity politics will remain embedded within South East Asian democratic politics, as ethnic 
and religious definitions of society have been used by political leaders to gain traction during 
electoral contestation. The rise of populism in Asia has become a significant point of interest 
because many of these growing (and weak) democracies may not be able to withstand the 
power of populist’s influence and thus lead down a path of democratic decline (Fukuyama, 
Gryzmala-Busse, Malhotra, 2018). Populists who mobilise an exclusionary form of identity 
politics will erode pluralist views and favours a mass clientele (Aslanidis, 2017, 98). In both 
cases, there was a drive of democracy towards a form of fascism that is defined as a hybrid of 
left-wing socialism and right-wing nationalism involving religion. Even with a sharp decline 
in religious practice, there is a core that is shaped by faith/ traditions that pervades politics. 
 
Malaysia and Indonesia are now pivoting to the far right no matter which side of the political 
spectrum wins- and that is a dangerous threat to democratic progression. This deep polarisation 
has now become so embedded within both country’s political institutions, that beyond 




This comparative analysis has been conducted to shed light on political determinants of 
religious populist discourse and that alliances with elites have been successful in influencing 
electoral outcome through mobilisation strategies through identity and religion. Populism is 
among the approaches that can poignantly explain the development of politics and democracy 
in Malaysia and Indonesia. Populism amplifies the underlying problems that are derived from 
oligarch’s and elitist processes during electoral contestation. This has been the case in Malaysia 
and Indonesia and will possess a strong probability in experiencing a similar outcome, 








Abbott, J. (2009). Malaysia's Transitional Moment: Democratic Transition Theory and 
the Problem of Malaysian Exceptionalism. South East Asia Research. 17(2): 175-200. 
 
Abdul Hamid, F. (2010). Politically Engaged Muslims in Malaysia in the Era of 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009). Asian Journal of Political Science. 18(20):152-176. 
 
Abdul Hamid, F. (2018). The Islamist Factor in Malaysia’s Fourteenth General 
Election. The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. 107 (6) 683-701. 
 
Abdul Halim, F. (2019, January 4). Populist Undercurrents in Pakatan Government. 
The Malaysian Insight. https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/123299. 
 
     Abdul Hamid, F. (2020, April 25). The Return of Old Style Malay Centric Politics?. 
East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/04/25/the-return-of-old-style-malay-
centric-politics. 
 
     Abdul Khalid, M, & Yang, L. (2019, September 11). Income inequality among 




    Abromeit, J. (2017). A Critical Review of Recent Literature on Populism. Politics and 
Governance. 5(4):177-186. 
 
Adiputri, R. (2019). Indonesia After Election 2019- Politics As Usual. Politiikasta. 
https://politiikasta.fi/en/indonesia-after-election-2019-politics-as-usual-2. 
 
Adiwilaga, R., Mustofa, M., & Rahman, T. (2019). Quo Vadis Islamic Populism? An 




Ahmad Farouk, A. (2011). The Limits of Civil Society In Democratising The State: 
The Malaysian Case. University Sains Malaysia. 29(1):91-109. 
 
Ahmad, Z. (2007). Multiculturalism And Religio-Ethnic Plurality 
The Malaysian Experience. Culture and Religion.8(2): 139-153. 
 
Ahnaf, M. (2017, July 28). Where does Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Go From Here?. New 
Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-go. 
 
Akmar, Z. (2019, January 8). Only Hell Awaits If Non-Muslims Lead, Hadi Says In 




Al Ramahi, R. & Abdul Rashid,R. (2019). Theorising Critical Populist Discourse 
Analysis: A New Plausible Paradigm. Journal of Nusantara Studies. 4(1): 422-444. 
 
Amal, K. (2020). Explaining Islamic Populism in South East Asia: An Indonesian 
Intellectual’s Perspective. Journal of Critical Review. 7(5):583-588. 
 
Aminuddin, N. (2020). Ethnic Differences And Predictors Of Racial And Religious 
Discriminations Among Malaysian Malays And Chinese. Cogent Psychology. 7(1):1-18. 
 
Anugrah, I. (2020). The Illiberal Turn in Indonesian Democracy. The Asia Pacific 
Journal. 18(8). 
 
Arakaki, R. (2009). 2008 Malaysian Election: The End of Malaysia’s Ethnic 
Nationalism?. Asian Politics and Policy. 1(1): 79-96. 
 
Ardiansah, A. (2020). Islam as The State Official Religion: A Comparative Study on 





Ariff, S. (2016, September 30).  Rise of Populism in US and Malaysian Politics. News 
Straits Times Malaysia Online. https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/09/177061/rise-
populism-us-and-malaysian-politics. 
 
Arifin, E. (2016). Chinese Indonesians: How Many, Who And Where?. Asian 
Ethnicity. 18(3):310-329. 
 
Arifianto, A. (2019). What The 2019 Election Says About Indonesian Democracy. Asia 
Policy. 14(4):46-53. 
 
Arifianto, A. (2021, January 26). Will Indonesia’s new religious affairs minister protect 
religious minorities?. East Asia Forum.  
 
Aslanidis, P. (2015). Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and A New Perspective. 
Political Studies. 64(1): 88-104. 
 
Aslanidis, P. (2017). Avoiding Bias in the Study of Populism. Chinese Political 
Review. 2: 266-287. 
 
Aspinall, E. (2013). Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia's Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation. Indonesia. (96): 101-121. 
 
Aspinall, E. (2015). Oligarchic Populism Prabowo Subianto's Challenge to Indonesian 
Democracy. Indonesia. No. (99):1-28. 
 
Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2019). Southeast Asia's Troubling Elections: 
Nondemocratic Pluralism in Indonesia. Journal of Democracy.30(4):104-118. 
 
Aspinall, E., & Warbuton, E. (2019). Explaining Indonesia's Democratic Regression: 
Structure, Agency and Popular Opinion. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of 
International and Strategic Affairs. 41(2): 255-285. 
 
Aspinall, E., Fossati, D., & Muhtadi, B. & Warbuton, E. (2019). Elites, masses, and 




Azhari, A., & Abdul Halim, F. (2019). Changing Nature of Populism in Malaysia. In 
Lee, S. Chin, W. & Kanti, K. (Eds). Populism in Asian Democracies. pp.147-162. 
 




Barr, R. (2018). Populism As A Political Strategy. In. De La Torre, C. (Ed). 
Routledge Handbook of Global Populism. pp.44-55. London. Routledge International. 
BBC NEWS ASIA. (2020, March 4). Mahathir Mohamad: The Man Who Dominated 
Malaysian Politics. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44028023. 
 
Bland, B. (2019). Politics In Indonesia: Resilient Elections, Defective Democracy. 
Lowy Institute. 
 
Bonikowski, B., Halikopoulou, D., Kauffman, E., & Rooduijn, M. (2019). Populism 
and Nationalism in a Comparative Perspective: A Scholarly Exchange. Journal of the 
Association For The Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism. 25(1): 58-81. 
 
Bourchier, D. (2019). Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From 
Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism. Journal of Contemporary Asia. 
49(5): 713-733. 
 
Buku Harapan. (2018). Pakatan Harapan Manifesto. Malaysia Kini. 
https://pages.malaysiakini.com/100days/Manifesto-PH-MY.pdf. pp.129-156. 
  
Burke, F. (2019, February 5). What Actually is Populism? And Why Does It Have A 





Case, W. (2018). Populist Threats and Democracy's Fate in Southeast Asia: Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia. Routledge Contemporary Asia Series. 
 
Chacko, P., & Jayasuriya, K. (2017, January 16). Trump and the Rise of Authoritarian 




Chalmers, I. (2019, April 29). A Temple to Populist Nationalism. Inside Indonesia. 
Viewed on 9th September 2020 at https://www.insideindonesia.org/a-temple-to-populist-
nationalism. 
 




Chan, T. (2018). Democratic Breakthrough in Malaysia – Political Opportunities and 
the Role of Bersih, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 37(3):109–137. 
 
Chew. A. (2019, September 25). Malaysia’s Dangerous Racial And Religious 
Trajectory. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/malaysia-s-
dangerous-racial-and-religious-trajectory. 
 




Chin, J. (1997). Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia. International Affairs. 73(2): 399.  
De Cleen, B., Glynos, J., & Mondon, A. (2018). Critical Research on Populism: Nine Rules 
of Engagement. SAGE. 25(5):649-661. 
. Chin, H. & Kee, B. (2018). Introduction: How Did Malaysia End UMNO’s 61 Years 
of One Party Rule? What’s Next?. The Round Table The Commonwealth Journal of 




CIVICUS interview with Malaysia electoral reform coalition, Bersih 2.0 
News. (2018, May 5). https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/3155-
civicus-interview-with-malaysia-electoral-reform-coalition-bersih-2-0. 
. 
Coyne, D. (2019, February 12). Populism and Religion: A Conclusion. LSE Religion 
and Global Society Blog. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2019/02/populism-
and-religion-a-conclusion. 
 
Cox, M. (2018). Understanding The Global Rise of Populism. London School Of 
Economics Strategic Update. http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-
IDEAS-Understanding-Global-Rise-of-Populism. 
 
Dass, R. (2020, n.d.). Ethno-Religious Politics In Malaysia: Will Malaysia Ever 




DeHanas, D., & Shterin, M. (2018). Religion and the Rise of Populism. Religion, State 
and Society. 46(3): 177-185. 
 
De La Torre, C. (2007). The Resurgence of Radical Populism. Constellations. 
14(3):384-397. 
 
Disch, L. (2019). Reclaiming Populism. Contemporary Political Theory. 100-107. 
Featherstone, G. & Karaliotas, L. (2019). Populism. Soundings.72 (1): 31-47. 
 
Dobell, G. (2020, April 14). Malaysia’s Great Political Experiment. Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/malaysias-great-political-
experiment. 
 
Emont, J. (2017, May 30). Hard-Line Moralist in Indonesia Faces Pornography 





Enyedi, Z., & Whitefield, S. (2019). Populists in Power: Populism and Representation 
in Illiberal Democracies. The Oxford Handbook of Political Representation in Liberal 
Democracies. Rohrschneider, R., Thomassen, J. (Eds). Oxford University Press. 
 
Evans, G. & Tilley, J. (2017). The New Politics of Class After the 2017 General 
Election. The Political Quarterly. 88(4): 710-720. 
 
Facal, G. (2019). Islamic Defenders Front Militia (Front Pembela Islam) And Its 
Impact on Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia. Cambridge University Press.   
 
Fachrudin, A. (2019, March 20). Law as a Weapon: ‘The Criminalisation of Ulama’. 




Farouk, A. (2011). The Limits of Civil Society In Democratising The State: The  
Malaysian Case. Kajian Malaysia. 29(1): 91-109. 
 
Fauzi, I. (2018, May 16). Nationalism and Islamic Populism in Indonesia. Heinrich 
Bol Stiftung South East Asia. https://th.boell.org/en/2018/05/16/nationalism-and-islamic-
populism-indonesia. 
 
Fealy, G. (2020, September 29). Jokowi’s Repressive Pluralism. East Asia Forum. 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/09/27/jokowis-repressive-pluralism. 
 




Fieschi, C. and Heywood, P. (2004). Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-Politics. 




Free Malaysia Today. (2019, October 22). Amanah’s Loyalty to DAP Impressive, 
Says Perlis Mufti. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2019/10/22/amanahs-
loyalty-to-dap-impressive-says-perlis-mufti. 
 
Fukuyama, F., Grzymala-Busse. A., &, Malhotra, N. (2018). The Great Recession Has 




Galston, W. (2018). The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy. Brookings. 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-populist-challenge-to-liberal-democracy. 
 
Gagnon, J.P., Beausoleil, E., Kyong, M.S., Arguelles, L., Chalaye, P., Johnston, C. (2018). 
What is Populism? Who is the Populist?. Democratic Theory. 5(2):vi-xxvi. 
 
Gidron, N. and Boninowski, B. (2013). Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and 
Research Agenda. Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs. 13(4): 1-39. 
 
Graef, J. (2019). Populists as Strangers: How The Politics of Extraordinary’ Challenges 
Representative Democracy in Europe. Dahrendorf Forum. https://www.dahrendorf-
forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Politics-of-the-Extraordinary.pdf. 
 
Guasti, P. and Bustikova, L. (2018). The State as a Firm: Understanding the 
Autocratic Roots of Technocratic Populism. East European Politics & Societies. 33(2). 
 
Guller, M. (2019, April 20). The Current Political Landscape In Malaysia. Daily Sabah. 
https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/04/20/the-current-political-landscape-in-malaysia. 
 
Gusti, O. (2019, October 4). Why Populism Serves Oligarch’s. The Jakarta Post. 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/04/10/why-populism-serves-oligarchs.html. 
 
Hara, E. (2018). Populism in Indonesia and its Threats to Democracy. Advances in 




Hadiz, V. (2018). Imagine all the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right Wing 
Politics Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia. 48: (4). 566-58. 
  
Hadiz, V. & Chryssogelos, A. (2017). Populism in World Politics: A Comparative 
Cross Regional Perspective. International Political Science Review. 38(4): 399-411. 
Hadiz, V. & Khoo, T. (2011). Approaching Islam and politics from political economy: a 
comparative study of Indonesia and Malaysia. The Pacific Review. 24(4):463-485. 
 
Halikopoulou, D. (2019, November 19). Resisting The Seductions Of Populism. 
Social Europe. https://www.socialeurope.eu/resisting-the-seductions-of-populism. 
 
Hamayotsu, K. (2017, n.d.). Moderate-Radical Coalition in the Name of Islam: 
Conservative Islamism in Indonesia and Malaysia. Kyoto Review. 
https://kyotoreview.org/issue-23/conservative-islamism-indonesia-malaysia. 
 
Hannan, C., Robinson, Q., Wellander, M., & Wolf, M. (2018). Global Implications Of 
Populism on Democracy. University of Washington.  
 
Hatherell, M. & Welsh, A. (2020). Populism and the Risks of Conceptual Overreach: 
A Case Study from Indonesia. Journal of Representative Democracy. 56(1): 53-69. 
 
Hattingh, S. (2019). What Is Authoritarian Populism and Why Should It Be 
Combatted? Pambazuka News. https://www.pambazuka.org/democracy-
governance/what-authoritarian-populism-and-why-should-it-be-combatted. 
 
Hellman, O. (2017). Populism in East Asia. University of 
Waikato.http://Downloads/PopulisminEastAsia_OUPHandbook.pdf. 
 
Henschke, R. (2019). Indonesian 2019 Elections: How many Chinese workers are 
there? BBC News Asia. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47881858. 
 
Hicks, J. (2012) The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation of Islam in 




Human Rights Watch. (2017, April 26). 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/27/indonesia-journalists-under-assault. 
 
Hunt, L. (2020, May 25). Press Freedom Slides in Malaysia and Indonesia. Union of 
Catholic Asian News. http://ucwanews/news/press-freedom-slides-in-malaysia-and-
indonesia/88131#. 
 
Hutchinson, F. (2018). Malaysia’s 14th General Elections: Drivers and Agents of 
Change. Asian Affairs. 49(4): 582-605. 
 
Ibrahim, A. (2018, December 13). How Malaysia’s Democratic Disruption Stands 




Ibrahim, Z. (2004). Growth and Governance in Asia. Honolulu: Asia Pacific Centre for 
Security Studies. Ed. Yoichiro Sato, Chapter 9.  
 
Tjandraningsih, I. (2018). Populism, Identity Politics and the Erosion of Democracies 
in the 21st Century. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/indonesien/15936.pdf. 
 
 Irawan, A. (2017). They Are Not Muslims: A Critical Discourse Analysis Of The 
Ahmadiyya Sect Issue In Indonesia. Discourse and Society · 28(2) 162–181. 
 




Jager, A. & Jenkins, D. (2019, June 11). The Populist Right is Forging an Unholy 





Jansen, R. (2011). Populist Mobilisation: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism. 
Sociological Theory. 29(2): 75-96. 
 




Judis, J. (2016). The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed 
American and European Politics. Columbia Global Reports. New York. 
 
Juoro, U. (2019, November 29). The Rise of Populist Islam in Indonesia. Turkish 
Policy Quarterly. http://turkishpolicy.com/article/987/the-rise-of-populist-islam-in-indonesia. 
 
Kaltwasser, C., & Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford 
Publishing. London, UK. 
Kenny, P. (2019). Populism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  
Katz, R. and Mair, P. (2009). The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement. Perspectives 
on Politics. 7(4): 753-766. 
 
Katzenstein, K. & Okawara, N. (2002). Japan, Asian Pacific Security and Case for 
Analytical Eclecticism. International Security. 26 (3): 153-185. 
 
Khoo, Y.H. (2013, May 6). What About Bersih?. New Mandela. 
https://www.newmandala.org/what-about-bersih. 
 
Khoo, Y.H. (2014). Social Movements and Democratization in Malaysia [PhD Thesis, 
University Putra Malaysia]. University Putra Malaysia Repository. 
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/60395. 
 
Khoo, Y.H. (2018). Civil society and democratisation in Malaysia: between resistance 






Khoo, Y.H. (2019, February 1). Making Democracy Work In Malaysia. The Diplomat. 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/making-democracy-work-in-malaysia. 
 
Kimura, E. (2017). Populist Politics in Indonesia. East West Center. 
https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/populist-politics-in-indonesia. 
 
Kurlanrzick, J. (2018). South East Asia’s Populism Is Different But Also Dangerous. 
Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/southeast-asias-populism-
different-also-dangerous. 
 
Kyle, J. and Mounk, Y. (2018, December 26). Populist Harm to Democracy: An 




Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso. London.  
 




Lane, M. (2019, June 14). The 2019 Indonesian Elections: An Overview. ISEAS Yusof 
Ishak Institute. Issue:2019. No. 49. 
 
Lashmar, P., and Oliver, J. (1998). How We Destroyed Sukarno. Independent. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/how-we-destroyed-sukarno-1188448.html. 
  
Menon, P., and Latiff, R.  (2016, November 19). Malaysian Protesters March Against 









Liddiard, P. (2019). Is Populism Really A Problem For Democracy?. History and 




Lim, M. (2016). Sweeping the Unclean: Social Media and the Bersih Electoral 
Reform Movement in Malaysia. Global Media Journal. 14:27. 
 
Liu, H. (2019). From The Malay Dilemma to Malaysia’s Dilemmas: The Political 
Economy of Mahathir’s China Policy since May 2018. Conference Paper. Research 
Division Asia. 
 
Magcamit, M. (2015). A Costly Affirmation: Exploring Malaysia's One-Sided 
Domestic Security Dilemma. Asian Affairs: An American Review. 42(1): 22-45. 
  
Malhi, A. (2018, May 29). Flipping the Chinese Threat: How the Malaysian Opposition 




Malik, A. & Edwards, S. (2018, December 18). From 212 to 812: Copy and Paste 
Populism in Indonesia and Malaysia?. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/from-
212-to-812-copy-and-paste-populism-in-indonesia-and-malaysia. 
 
Malik, A. & Edwards, S. (2019, April 9). How Powerful is Ethno-Religious Populism 









Markar, I. (2018, September 11). Is Populism a threat to Democracy?. UNDP Sri 
Lanka. https://www.lk.undp.org/content/srilanka/en/home/blog/2018/11092018.html 
 
Marouzki, N., McDonnell, D., & Roy, O. (2016). Saving The People: How Populists 
Hijack Religion. Oxford University Press. 
Massola, J. (2018, October 20). Prabowo wants to ‘Make Indonesia Great Again’. The 
Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/prabowo-wants-to-make-
indonesia-great-again-20181020-p50awr.html. 
 
Matijasevich, D. (2018).  Populist Hangover: Lessons from South East Asia. Asian 
Journal of Comparative Politics. 1-16. 
 
Mcbeth, J. (2019). Indonesia’s Election: A High-Stakes Endgame as Prabowo Appeals 





McCarthy, J. (2019). Authoritarianism, Populism, and the Environment: Comparative 
Experiences, Insights, and Perspectives. Annals of the American Association of 
Geographers. 109(2): 301-313. 
 
Menchik, J. (2019). Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia. 




Metz, S. (2018, November 2). The Rise of Identity Populism Is Making the World 




Mietzner, M. (2018). Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamic Populism and 
Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia. Pacific Affairs. 91(2): 261-282. 
 
Mietzner, M. & Muhtadi, B. (2018). Explaining the 2016 Islamic Mobilisation in 
Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation. 
Asian Studies Review. 42(3): 479-497. 
 
Mietzner, M. (2019). Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, 
Identity Politics And Executive Illiberalism. Democratization. 27(6):1021-1036. 
 
Mietzner, M. & Fossati, D. (2019). Analyzing Indonesia’s Populist Electorate: 
Democratic, Ideological, and Attitudinal Trends. Asian Survey. 59 (5): 769-794. 
 
Mietzner, M. (2020). Populist Anti-Scientism, Religious Polarisation and 
Institutionalised Corruption: How Indonesia’s Democratic Decline Shaped Its COVID 19 
Response. Journal of South East Asian Affairs. 1-23. 
 
Mikucka-Wojtowicz, D. (2019). The Chameleon Nature of Populist Parties. How 
Recurring Populism is Luring ‘the People’ of Serbia and Croatia. Europe-Asia Studies. 
71(3): 450-479. 
 
Ming, O. (2019, February 7). Winning the Malay and Bumiputera Votes, One Step at 
a Time. Malaysiakini. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/463053. 
 
Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and 
Representation. Stanford University Press.  
Molloy, D. (2018, March 6). What is Populism and What does the term actually mean? 












Mughan, A., Bean, C., and McAllister, I. (2003). Economic Globalization, Job 
Insecurity And The Populist Reaction. Electoral Studies. 22(4):617-633. 
 
Muhtadi, B. and Muslim, K. (2020, August 4). Populism, Islamism and Democratic 
Decline in Indonesia. Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/populism-
islamism-and-democratic-decline-indonesia. 
 
Müller, J-W. (2016). What is Populism?.  London: Penguin Books. 
 
Munro-Kua, A. (1996). Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia. Macmillan Pres Ltd. 
London  
 




Nadzri, M. M. N. (2018). The 14th General Election, the fall of Barisan Nasional, 
and Political Development in Malaysia, 1957-2018. Journal of Current Southeast 
Asian Affairs. 37(3):139–171. 
 
Nair, S. (2007). The Limits of Protest And Prospects For Political Reform in Malaysia. 
Critical Asian Studies. 39(3): 339-368. 
 





N.A. (2020, June 30). Mahathir’s ‘Rich Chinese’ Assertion. 
https://www.sinchew.com.my/content/content_2299071.html. 
 
Neo, J. (2006). Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the Constitutional 
Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of Malaysia. International Journal of 
Minority Groups and Rights. 13: 95-118. 
 




News Straits Times. (2018, September 6). Maszlee broke his prom-ise, say Umno 
lead-ers.  
 
Newman, K. (2020, April 20). Is Illiberalism The Force Of The Future? Inside Story. 
https://insidestory.org.au/is-illiberalism-the-force-of-the-future. 
 
Ng, E.  (2018, December 9). Ng, E.  (2020, July 27). Corruption Verdict For Malaysia's 




Ng, E.  (2020, July 27). Corruption Verdict For Malaysia's Najib Razak A Test Of Rule 
Of Law. The Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/corruption-verdict-
for-malaysia-s-najib-razak-a-test-of-rule-of-law-20200727-p55fxx.html. 
 
Nordholt, H. (2005). Decentralisation in Indonesia: Less State, More Democracy?. 
Politicising Democracy. Chapter 2:29-50. 
Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and 
Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press. London. 
 
Norris, P., Frank, R., & Martinez, F. (2014). Measuring Electoral Integrity Around the 




Nugroho, S. (2018). Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election and The Future of 
Indonesian Politics. Asian Politics. 23(1): 45-49. 
 
Otswald, K., Schuler, P., and Chong, J. (2018). Triple Duel: The Impact Of Coalition 
Fragmentation And Three Corner Fights On The 2018 Malaysian Election. Journal of Current 
South East Asian Affairs. 37(3): 31-55. 
 
Otto, B. and Sentana, I. (2019, May 21). Widodo Re-Elected Indonesia’s President in 




Otto, B., and Sentana, I. (2019, May 24). Loser in Indonesian Presidential Election 
Challenges Result in Court. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/loser-in-
indonesian-presidential-election-challenges-result-in-court-11558721385. 
 
Pabst, A. (2018, August 2). "Vox populi vox dei"? Examining The Religious Roots Of 
Populism. ABC Religion and Ethics. https://www.abc.net.au/religion/vox-populi-vox-dei-
examining-the-religious-roots-of-populism/10214296. 
 
Palaver, W. (2019). Populism and Religion: On The Politics Of Fear. Dialog. 58: 22-
29. 
 
Palmer, T. (2019, July 14). The Terrifying Rise of Authoritarian Populism. Reason. 
https://reason.com/2019/07/14/the-terrifying-rise-of-authoritarian-populism. 
 
Pappas, T. (2016). Are Populists Leaders Charismatic:?. John Wiley & Sons. 23(3): 
378-390. 
 
Parameswaran, P. (2020, April 14). Malaysian Politics Under the New Perikatan 





Prasetyawan, W. (2019, n.d.). Populism or Identity Politics: Explaining Electoral 
Politics in Indonesia. Kyoto review of South East Asia. https://kyotoreview.org/yav/populism-
identity-electoral-politics-indonesia. 
 
Pratamasari, A. & Az-Zahra F. (2019). Populism as a Threat To Democracy: Drawing 
Parallels of Populist Elements Between The Presidential Campaigns Of Donald Trump And 
Prabowo Subianto. SNU Journal Of International Affairs. 3(2): 99-127. 
 
Pearce, J. (2018). A Politics of The People: Comparing the Use of Populist Discourse 
in the 2016 US Presidential Election. LSE Undergraduate Political Review. Volume 1: 
22-57. 
 
Pepinsky, T. (2019). Islam and Indonesia’s 2019 Presidential Election. Asia Policy. 
14(4):54-62. 
 
Pepinsky, T. (2019). Migrants, Minorities, and Populism in Southeast Asia. Pacific 
Affairs. 93(3):593-610. 
  
Petersen, H. (2020, October 25). 1MDB Scandal Explained: A Tale Of Malaysia's 
Missing Billions. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/25/1mdb-
scandal-explained-a-tale-of-malaysias-missing-billions. 
 
Pierson, D. (2019, June 1). Here’s Why Indonesia Remains On Edge Six Weeks After 
Elections Were Held. Sun Sentinel. https://www.sun-sentinel.com/la-fg-indonesia-election-
turmoil-20190601-story.html. 
 
Plagemann, J. and Ufen, A. (2017, n,d,). Varieties of Populism in Asia. German 
Institute of Global and Area Studies. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/spielarten-
des-populismus-in-asien. 
 





Poblete, M. (2015). How To Assess Populist Discourse Through Three Current 
Approaches. Journal of Political Ideologies. 20(2): 201-218. 
 
Power, T. (2018). Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline. 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 54(3): 307-338. 
 
Ratnapala, S. (2019). Defending Liberal Democracy and Liberal Peace in the Time of 
Rising Populism and Fascism. The Centre for Independent Studies- Culture, Prosperity and 
Civil Society. Analysis Paper 3. cis.org.au/app/uploads/2019/07/ap3.pdf. 
 
Reicher, S. and Hopkins, N. (2001). Self and Nation: Categorization, Contestation 
and Mobilization. London: Sage.  
 
Regan, H., Hollingsworth, J., Quiano, K., & Faidell, S. (2019, April 18). Indonesia 




Reno. R. (2019). Religious Populism First Things. A Monthly Journal Of Religion And 
Public Life. 289: 65-68. 
 




Reuters. (2015, September 22). Alliance of Hope: Malaysia’s Opposition Forms United 










 Roth, K.  (2017). The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on Human 
Rights Values. Journal of International Affairs.79-84. 
 




Rooduin, M. (2019). State of The Fields: How To Study Populism And Adjacent 
Topics? A Plea For Both More And Less Focus. European Journal of Political 
Research. 58:362-372. 
 
Rummens, S. (2017). Populism as a Threat to Democracy. Rovira, C. (Ed). The 
Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press.  
 
Sambhi, N. (2020, March 20). Back from the Barracks: Why Indonesia’s Military 




Saravanmuttu, J. (2019). Elite Contestation, Politics of Reform And New Voting 
Dynamics of Peninsular States. Gomez, E., Osman, M. (Eds). Malaysia’s 14th General 
Election and UMNO’s Fall- Intra Elite Feuding In Pursuit of Power. Routledge. 
 
Satrio, A. (2019). A Battle Between Two Populists: The 2019 Presidential 
Election and the Resurgence of Indonesia’s Authoritarian Constitutional Tradition. 
Australian Journal of Asian Law. 19(2):2. 
 
Sebastien, L. & Nubowo, A, (2019). The Conservative Turn in Indonesian Islam: 
Implications for the 2019 Presidential Elections. Asie Visions. No. 106. 
 
Selvanathan, H. (2018, November 8). How The Bersih Movement Is Laying 






Selvanathan, H., Khoo, Y., & Lickel, B. (2019). The Role Of Movement Leaders in 
Building Intergroup Solidarity For Social Change: A Case Of The Electoral Reform Movement 
in Malaysia. European Journal of Social Psychology. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2598 
 
Setijadi, C. (2017, June 8). Ahok’s Downfall And The Rise Of Islamist Populism In 
Indonesia. Yusof Ishak Institute. 
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_38.pdf. 
 
Shah, S. (2019). Populist Politics In The New Malaysia. New Diversities. 21: (2).55-
67. 
 
Shannon, T. (2015, March 24). Malaysia’s Opposition DAP Cuts Ties with PAS Leader 
Over Huddud Issue. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-
opposition-dap-cuts-ties-with-pas-leader-over-hudud-issue. 
 




Sheany, S. (2018, April 17). Understanding the 212 Movement. Jakarta Globe. 
https://jakartaglobe.id/news/understanding-212-movemen. 
 
Smith, D. (2018, July 6). Trump's promise to 'drain the swamp' proves false even with 









Stavrakakis, Y. (2002). Religious Populism and Political Culture: The Greek Case. 
South European Society and Politics. 7(3): 29-52. 
 
Surendran, S. (2019, May 9). Was PH Right to Abolish GST?. The Edge Malaysia. 
https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/was-ph-right-abolish-gst. 
 
Syechbubakr, A. (2017, May 4). Anti-Ahok Protests: Why Were Nadhlatul Ulama 




Taggart, P. (2006). Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe. 
Journal of Political Ideologies. 9(3): 269-288. 
 
Tan, C., & Tay, C. (2018, May 8). Overseas Voters Race Against Time to Get Votes 
Home. The Edge Markets. https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/overseas-voters-race-
against-time-get-votes-home. 
 
Tan, T & Preece, C. (2018, March 26). Malaysia’s Dire Democratic Crisis. The 
Conversation.  https://theconversation.com/malaysias-dire-democratic-crisis-93737. 
 
Tee, K. (2019, December 30). As 2020 Looms, Is Right Wing Politics On The Rise In 
Malaysia Baharu? Malay Mail. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/12/30/as-
2020-looms-is-right-wing-politics-on-the-rise-in-malaysia-baharu/1823166. 
 
The Coverage. (2020, February 24). Mahathir The Grand Master Strategist : The First 









The World Bank. (2017, December 14). Malaysia’s Economic Growth Accelerates to 
5.8 Percent in 2017. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/12/14/malaysia-
economic-growth. 
 




The Straits Times. (2015, August 27). What You Need to Know About Malaysia’s 
Bersih Movement. The Straits Time. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/what-you-
need-to-know-about-malaysias-bersih-movement. 
 
The Straits Times. (2018, March 11). Cash Handouts Spike As Malaysian Election 
Nears. The Straits Times. 
https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/18/171/35/1520757887802.html. 
 
Törnquist, O. (2019). Many Votes, Little Voice: Indonesia’s 2019 Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections. Pacific Affairs. 92(3):459-474. 
 
Ufen, A. (2009). The Transformation Of Political Party Opposition In Malaysia And 
Its Implications For The Electoral Authoritarian Regime. Democratization.16(3): 604-627. 
 
Urbinati, N. (2018). Political Theory of Populism. Annual Review of Political Science. 
22: 111-127. 
 
Vatikiotis, M. (2019, May 22). Populism and Identity Politics Damage South East 
Asian Democracy. Nikkei Asian Review. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Populism-and-
identity-politics-damage-Southeast-Asian-democracycase. 
 
Verbeek, B., & Zaslove, A. (2019). Contested Issues Surrounding Populism in Public 




Waikar. P. (2019). Malaysia's 14th General Election and UMNO’s Fall. Gomez, E., 
Osman, M. (Eds). Malaysia’s 14th General Election and UMNO’s Fall- Intra Elite Feuding In 
Pursuit of Power. Routledge. 
 
Weiss, M. (2020, July 2). Identities, Institutions and Intellectual Aspirations: The 




Welsh, B. (2018). Saviour Politics and Malaysia’s Breakthrough: Rethinking 
Explanatory Narratives and Implications. Journal of Current South East Asian Affairs. 
37(3):85-108. 
 
Weyland, K. (2017). Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach. Kaltwasser, R., 
Taggart, P., Espejo, P., Ostiguy, P. (Eds). Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Whiting, A., & Balasubramaniam, R. (2018, May 17). Malaysia’s Remarkable 
Election Outcome. Legal Affairs. https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/malaysia-s-
remarkable-election-outcome. 
 
Wilson, I. (2015). The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post- New Order Indonesia: 
Coercive Capital, Authority  and Street Politics. London: Routledge. 
 
Wilson, I. (2016, November 3). Making Enemies Out Of Friends . New Mandala. 
https://www.newmandala.org/making-enemies-friends. 
 
Winter, A. and Mondon, A. (2020). Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the 
Populist Far Right Became Mainstream.Verso, London. 
 
Wisnu, D. (2018). Populism, Identity Politics and the Erosion of Democracies in the 





Weng, H.W. (2018, December 18). Himpunan 812 And A New Rivalry In Malay 
Politics. New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/himpunan-812-and-a-new-rivalry-in-
malay-politics. 
 
Weng, H.W. (2018,April 30). Voting For Islamisms Beyond The Ballot Box. New 
Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/voting-islamisms-beyond-ballot-box. 
 
Werner, A. & Giebler, H. (2019). Do Populists Represent? Theoretical Considerations 
on How Populist Parties (Might) Enact their Representative Function. Journal of 
Representative Democracy. 55(4): 379-392. 
 
Wong, B. (2020, February 2020). Democracy in Crisis: Where Does Malaysia Go From 
Here?. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/democracy-in-crisis-where-does-
malaysia-go-from-here. 
 
Wong. C.H. & Ooi, K. (2018). Introduction: How Did Malaysia End UMNO’s 61 Years 
of One-Party Rule? What’s Next?. The Round Table. 107(6): 661-667. 
 
Wong, W. (2018, February  8). Why is Malaysia’s Chinese Population Leaving in 
Droves?. The McGill International Review.https://www.mironline.ca/malaysias-chinese-
population-leaving-droves.   
 
Xinhua. (2012, February 3). 80% of 40 richest Malaysia are ethnic Chinese. China 
Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-02/03/content_15781890.htm. 
 
Yeoh, T. (2020, March 6). The Political Economy That Perikatan Nasional Inherits – 
And Will Have To Tackle. New Mandela. https://www.newmandala.org/the-political-
economy-that-perikatan-nasional-inherits-and-will-have-to-tackle. 
 
Yeoh, T. (2020, April 6). Malaysia's Federalism Reverts to a Vanishing Past. Asia Link 





Yunus, A. & Arumugam, T. (2020, March 1). Muhyiddin Government May See Return 




Zawawi Ahmad. (2007). Multiculturalism And Religio-Ethnic Plurality- The 
Malaysian Experience. Culture and Religion. 8(2): 142. 
  
Zaharia, M. (2018, May 10). Mahathir's Shock Malaysian Election Win Raises Populist 




Zuquete, J.P. & Weyland, K. (2017). Populism and Religion. Kaltwasser, R., Taggart, P., 
Espejo, P., Ostiguy, P. (Eds). Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press.zu 
 
